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1.0 SUMMARY/OVERVIEW 
1.1 Sunrnary 
This is the final report for NASA contractNAS4-2877. This contract 
was to establish the feasibility, system requirements, and candidate 
architectures for an Advanced Flight Control System, and study potential 
test-beds that seem appropriate for a flight test and demonstration 
proqram. The contractor, Bendix Flight System Division, was assisted by 
Grumman Aerospace Corporation. 
The results of the study established the feasibility of an advanced 
flight control system that can meet the system reauirements; specifically, 
functional reliability and periodic maintenance requirements. Candidate 
architectures are discussed and a preference is justified for a distributed 
(carallel) microprocessor - implemented configuration. The selected 
confiquration meets the reliability and safety criteria established by 
NASA and has the potential for improving software validation. Several 
methods for meeting the periodic maintenance requirements have been traded 
off; the results indicate that the number of required on-board spares is 
reasonable, especially in view of the trends in microprocessor reliability. 
Also, we have computed the efficiency of a parallel processing arrangement 
and it appears to offer siqnificant advantages. A multiplexed (1553 B) bus 
arranqement is proposed to transmit data between servos, processors, and 
actuators, controlled hv an ultrareliable bus controller that makes use of 
the NASA-developed SIFT technology. This results in an expandable, 
flexible system configuration. 
Concerning the choice of a test-bed aircraft, it appears that the 
Grumman Gulfstream II, as modified for NASAls use as the Shuttle Training 
Aircraft rSTA) offers significant advantages to NASA in terms of 
avail abil ity, suitabi 1 ity as a commerci al demonstrator, and cost. Therefore, 
a retailed study of special airplane modification has been conducted only 
for the Gulfstream II. 
In anticipation of the full-scale development of the Advanced Flight 
Control System, Bendix/Grumman are proposing, as established in section 2, 
several proof-of-concept and validation tasks. The accomplishment of these 
tasks, ahead of full-scale development rather that as part of it, will 
reduce program risks and establish confidence that NASAls objectives will be 
achieved. The tasks that we propose can be accomplished at minimum cost by 
utilizing NASA-owned hardware (the SIFT system and its associated test 
stand), facilities (e.g. Airlab), and software programs (CARE III 
reliability model). They comprise a validation of a SIFT-type bus 
controller, a reliability/safety analysis of the entire system, and a more 
detailed analysis of parallel processing for this application. 
9 
Grumman support ~urinq this period will address detail application of 
analytic redundancy and skewed sensors. In the actuation area the 
reau~rements for t~st proqrams to include electro-mechanical actuation in 
the test-bprl aircraft will be determined. An overview evaluation of the 
overall system reliability will be addressed with the application of CARE 
III considered. A plan to provide a step by step build-UD of a laboratory 
system to demonstrate the salient points of the FCS will be developed. 
8enrix and Grum~an intend to continue ·their association in the event 
that follow-on contracts, of the type described in the next section, are 
awarded. In the event of an award of a full-scale development and 
demonstration program, Grumman would be the prime contractor and Bendix a 
sub-contractor. 
1.2 Overview of Recommended System 
The Advanced Flight Control System (ADFCS) that we are proposinq 
includes the followina technologies: 
• Fault-tolerant multi-processing 
• Software-implemented fault tolerant computinq 
• Parallel processinq 
• Analytic redundancy 
• Multi-plexed data bussinq 
• nirect-drive electrohydraulic control valves 
• Skewed and inteqrated sensor subsystems 
• Fiber-optic communication media 
• Multi-function displays 
The ADFCS is a distributed microprocessor-implemented system that is 
comprised of the followinq major elements: 
10 
• An ultra-reliable bus controller, usina SIFT techniques, that is 
a system monitor while also controlling bus traffic and 
reconfiauration. 
-'-
.---
• A set of 15538 busses that carry data to and from the sensinQ, 
processing, and actuatinq elements of the system, EXPANDABLE, 
EVENTUALLY, to FIBER OPTIC LINKS. 
• A set of application processors that execute control laws and 
other real-time computations~ logic statements, and self-test 
proqrams. Each application processor will be comprised of 
microprocessors that perform parallel computations. 
• An inteqrated sensor system, using a SDOF gyro configuration of 
hard-mounted rate gyros and accelerometers (minimum of six each) 
that also includes sensed data processing to the bus format. 
• A set of auad-redundant actuators that process actuator command 
data received from the busses. 
• An array of multi-function displays that receive their data, over 
the hus structure, from the application processors. The displays 
will include mode and failure annunciation status displays, and 
required pilot-AOFCS interactive devices. 
T~e system is configured to include the redundancy needed to meet 
NASA's system reliability and periodic maintenance requirements. The 
precise redundancy levels which differ for the various system elements are 
explained in the sections below. T~e interconnection of the system 
elements is shown in Figure 30. 
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2.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thpre appears to he no technical reason to delay a full scale 
development and demonstration (to commercial operators) program of the 
Advanced Flight Control System. The technology to make it feasible is at 
hand, the need surely exists in view of the near certainty that active 
controls will be included in the next generation of transoort aircraft, and 
previous studies have shown that there is a highly beneficial DOC 
trade-off. 
If, in view of budgetary or other constraints, it is not possible to 
launch the full-scale program, the best alternate would be to concentrate 
efforts on those aspects of the proposed system which (1) take the longest 
to verify and validate and (2) are th~ most risky for the overall program. 
Accor~ingly, we "resent in this section several tasks whose early 
accomplishment \'lOuld greatly benefit the system and reduce program risks. 
These tasks are as follows: (Tasks 1 thru 5 are proposed by Bendix; tasks 
6 thru 11 by Grumman). 
Task 1: 
We prepose to utilize the SIFT hardware and its associated system test 
stand as a a bus controller/system monitor. Ideally, this arrangement 
would be validated for instance by connecting the SIFT complex via 1553B 
links to an array of application processors, and performing appropriate 
exoeriments on the entire system. The basis for such experiments would be 
the simulation of an advanced transport control system, possibly including 
an active control function such as is caused by relaxed static stability, 
as well as an autoland mode. The experiments would then include bus 
transfers, fault injections (single as well as multiple), reconfigurations, 
self-test, and environmental disturbances. The application processors could 
oreferably be implemented in bread-board type hardware; as this may not be 
oractical due to funding restrictions, we would propose implementing the 
aoolication software on a high speed host computer in the Airlab (e.g. VAX 
11/780) so that the experiments can be performed in real time. We would 
propose simulating in real time, application processors, and sensor and 
actuator interface processors, on high speed host computers resident in the 
Airlab facility. Figure 1 identifies the components of the simulation. 
The same SIFT hardware, modified by the addition of Remote Terminals, 
could be used to implement application processors. In this approach, the 
Airlab host computers will simulate bus controllers and other subsystems. 
The accomplishment of this task would increase confidence that the 
basic configuration can achieve the NASA requirements. This task is a 
basic Dart of the reliahility and safety analyses which would, in any 
event, be needed for the full-scale development program. 
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Task 2: 
Preliminary evaluation of parallel processing efficiency and overhead 
(see Section 6) indicates that parallel processing offers substantial 
benefits in performance and economy. It is proposed to conduct a more 
detailerl evaluation of parallel processing applied to flight controls. In 
addition to analytical trade-offs the study would include a demonstration 
that a representative flight control system can be partitioned into 
subtasks suitahle for execution in a parallel processor. This 
demonstration would include implementation in a prototype parallel 
processor in a closed-loop simulation facility. Two approaches can be 
taken reqarding the prototype hardware: 
1. Use SIFT 
The SIFT hardware configuration is ideally suited to parallel 
processing. This is not surprising since parallel processing 
is an important part of the SIFT concept. 
2. Develop a prototype using microprocessors. 
The basic desiqn would be as described in Section 6. 
Task 3: 
For this task we propose to emulate, at the gate-level, a dual 1553B 
bus controller and remote terminals and perform fault injection experiments 
to identify single and multiple failure comhinations that result in loss of 
the entire bus. The emulation would include the bus interface circuitry 
described in Section 4.5 
Task 4: 
The ability to monitor the bus controller is a critical issue of the 
advanced architecture. It is, in fact, an important issue in any 
application of multiplexed data busses (e.g. 1553B). Therefore, for this 
task we propose to: 
• develop algorithms for on-line monitoring of the bus controller; 
• validate monitorinq coverage, and determine the time to detect 
a fault and the effects of each fault before detection 
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This latter task would be accomplished by emulating the bus controller 
multiprocessor and a dual remote terminal at the gate-level and performing 
fault injection experiments. The effort can be reduced significantly if the 
multiprocessor consisted of Bendix BDX-930 processors. This emulation 
already exists and has been demonstrated to be ideally suited for emulating 
multiprocessors, such as SIFT (see Ref. 12). 
Task 5: 
For this task, we propose to devise a reliability model of the entire 
system, and to utilize NASAls CARE III reliability program as the tool for 
the analysis. This analysis would yield, for example, required parametric 
data on the effects of reconfiguration time and the effects of LRU failure 
rates on system functional reliability. The CARE III model can be used to 
optimize the configuration via a functional reliability/hardware complexity 
trade-off. The survivability of the system in the event of $imultaneous or 
near simultaneous failures will also be investigated. 
Task 6: Analytic Redundancy 
a. Desi9n and evaluate candidate techniques using state estimators 
with failure signal monitor techniques, then extend state 
estimator design techniques to include formulation of likelihood 
functions. 
b. Address quantization of redundancy benefits in terms of relia-
bility, accuracy, computation requirements, relative cost, i.e., 
H/W comparison monitoring vs. S/W analytic redundancy, etc., 
reconfiguration potential, nuisance disconnects, etc. 
c. Address analytical reconfiguration techniques so that sensor and 
control actuators not within the local domain are used to extend 
the redundancy concepts. 
d. Establish trades of analytic redundancy effects on system 
architecture. 
Task 7: Skewed Sensors 
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a. Design and evaluate parity schemes for large numbers of sensors. 
The primary question is whether it is better to handle all the 
sensors as one system or to separate them into sub-groups. This 
decision requires the quantization of criteria and to address the 
issue of hierarchy of orthogonalization and failure monitoring. 
b. Address system architecture with respect to sensor processing, 
data distribution, reconfiguration reauirements, etc. 
c. Investiqate installed performance, addressing the effects of 
environment, physical configuration, data bus coupling, etc. 
Task 8: Actuation Systems 
a. Perform detailed evaluation of Direct Drive, Electro-Mechanical 
and Integrated Actuator Package actuation systems to determine the 
most appropriate candidate for the test-bed aircraft. In the case 
of EMA, determine the requirements for test programs in order to 
include EMA technology in the test-bed aircraft. 
b. Address architectural considerations for the candidate technology 
confiqurations. This is to include controller type and location, 
self test/monitoring techniques, analog vs. digital controller 
trades and redundancy management techniques and requirements. 
Task 9: Reliability 
a. Address the problem of evaluation of overall system reliability. 
Investiqate the application of CARE III to this problem and 
compare it with existing techniques. 
b. Develop techniques to evaluate hardware vs. software 
confiqurations. 
c. Support analytic redundancy, skewed sensor and actuation system 
studies. 
d. Address analytic treatment of imperfect redundancy management with 
consideration qiven to beinq able to restore non-failed sensors 
which were considered to have failed between missions (they were 
considered hard failed in the base study). Relate imperfect 
failure redundancy parameters to the base sensor failure rate. 
Expand treatment to cover Markov analysis scenarios. 
e. Perform a cost trade for allowing unscheduled maintenance vs. the 
baseline requirement for none. 
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Task 10: System Oemonstration 
a. Develop a plan for a step by step build-up of a laboratory system 
demonstration system containing the salient portions of the 
Advanced FCS. Initially, the laboratory system will address the 
avionics issues of sensor/data bus and data bus/actuator inter-
faces and general data bus controllers. Expansion would include 
sensor and actuation technology. Use of NASA AIRLAB and other 
NASA facilities as well as contractor facilities will be 
considered. 
b. Develop a program for expansion of the baseline laboratory system 
demonstration system to a prototype evaluation system for the 
test-bed aircrAft, leading to final configuration for the test-
bed aircraft. 
Task 11: Test-Bed Aircraft 
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a. Evaluate the impact of significant changes to be baseline system 
on the test-bed aircraft. 
b. Update the test-bed aircraft estimate as required. 
1553B 
SIFT 
HARDWARE 1553B 
BUS CONTROLLER 
TERMINALS RT RT RT RT 
BUS SSIU SSIU 
INTERFACE 
HARDWARE 
REMOTE HOST HOST TERMINALS COMPUTER COMPUTER 
Figure 1 System Simulation 
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3.0 INTRODUCTION 
3.1 Objectives of the Study 
The principal objectives of this study as stated in NASAls SOW were 
to IIdetermine, through trade studies, the feasibility and practicality of 
utilizing currently emerging technology to design a systems architecture 
that would yield an ultrareliable hybrid fly-by-wire flight control system 
for experiments in the near future. The system would have significantly 
improved performance and reliability over contemporary digital flight 
control systems. 1I The system would have the following characteristics: 
Active Controls 
Fault Tolerance 
Dispatch 
Periodic Maintenance 
Expansion Ability 
- Ability to execute flight crucial active 
controls with ultra-high reliability. 
- Ability to tolerate several faults prior to 
or during flight operation while continuing 
undegraded operation. 
- Ability to allow dispatch of an aircraft 
with failed control system elements. 
- Requirement for periodic maintenance only, 
with a high degree of integrity between 
maintenance periods. 
- Ability to expand the number of functions 
or subsystems with minimum reconfiguration 
of the existing system. 
Technology Independence - Ability to accommodate hardware element 
retrofits without architectual redesign. 
These objectives were to be realized by producing a detailed 
conceptual design of an advanced hybrid fly-by-wire system for a projected 
advanced future aircraft. This aircraft could incorporate active controls; 
in any event, the electrical flight control system would be flight critical 
for the entire flight since a mechanical back-up control system would not 
be included in the design. The system must be validatable on current 
aircraft and demonstratable to the airline and aviation communities. 
The approach of the Bendix/Grumman team towards meeting these 
objectives was first, to recognize that an extensive technology base exists 
to support these objectives, and to define that technology base, and 
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second, to concentrate on using that technolo~y base in formulating the 
basic building blocks of the Advanced Flight Control System. These 
huilding blocks include, most importantly, the microprocessor complex and 
the bus network. Other basic building blocks are the sensor arrays and the 
secondary surface actuator configuration. A system configuration that 
meets the above system requirements and that can be configured from 
building blocks that have already been validated, is the least risky 
approach. If such a system trades off well against other, riskier 
approaches, then it becomes the clearly preferred approach. However, the 
situation is rarely that clear-cut, and, in the actual, practical 
situation, some risks normally should be taken because the potential 
rewards are attractive. In the present case, we are recommending that the 
bus controller be a SIFT-type network and the microprocessor computing 
complex be a parallel processing complex. The SIFT concept has been 
mechanized and its basic applicability to the tasks envisaged here 
should he well accepted, while the basic concept of a parallel processing 
network has been well explored and validated. However, neither has been 
used in quite the way proposed here, nor have MIL-STO-1553-B data links 
been employed for the relatively high band-width requirements of flight 
control sensor, computer, and actuator data. So, some risks remain but 
they are judged to be acceptable. 
On the other hand, the potential rewards of this approach are judged 
quite significant. They include: 
• More easily validatable software 
• Expandability and flexibility . 
• Transparency to processor architectures 
• Technology independence 
• Minimum confiquration (cost, weiqht, power, etc.) to satisify the 
the scheduled maintenance requirements 
• Minimum total software costs 
A detailed description of the recommended system architecture will be 
found in section 5, as well as alternate systems that were considered and 
why they were not selected. It is emphasized that the recommended 
architecture builds on the successful experience with SIFT concepts, 1553B 
controllers, and multiple microprocessor systems. 
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3.2 Causes of System Failure 
A detailed analysis of redundancy requirements for meeting the several 
system objectives has revealed that the periodic (6 month) maintenance 
requirement will be the driving factor that establishes how much redundancy 
(e.g. how many spares) need to be carried. Obviously, since this is not a 
direct safety-related issue, the six month term could be relaxed, in which 
case the conventional causes of systems failure may dictate the required 
redundancy. These causes are: 
• Exhaustion of redundant spares due to multiple failure within mission 
time 
• Almost simultaneous faults, i.e. a second failure during the time 
it takes to reconfigure from a first failure 
• Latent faults not detected by a pre-flight ground test 
Other causes of system failure need to be eliminated by design 
methodology and testing. These are, principally, design errors in either 
hardware or software. Such errors are sometimes called qeneric errors. 
There is no general method for eliminating such errors except for rigorous 
attention to detailed desiqn methodolo~y, careful review of all 
specifications (the major source of such errors), and structured software 
generation and validation. Alternatives such as dissimilar redundant 
systems or analog back-up systems ar~ considered unattractive because they 
are uneconomical and raise more design problems than they solve. 
Since the orientation of this program is primarily commercial, damage 
due to external objects (e.g. bullets) is not considered a factor in 
confi~uration design. Rather, aircraft installations should be arranged in 
such a manner that any localized damage (e.g. due to an engine blade 
separation or a localized structural failure) does not compromise the 
controllability of the aircraft. 
Finally, the ability to correctly detect and isolate faults is a major 
contributor to economical system operation and to system reliability. 
Clearly, if the correct identification of faulty LRU's is not achieved, 
either or both of the following deleterious consequence may occur: Faults 
may stay in the system until their accumulated number overpowers correctly 
operatin9 LRU's, or, more likely, resources will be exhausted prematurely 
as correctly operating equiment is discarded. 
The system configurations that are presented in section 5 have the 
potential of meeting all the NASA requirements. All of the above causes 
of failure have been evaluated for these configurations and appropriate 
safety margins have been included in the design. 
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4.0 ASSESSMENT OF ADVANCED FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES 
Fault Tolerant Multi-Processors 
In accordance with Paragraph 6.1.1 of the SOW, we present here a 
survey and assessment of the state of the art of advanced flight control 
technolo~y elements to determine their potential utility in an 
ultra-reliable fly-by-wire control system. 
4.1 Fault Tolerant Multiprocessors 
4.1.1 Requirements 
For the purpose of this study, key requirements are the ability to 
tolerate several faults during flight operations while maintainin~ 
undegraded performance, the periodic maintenance requirements and the 
ability to dispatch in the presence of faults. These can only be satisfied 
by a system organization that can survive several similar, and many more 
dissimilar failures. Central to such a system is a fault-tolerant 
computing complex that not only must detect and survive its own internal 
failures, but may also be "in charge" of failure detection and 
reconfiguration for the entire flight control system, consisting of 
sensors, busses, computers, and actuators • 
. --- Further, the software for this system must be able to be validated so 
that confidence can be established in its integrity, and the possibility of 
generic (desi~n) errors minimized. This requirements is thought to be a 
constraint (as well as an evaluation criterion) for the design. 
4.1.2 Current State-of-the-Art of Protype/Production System 
The survivability requirements for most current fly-by-wire (military) 
or flight-control commercial (autoland) systems are of the order of 10(-7) 
per hour of flight. These requirements can usually be satisfied by 
conventional triplex or quadruplex systems, the choice depending on whether 
a 100% "two fail-operate" requirement is imposed. If the "two-fail 
operate" requirement is not 100%, the system configuration can be triplex 
with self-test (e.g. AFTI-F-16); otherwise, a quad configuration is needed. 
It is to be noted that all current full-time digital fli~ht control systems 
employ an independent back-up; this can be either a mechanical system (F-18) or an analog electrical system (AFTI-F-16). Flight-critical digital 
fliqht control systems for commercial applications are just now coming into 
use; so far, only non-flight critical functions have been certified 
(DC-9-80). However, the only flight-critical functions to be certified 
over the next several years are the autoland functions where the exposure 
time is minimal. Of course, mechanical control systems are present in all 
current and anticipated commercial transports. 
Thus, it is clear that current useage for military and commercial 
digital flight control systems includes a mechanical or analog back-up 
system with at least level 3 (MIL-F-8785) handling characteristics. This 
back-up system is not needed to meet the "probability of functional loss" 
requirement; rather, it is included because (1) the designer, or purchaser, 
does not believe that the integrity of the software can be adequately 
demonstrated or (2) an emotional feeling that"it should be there, just in 
case". These two arguments are of course very similar, and, being 
unquantifiable are difficult to refute. The argument is sometimes clothed 
in terms of the need to protect against "generic software errors" (which 
are, in reality, design errors), but, again, this is an unquantifiable 
requirement. After all, design errors, unlike hardware failures, are not 
discovered at a constant rate. While it is possible to design a system 
that can survive software coding errors, this does not necessarily insure 
against other, possibly more prevalent design faults, such as incorrect 
software specifications, compiler errors etc. One method that attempts to 
do both makes use of "dissimilar redundancy" which is interpreted to mean 
that two (or more) different processors, with different software programs, 
are used in the system, thus virtually eliminating the probability that one 
common software design flaw could disable the entire system. 
Aside from the additional burden that dissimilar software programs 
place on the entire development process, a basic objection to this approach 
is that the gains, if any, can't be quantified. In other words, since it 
is impossible to predict the probability of occurrence of a "generic 
software error" (or, a second or third such occurrence), detection of one 
such event does not yield any statistically significant information of the 
probability of functional survival. Nor can there be much confidence that 
design errors will really be detected by this method since many such errors 
arise from incorrect or incomplete specifications, rather than coding 
errors. 
In Bendi x' view, it is important t,o break with today's practi ce of 
mechanical back-up system, first, because the inclusion of such a back-up 
system in the design would tend to relax design discipline and possibly 
change design methodology; second, because it would undermine the need for 
the ultra-reliability and other advanced features that are the major justification for this program and last, but not least, because, if the 
design is credible in terms of its reliability, no back-up system is 
required; if not, then the proper course of action is to improve the design 
of the primary system to meet the requirements. 
Similarly, as discussed above, we think the concept of "dissimilar 
processors" to circumvent the existence of design errors is a technically 
unsound approach which creates more difficulties than it removes. 
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4.1.3 Advanced Techniques for Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessors 
A number of advanced fault-tolerant multiprocessor systems are 
currently under development for specific application to ultra-reliable 
flight control systems. These include: 
• SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) 
• FTMP (Fault Tolerant Multiprocessor) 
• Continuously Re-Confiquring Multi-Processor 
• Multi-Microprocessor F1iqht Control 
SIFT AND FTMP are being developed by SRI/Bendix and CSDL/Co11ins, 
respectively, for NASA/LRC. The other two are USAF developments, the 
Continuously Re-Confiquring Multi-Microprocessor being an in-house 
development at AFFDL and t~e Multi-Microprocessor Flight Control being 
developed by Honeywell under USAF/AFFDL sponsorship. 
It is fair to say that (1) all of the above developments are 
concentrating on the computers of the flight control system, with scant 
attention beinq paid to sensors and actuators and their orqanization and 
(2) that SIFT and FTMP are further along in their development cycle than 
the other two systems. Further, the Continuously Re-Configuring system 
represents the most radical departure from current practice and hence, 
needs the most development. Its potential cannot really be evaluated at 
this time. The other three approaches suffer from the following common 
unresolved problems (in addition to the limitation pointed out above). 
• Software validation methodology is not proven and not generally 
accepted. 
• Bus communication networks are not designed to the ultra-
reliability of the computing systems. 
• A complete implementation of these systems does not exist as 
yet and, therefore, has not been proven. 
This is not to say that some of these techniques cannot or should not 
be used in an Advanced Flight Control System; indeed, as described in 
Section 5, we propose to take elements from these approaches and combine 
them in our proposed architecture. 
A brief description of these techniques is included for the sake of 
completeness. 
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4.1.3.1 SIFT 
SIFT is a fault-tolerant computing system in which fault tolerance is 
achieved primarily by software mechanisms. 
Application tasks are executed redundantly on multiple independent 
processors which are connected by a system of independently connected 
broadcast busses. A SIFT-type computing module consists of a processor and 
a memory unit. Each module communicates with every other module via a 
dedicated, high speed broadcast bus. When a processor writes into a 
designated subset of memory, the data is transmitted by an autonomous I/O 
controller to all modules. In this way the results of all computations are 
accessible by all of the processors of the SIFT computer (Figure 2). 
As shown in the figure, the SIFT processors communicate with the outside 
world via dedicated 1553 busses with each processor performing the function 
of bus controller for its dedicated link. A detailed discussion of how 
these links could be connected to other aircraft subsystems will be given 
subsequently. For the present discussion, the configuration of Figure 3 
will suffice. 
It was envisioned that the "SIFT" compute~ would perform all flight 
control, avionics and engine controls. The computations are divided, in 
advance, into a number of task programs in such a way that no task requires 
more computing power than is available from a single processor. At any 
given time, each processor is multiprogrammed over a certain subset of 
tasks. Tasks may be replicated in other processors, the level of 
replication depending upon the criticality of the task. Figure 4 
illustrates a typical allocation of a set of tasks designated by A, B, C, 0 
... J, over a set of 6 processors. From the figure it can be seen that two 
processors may have different task allocations even though they may be 
executing certain tasks in common. 
The control of the computing system is carried out by a number of 
functions that can be segmented into two classes: 
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1. Local Executive: performs functions that apply to each 
processor such as dispatching, voting, error reporting, 
executing new task programs. 
2. Global Executive: performs functions that are global to the 
system such as allocating and rescheduling work load and 
reconfiguration. 
-, 
--
. -
A complete set of software functions of the Local Executive is present 
in each processor; those of the Global Executive are carried out in a 
sufficient number of processors to provide the degree of fault tolerance 
required. The functions are realized by programs that have the same task 
structure as all other programs • 
The normal operating mode for a processor carrying out a task is as 
follows: 
Data required for a task is assumed to have been computed by several 
processors and communicated to all processors via the internal broadcast 
busses. Thus, a processor commencing a task already has the redundant 
input data resident in its own memory. The redundant input data is voted 
and validated by each of the processors performing the task by 
comparison-monitoring. If it is arranged that the input data is identical 
under non-failed conditions, then any discrepancy in this data signifies a 
fault and is duly noted for later processing by the executive. 
If the voted input is unambiguous, then the processors proceed with 
the task computation. The results of the computation are stored in memory 
and simultaneously transmitted to all other processors. When a discrepancy 
is detected, diagnostic programs in the global executive determine which 
unit is at fault. Reconfiquration is achieved by having the several 
versions of the global executive indicate to each local executive which 
tasks should be performed and which other processors should replicate the 
calculations for each task. All the local executives examine each of the 
qlobal executive versions and independently vote on these directions. That 
is, each local executive decides which of the reconfiguration directions it 
will accept, using a majority rule. A faulty processor might not heed the 
directions of the global executive, but, based on the instructions of the 
global executive, operative processors will ignore the faulty processor. 
4. 1. 3 • 2 FTMP 
Another implementation of a fault tolerant system is the FTMP (Fault 
Tolerant Multi-Processor) system desiqned by C. S. Draper Laboratories. 
The system architecture is essentially that of Figure 3 except that 
the SIFT computer is replaced of the FTMP computer. 
The principal elements of this system are: 
o FTMP computer 
o Communication links between the FTMP computer and other aircraft 
subsystems 
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FTMP Computer 
The FTMP computer, unlike SIFT, is a fault-tolerant computer in which 
fault tolerance is achieved primarily by hardware mechanisms. Application 
tasks are executed redundantly on multiple processors which are connected 
by an internal bus network as shown in Figure 5. A typical FTMP LRU is 
shown in Figure 6. 
LRU 
The LRU consists of: 
• CPU processor and code memory 
• Shared memory 
• I/O module 
• Bus Guardian Unit 
• Bus Interface Unit 
• Clock 
• Power Supply 
Tasks are allocated to redundant CPU's which operate in triplicate in 
tight (i.e., in bit) synchronism. The triad members perform identical 
operations, on identical data, forming identical results. Three copies of 
all data are sent simultaneously on three independent serial busses (e.g., 
A, B, ..• E of Figure 7), one from each member of the triad. Errors 
are detected and masked at the receiving device by the Bus Guardian Unit, 
which uses a majority vote on each transmitted bit. 
To reduce bus 10adinQ each bus consists of four lines each of which is 
dedicated toa specific task: 1) Clock bus (G), 2) poll bus (P), 3) 
transmit bus (T), 4) Receive bus (R), as shown in Figure 7. 
When a fault is detected the faulty unit is identified and replaced by 
a spare unit. If no spares are available the triad is disassembled and its 
non-faulted units become spares for the rest of the system. When a fault 
is detected the BGU's inhibit the faulty processors' access to the busses, 
thus, effectively disengaging the processor from the system. 
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Data between other aircraft subsystems and FTMP is controlled by the 
I/O module which acts as 1553 bus controller and as I/O port for access 
with FTMP. These modules are not configured in triads in FTMP because 
aircraft sensors and actuators are not triply redundant on the external 
bus. Data redundancy is established after reception by the processor 
using "interactive consistency" techniques (D). (Ref. 1) 
The redundancy used in FTMP requires tight synchronization of the 
executed tasks and the transmission and reception of bus data in order to 
facilitate the hardware voting of the Bus Guardian Units. The timing 
reference is obtained by employing a redundant clock system. This system 
utilizes four independent phase-locked crystal oscillators connected in a 
majority logic inter-connection scheme (Ref. 2). 
The shared memory contains the resources necessary to reallocate tasks 
within the FTMP complex. These units contain stored programs and 
intermediate data from task computations, such as integrations. The shared 
memories also act in triads in the same way as the CPU's and cache 
memories. 
In many respects FTMP operates like SIFT, e.g., tasks are allocated to 
individual processors which operate in redundant sets. Tasks are 
reallocated when faults occur, depending upon available system resources. 
Both systems are distributed since tasks are executed by independent 
processors. The main differences are: 
1. Failure detection in FTMP is achieved through hardware 
mechanisms, whereas SIFT utilizes software. 
2. SIFT imposes but few constraints on its constituent processors 
and busses whereas FTMP requires very specialized hardware. 
4.1.3.3 Continuously Reconfiguring Multi-Microprocessor (CRM2FCS) 
The following summary description of this intriguing system is based 
on reports published by USAF/AFWAL (Ref. 3). 
The CRM2FCS design centers around a system of autonomous 
microprocessors connected by a common set of serial multiplex busses. These 
processors operate in a pooled configuration where any processor can 
perform any task at any time. Further, task assignments are continuously 
redistributed among all processors in a never-ending process of 
reconfiguration. If a processor fails, it is left out of the next 
reconfiguration cycle and the system continues to operate without any 
adverse effect. There is no central controller in this system. 
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A diagram of the architecture is shown in Figure 8. The SIM (State 
Information Matrix) is a mathematical abstraction used for organizing all 
the available information about the state and environment of an aircraft. 
With this structure all microprocessor functions can be broken down into 
three sets. The first set of functions takes raw sensor data, processes, 
filters, and stores it in designated locations within the SIM. Another set 
of functions takes information which is in the SIM, processes it, and 
refines it to produce hiqher quality data. This could be, for example, a 
Kalman Filter algorithm. This refined data is stored back in the SIM where 
it can be accessed by other processors in the system. A third set of 
processor functions take information from the SIM and processes it for use 
by the outsicie world. These are typically control laws or display 
alQorithms. With the SIM structure, all software programming for each 
microprocessor has been reduced to a single set of interactions with the 
state information matrix. 
The implementation of the virtual common memory in hardware (shown in 
Figure 8) utilizes a simple serial bus structure. Each unit interfaced 
to the serial bus is referred to as a processing module. A processing 
module consists of a microprocessor, local memory, transmitter, receiver, 
and a copy of the state information matrix. Each processing module 
independently determines which task it must do next. It accesses variables 
from the local SIM which are needed to do a computation. When the 
algorithm has been completed, the data and its location in the SIM are 
placed in the processing module's transmitter buffer. The transmitter 
circuit automatically searches for an available bus and transmits the 
information. Every processing module receiver, including the originating 
processing module, receives the data. Through a direct memory access, the 
data ;s then placed in the proper location in the SIM of every processing 
module. Each processing module maintains an identical copy of the SIM. As 
far as any processinq module is concerned, the SIM appears to be entirely 
within its own local memory. Using this concept, processors connected by a 
simple serial bus appear to share one common memory containing all 
information in the system. This greatly simplifies programming by reducing 
interprocessor communication to simple reads and writes on a virtual common 
memory. 
In the figure, six processing modules are shown connected to a set of 
four common data busses. Each data bus consists of one clock and one data 
line. Information is transferred between processors using a simple serial 
multiplexing scheme. Processors compete for access to the busses. In the 
event that two transmissions "collide" only one message survives while the 
other one is automatically re-transmitted as soon as the bus is free. Thus, 
one of the advantages of this scheme is that it uses busses efficiently. 
Another advantage is that latent failures are not likely to remain latent 
for very long. Also, failure transients due to reconfiguration are 
minimized (as they are in SIFT, FTMP, etc.). 
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An example of what is meant by continuous reconfi~uration is shown in 
Figure 9. A system of 9 processors is shown performing 6 different 
tasks, A thru F during three consecutive time frames. During the first 
time frame processor 1 is doing task B, processor 2 task D, processor 3 is 
a spare, and so on. In continuous reconfiguration the tasks are 
redistributed among the processors at the beginning of every time frame. 
For example, in the second time frame, there is an entirely different 
assignment of tasks to the processors. This reassignment is accomplished 
by having all of the processors that are currently healthy in the system 
compete for task assignments. If a processor fails during any time frame, 
it is no longer able to compete for task assignments. If processor 4 
failed during the second time frame, then during the next frame, it would 
not be able to compete for task assignment. The 6 tasks which need to be 
done are taken by healthy processors and the 2 remaining processors become 
spares. In other words, a failed processor simply disappears from the 
system without any other processors being aware that it is gone. 
There are a numher of advantages to the continuous reconfiguration 
approach. One of these is the ability to have continuous spare check-out. 
In traditional systems, where certain processors are permanently assigned 
to the spare status until they are needed, it is possible for one of these 
processors to fail while functioning as a spare. When a system processor 
fails and the failed spare is brought on line, catastophic results may 
occur. The technique of continuously switching which processors are acting 
as spares allows every processor in the system to be constantly exercised. 
Latent fault protection is another advantage of the continuous 
reconfiguration approach. Latent faults are a class of faults that are 
characterized by the partial failure of a processor. The processor failure 
is not immediately detectable and may impede the systems ability to recover 
from any subsequent failures. Continuously exercising each processor, so 
that over a period of time every processor performs every task, forces a 
partially failed processor to reveal its failure and be removed from the 
system before it can interact with another partially failed processor in a 
manner that may preclude recovery. 
A third benefit of continuous reconfiguration is zero reconfiguration 
delay. Most systems that are reconfigurable treat a failure as an 
emer~ency requiring special processing. This produces delays and possible 
failure transients in bringing the system back to its fully operational 
state. With continuous reconfiguration there is no emergency. The system 
reconfigures naturally every time frame so that, when a failure occurs, the 
system takes it in stride and with no failure transient. 
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It is claimed, by the CRM2FCS investigators, that the benefits of this 
approach include the ability to reduce software costs, the possibility of 
greatly reducin~ unscheduled maintenances (by adding many more processors 
than are necessary to prevent loss of function), ·and the ability to expand 
the system, including software additions without re-programming. No 
evidence exists at this time that these claimed benefits can, in fact, be 
realized. Also, there are a number of basic questions that need to be 
answered before a realistic assessment of this system can be made. Among 
them are: (1) How are failures detected and (2) What mechanism keeps track 
of failures? Bus loading and contention delays may also impose constraints 
on system performance. 
At this time, this approach is not a viable candidate for an Advanced 
Fliqht Control System implementation phase. However, further develooment 
of this concept over the next year or two could cause us to revise our 
opinion. 
4.1.3.4 Other Multi-Processor Confiqurations 
Using microprocp.ssors as basic building blocks, it is possible to 
devise parallel processing arrangements that divide the computational load 
in a logical, pre-arranged manner. An example of such a parallel 
processing arrangement is discussed later on (Section 6). Another, similar 
parallel confi~urat;on is being developed for USAF/AFWAL by Honeywell under 
the name of Multi-Microprocessor Fliqht Control. These arrangements are 
not, by themselves, ultra-reliable, fault-tolerant multi-processors (in the 
sense that SIFT and FTMP are); rather their basic objective is to achieve 
higher thruput without surrendering the simplicity, low cost, and potential 
software simplifications obtainable through the use of microprocessors. It 
is of course possible to construct a SIFT-type multi-microprocessor system 
that is in all respects equivalent to the current miniprocessor-based SIFT 
System, and, as detailed in Sections 5 and 6, that is the approach we intend 
to pursue. This arrangement will result in a more structured software 
program and one that is more maintainable. 
Specifically, we want to arrange the software so that, in the event of 
a change, only that section of the software affected by the change needs to 
be revalidated. We believe that this goal, which should result in lower 
software costs, can be achieved with a parallel processor/SIFT arrangement. 
Such an arrangement has the further advantage that it is more easily 
expandable than architectures that inherently depend on multiples of 
microprocessors. For example, not all functions of a Flight Control System 
are flight critical (especially in the case of commercial transports) and of 
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course, non-flight critical functions do not require the redundancy of 
flight critical functions. In a parallel processor/SIFT architecture, we 
can accommodate such a requirement with a single (non-redundant) processor; 
in a multiple microprocessor arrangement, a multiple processor (minimum of 
two) must be added. There appears to be no reason to pay this penalty. 
Finally, it is desirable to implement the redundancy management and 
bus controller algorithms in s~parate hardware so that applications 
software changes (which occur relatively frequently) do not require 
re-validation of redundancy management software. As pointed out above, the 
application software is further structured so that changes that affect only 
one axis of control, for example, only require that the software for one of 
the parallel microprocessors must be re-validated. 
4.1.3.5 Concluding Remarks 
While microprocessor technology may be expected to achieve further 
improvements in speed (thruput), size, weight, and reliability, this will 
not, in our view, lead to system concepts that are radically different from 
those outlined in the previous sections. The basic parameters of an 
appropriate architecture for an Advance Flight Control System involve the 
redundancy management, the organization of the application processors 
(parallel or not), and the bus controller and network organization, and 
these parameters can realistically only be chosen in the manner discussed 
above (including, or course, the possible variations that have been 
described) if the system requirements are to be met. It is difficult to 
think of suitable configurations that differ in essentials from those 
described herein. 
The risks of our approach are minimal because the proposed system 
architecture is a direct extension of SIFT/FTMP concepts. These concepts 
have been thoroughly studied and proven hy simulation and emulation 
techniques. Breadboard hardware has been built in both cases and is 
currently being evaluated. Oesign changes have been identified and 
incorporated into the hardware. The interface with the 1553 bus has been 
validated. 
The remaining issues are: (1) the use of the redundant 1553B bus in a 
fail-operational configuration and (2) the validity of the ultra-reliable 
bus controller concept. Obviously, a detailed system failure modes and 
effects analysis needs to be conducted to ensure that there are no common 
failure modes in the design and that all failures are, in fact, detected. 
Specifically, a SIFT/FTMP type of computer complex has not heretofore been 
connected to an aggregate of redundant sensor and actuator subsystems via a 
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set of multiplexed busses and the possibility of bus failures disabling or 
defeating, in whole or in part, the redundancy management algorithm must be 
investigated, using the FMEA or a system emulation (on an appropriate host 
computer). However, as is shown in subsequent sections, we do not think 
doing so presents any inherent difficulties, but that the design concept is 
sound, and that the communications problem is solvable. 
4.2 Software Implemented Fault Tolerant Computing 
4.2.1 Software/Hardware Trade-Offs 
The SIFT approach offers economies in hardware, which on a recurrent 
basis, appear quite attractive even though the relative cost of hardware 
is now less than it was when this philosophy was conceived. It suffers 
from two disadvantages; first, that it put an extra computational burden on 
the processor (redundancy management algorithm and peripherals can take up 
to 35-45% of the total required thruput) and it increases the software 
task, i.e., the amount of software that must be generated and validated. 
As to the first, any thruput limitation on the processor is alleviated by 
the parallel processing approach, and of course, processor thruput 
capabilities are increasing. With 4 processors in a parallel complex, for 
example, even systems that conventionally are "squeezed" for thruput, will 
be able to "coast", since the overhead is low (see Section 5.7). As for 
the software, to be sure, there is somewhat more of it, but, again, the 
system architecture permits a decomposition of the total software into 
small modules whose generation and validation is more easily managed. So, 
while there is, overall, a greater amount of software, it is more easily 
structured using the distributed approach and therefore more easily 
validated and verified. We do not think that this is an unfavorabl~ 
trade-off. 
Experience with Digital Flight Control Systems (e.g. AFTI F-16) 
indicates that typical real time utilization is approximately as follows: 
Redundancy management/monitoring 
Control laws processing 
Overhead (Executive, MUX interface, 
I/O processinq) 
43% 
32% 
25% 
The AFTI-F-16 approach is like SIFT in that all the monitoring and 
voting is performed in software. The above percentage of real time that is 
taken up for redundancy management and monitoring is, therefore, the 
maximum; to the extent that some output monitoring is performed in the 
32 
actuator packages, this percentage will decrease. It is very clear that a 
software-oriented approach is feasible even with today's technology, is 
probably the most economical in the long run, and is really constrained 
only by the well-publicized difficulties of software validation. 
4.2.2 Software Validation 
We have reviewed many schemes for implementing and validating software 
that purport to be an improvement over the standard validation method, i.e. 
test and test and test. Among these methods are: 
• Dissimilar redundancy in pro~ramming (N-version programming) 
• Dissimilar redundancy in hardware and software 
• Recovery block technique 
• Proof-of-correctness of software 
• Combination approach 
We discuss each of these in turn but it can be said, at the outset, 
that they all tend to complicate the design and the validation processes, 
for what seems at best to be marginal gains. 
In putting the "software problem" in perspective, it may help to 
identify the principal causes of software "failures". Obviously, all 
software "failures" are really specification, design, or coding errors. The 
latter are, in our experience, detected fairly readily during the various 
software tests (e.g. module tests, system tests) that will be employed. It 
is the errors resulting from faulty or incomplete specifications (the 
princioal cause of software "failures") that are the most worrisome because 
they are the hardest to detect. Thus, the above techniques can most 
logically be evaluated in terms of their ability to 'detect these 
"failures". 
It is of course clear that one must start with a basic system 
specification that is correct. No validation scheme could detect errors in 
that basic document. However, the next level of detail, typically 
represented'by a Computer Software Requirements Document (CSRD) and then a 
Computer Software Design Document (CSOO),is where misinterpretations, 
omissions, inconsistencies, etc. can cause errors that will, eventually, be 
reflected in incorrect or incomplete code. The coding itself, assumed to 
be done via an HOl and a validated compiler, can of course produce 
additional errors. 
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If dissimilar redundancy, in either hardware or software, is employed, 
the number of specifications is increased and so is the probahility that 
errors are committed in writing them. This would be no cause for alarm if 
there were a greater assurance of success, by virtue of the dissimilar 
implementation, of detecting these errors. However, this would only be the 
case if the two CSRD's or the two CSDD's were sufficiently different, i.e. 
included different interpretations of the basic system document. While one 
can obviously make up scenarios where the dissimilar software (or hardware) 
would yield a benefit, one can make up other, equally plausible scenarios 
where it would not. In short, this approach would doubtless detect some 
coding errors, but very few software design errors. Considering that the 
software design and validation task is now at least doubled, that seems a 
high price to pay for such a small benefit. 
In the method of Recovery Blocks (due to Randall (Ref. 4)) an 
acceptance test is employed to ensure that the output of each software task 
yields an "acceptable" result, and a watchdog timer ensures that this 
output is available in a timely manner. If this does not occur, an 
alternative software "path" is activated to compute the same task. (The 
watchdog timer can be used independently of Recovery Blocks and is so used 
in all Bendix software). The key to the Recovery Blocks is the development 
of an acceptance test that will catch software failures in time. Such a 
test would be, in general, quite difficult to devise. However, if it could 
be devised, then, equally likely, the error which it is supposed to detect 
must be known, and then there is no need for the test in the first place. 
Thus, it seems to us that the use of this technique to detect software 
errors is not appropriate since it does not promise to solve the real 
software design problems. The test would seem to be more appropriate to 
hardware error detection. 
The "Proof-of-Correctness" (Ref. 5) method for validating software is 
being investigated by SRI, Inc. as part of the SIFT Program. The basic 
idea seems to be to so structure the software so that it can be regarded as a 
(nested) series of assertions that can be rigorously proved via the 
techniques of mathematical logic (predicate calculus). It appears, 
however, that this method "works", if it does at all, only for those parts 
of a flight control problem that can be represented as logic statements, 
surely not the total flight control program. Also, the technique is not 
readily understandable to the engineering community and therefore probably 
not acceptable. As of this date, its usefulness has not been demonstrated. 
In addition to a rigorously structured approach to software 
generation, and exhaustive testing at several levels, it is cost-effective 
to include software reasonableness tests, i.e. tests that can detect when a 
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variable has assumed unreasonable values, when a surface is commanded to a 
hardover position, etc. Clearly such tests have a limited application, but 
they are useful and don't cost much (in real time, memory etc.). Since 
their effectiveness is considerably less than 100%, no credit is taken, in 
the reliability calculations, for the failures detected (hardware or 
software) by these tests. 
4.2.3 SELF TEST 
An in-fliqht backqround self-test can detect hardware failures with an 
overall coverage of 95%-98%, i.e. that is the percentage of all failures 
that will be detected. The Advanced Flight Control System should include 
an in-flight self-test for the following reasons: 
• It is an alternate to the comparison monitoring method of 
failure detection, which in fact can readily isolate the 
failed channel, or LRU, and can confirm the failure once 
the faulty channel is removed from on-line operations. 
• The in-flight self-test may be considered a part of the 
maintenance and pre-flight self-tests, thus, they must be 
implemented anyhow and the required memory must be provided. 
If an in-flight real-time squeeze develops, the self-test can 
be run on alternate cycles, etc.; thus the real time usage can 
be made minimal. 
• No credit is taken, in the reliability calculations, for the 
potential contribution of self-test to the system's probability 
of survival. Because of this conservative ground-rule, it will 
not be necessary to prove the percentage of coverage. Self-
test results will not be permitted to throw "good" LRU's off-
line unless comparison monitoring failure logic has already 
indicated a failure. 
• Self-test exercises parts of the program (e.g. flare) that 
may otherwise incur latent failures. An accumulation of latent 
failures could defeat the failure detection algorithms. 
4.2.4 Failure Detection 
The principal method of failure detection is comparison monitoring. 
LRU's, that is, sensor processors, application processors, bus controllers, 
actuator processors, etc. will be voted in triads or "by fives", to mask 
the effect of any failure. Spares, when available, will be substituted for 
failed units. 
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Comparison monitoring is the best failure detection method with 
respect to coverage, i.e. all failures above the comparator threshold are 
detected. Speed of failure detection can be suited to the system design 
requirements; this parameter must be traded against nuisance alarms and the 
probability of premature exhaustion of available resources. Persistence 
counters and sophisticated algorithms such as sequential probability ratio 
tests are employed to minimize the false alarm rate. 
Failure detection can be implemented in software or in dedicated 
hardware. We are proposing that most of the fault detection and 
identification alqorithms be implemented in software, because this results 
in a system with less weight, greater reliability, greater flexibility to 
changes, and lower cost relative to hardware-implemented algorithms. The 
principal disadvantage of this approach has always been the relatively long 
execution time that these algorithms require. 
We believe that the use of a SIFT-like ultra-reliable bus controller 
make it reasonable to incorporate the failure detection software in that 
controller. The SIFT organization and software structure is peculiarly 
well adapted to logic statements (rather than number-crunching as in 
control law implementation). This of course also reduces the thruput 
requirements of the individual microprocessors so that standard, economical 
units can be selected. 
4.3 Analytic Redundancy Overview 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The advent of full authority digital fliqht control systems and their 
associated reliability requirements has given p~ominence to the areas of 
fault detection, redundancy management, analytic redundancy, failure 
tolerance, etc. Any fruitful discussion of these areas must start by 
applying accepted definitions to these terms and describing their 
relationships. A review of engineering application will then be presented 
along with suggestions as to the path future work should follow. 
A Redundancy Management (RM) system is that part of the flight control 
system which manages the sensor, and possibly actuator, complements in such 
a wa.y as to insure the required n fail-op performance. Included under this 
umbrella called II redundancy management" are items such as fault detection 
and isolation (FOI) which refers to the process by which a failed or 
erroneous complement is identified and isolated from the correctly 
operating portion of the Flight Control system. The fault detection 
process may be a simple pass/fail test (i.e. gyro spin motor sensors) or 
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may be a very sophisticated statistical test on the IIgoodness ll of the 
sensor output, (i.e., signal error whiteness). Once the fault is detected 
the next step is to remove the offending component off-line either 
momentarily in the case of a transient failure, or permanently for a 
permanent failure. 
Analytic Redundancy (AR) is a term which is defined as the use of 
known physical relationships in the performance of a Redundancy Management 
System. It has been described as a IIgeneral failure detection process ll , 
(ref. 19). Specifically, the known physical relationships are utilized to 
derive expected measurements, likelihood functions, parity results, etc. to 
determine if a sensor is failed and more specifically which sensor has the 
highest probability of being the failed component. Once the component has 
been identified the Redundancy Management System will take the appropriate 
isolation action. 
A survey of current work in this area gives good evidence of the 
validity of the analytic redundancy concept along with some of the 
problems. The major conclusion which can be drawn from the work summarized 
in Table 2 is that Analytic Redundancy can give good performance in 
terms of failure detection provided that adequate knowledge of the sensor 
characteristics during a failure is available and is correctly modeled when 
designing the system. 
Analytic Redundancy (AR) may be applied to all the components of a 
Digital Flight Control System (DFCS). The derived relationships are not 
only used in detecting failures, but are used to either IIrep1ace ll the 
failed sensor through a derived signal or reconfigure the DFCS to maintain 
flight performance, allowing for the possibility of failed control 
surfaces, (refs. 20, 21). Through the use of AR hiqh1y fault tolerant DFCS 
designs are possible. 
There are several techniques which can be utilized to perform the 
Analytic Redundancy function. A brief summary of some of these and their 
possible applications are presented in Table 3. Obviously some of 
these techniques would be extremely difficult to implement du'e either to 
software/hardware requirements (multiple hypothesis testing or parameter 
identification) or to the fact that these techniques are not yet out of the 
research phase (i.e. jump process analysis). 
4.3.2 Proposed Analytic Redundancy Schemes 
Using the accepted definition of analytic redundancy as a IIgeneral 
failure detection process ll , a series of methods will be presented along 
with associated advantages and disadvantages. 
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The simplest method is comparison monitoring of like sensor signals. 
The obvious advantage is the fact that no complicated software (or 
hardware) is necessary to implement the scheme. Disadvantages include high 
false alarm rates, difficulty of comparing skewed or unlike sensors, and 
the possible requirement for a large number of sensors to meet operational 
specifications. 
By accepting incremental costs in software and memory requirements, 
redundancy management can be performed through the use of parity equations. 
Based on a sensor complement's geometry, it is possible to form linear 
combinations of subsets of sensors which will equal zero if no errors (or 
failures) are present. Non-zero parity values are caused by the presence 
of errors in sensor data. Through the use of simple corrections for lever 
arm and structural effects, parity methods can give good P(detection) of 
failures as well as low false alarm or nuisance alarm rates. This 
technique has proven very effective when utilized in skewed sensor systems, 
(refs. 20, 21). 
If the P(detect) requirement is very high, the next step is to use a 
form of diagnostic filter along with generalized likelihood methods. This 
requires one or more state estimators along with the associated software 
and possibly a higher speed (and larger memory) CPU. These methods are 
extremely flexible in that they allow the use of unorthodox sensor geometry 
and multiple combinations of dissimilar sensors. Also, using these more 
complex schemes may give lower nuisance alarm rates. The major 
disadvantage of generalized likelihood or hypothesis testing methods is the 
need for a priori knowledge of sensor failure signatures (i.e., how the 
signal changes with particular modeled failures). This will require a more 
detailed knowledge and model of the particular sensors for an effective 
design. 
4.3.3 Proposed Generalized Likelihood Implementation 
The Generalized Likelihood approach assumes that postulated failures 
give recognizable signatures which are known a priori. Therefore a set of 
hypotheses can be stipulated i.e., 
h = no failures 
0 
h = i bias failure sensor 1 
h = soft failure sensor 1 
m 
h = unmodeled or unknown failure or 
z transient failure. 
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In order to determine the correctness of any hypothesis, the necessary 
information can be obtained through the use of a State estimator which 
takes in raw sensor data and develops estimates of modeled states based on 
this raw data and knowledge of certain stochastic properties of the 
measurements. Based on the estimated states in Figure 10, expected 
values of the measurements, Yk(Yk), can be formed. By including in the 
estimated state vector such quantities as sensor bias states, etc. sensor 
failures may show up as sudden changes in the values of the residuals (Yk -
Yk) = Ek· If the residuals, k, are used to generate likelihood functions 
L = f{Ek, Pm) (Pm is the associated covariance matrix) the correct 
hypothesis (hi) can be determined by the value of L. If the indeterminate 
hypothesis, hz, is indicated by more than, say 2-3 samples, then a backup 
detection scheme such as comparison monitoring or parity equations may have 
to be used to identify the particular failed sensor. Figure 10 is a 
simplified block diagram of this proposed scheme. 
Some of the points which must be resolved in the course of a design 
effort include detection of soft failures (i.e., null, or scale factor 
shifts), how many different failures must be hypothesized, computational 
loads due to matrix manipulations, etc. 
For detection of soft failures, if a skewed configuration is assumed, 
the problem can be solved by a simple comparison between estimated or 
expected and actual sensor outputs since the sensor is receiving inputs 
from more than one axis. This type of failure should lead the appropriate 
element ofE k to be large enough to noticeably change the value of L leading to an indication of a failure hypothesis, hi. 
For bias type failures (hard over, etc.) comparison of the estimated 
vs. actual sensor data can also be used as well as the resulting likelihood 
function value. Alternate tests could be zero-mean tests onck' the 
residual, and ramp-like changes in values of L etc. 
The required number of failure hypotheses will have to be determined 
based on the sensor number and configuration. A possible first assumption 
is that each sensor have 4 modes hI = all ok, h2 = bias failure, h, = 
soft failure, h4 = indeterminate status. . 
Computational loads can be determined by considering the number of 
states and measurements in the estimator as well as the matrix operation 
required for generating L = f(Ek' Pm). Based on the number of operations 
for these two functions, and the number of operations to perform other 
functions such as Fault Isolation, Built in Test, etc., a computer 
throughput requirement can be determined. 
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One area of interest in the generalized likelihood scheme is that of 
formulating the residuals in such a way as to magnify the failure 
signatures thus making them easier to detect. This area should be 
investigated in the early staqes of any design effort. 
Other areas of interest are: determination of p(detect) for depleted 
sensor sets, p(detect) for multiple simultaneous failures and threshold 
(maqnitude and time) values for determining hi' 
The final part of the design effort should be a laboratory 
verification of as complete a system as possible so as to insure the 
viability of the generalized likelihood method. 
In order to determine the advantages of using the more complex 
generalized likelihood method for AR, it is suggested that the backup FOI 
scheme be one which has a proven fault detection ability to do the FOI 
task, specifically a parity-space scheme may be used. In this way the new 
scheme can be tested against a known benchmark. 
In summary it is suggested that a study be undertaken to determine the 
quantitative benefits of doinq Analytic Redundancy utilizing the 
Generalized Likelihood Method for Fault Detection and Isolation. This work 
will define such criteria as software costs, hardware requirements, 
nuisance alarm rates, probability of detection P(detect), probability of 
multiple failure detection, effective system performance in presence of 
multiple failures, etc. Another area which will be investigated is that of 
the adequacy of sensor models and associated knowledge of failure 
characteristics which is needed to insure good performance of any 
likelihood type of detection method. Table 4 is a summary of some 
specific design goals and the recommended methods to achieve these goals. 
4.4 Actuation System Technology 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Various aspects of actuation system technology are beinq studied by 
the Navy, the air Air Force and NASA. Current prorams are directed at in-
vestigations of: 
• electromechanical actuation systems 
• Direct drive valves 
• Integrated actuator packages 
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• Liqht weight/high pressure hydraulic systems (8000 psi) 
• Rotary actuators, both electromechanical and electrohydraulic 
All current actuation systems programs were reviewed for potential ap-
plication to the Advanced Flight Control System and a brief description of 
each program is included in this survey. Table 4.4-1 contains a summary of 
the characteristics of the different approaches and a statement of the 
developmental status of the program. 
Table 5 also presents a forecast of the availability of the tech-
nology in terms of committment to the design of a planned aircraft and ex-
pected schedules for currently planned R&D flight test programs. 
4.4.2 Electromechanical Actuation Systems (EMAS) 
An electromechanical actuation system consists of three basic 
elements: 
• An electric motor(s) driven gear box/actuator assembly that con-
trols and powers the aerodynamic control surface or thrust vec-
toring device 
• Solid state, high power switching devices that provide power to 
the actuator 
• A microprocessor controller that provides: 
electronic computation 
- hiqh performance capability 
variable and controllable motor characteristics such as: 
torque; RPM; frequency; rate; commutation characteristics 
position and dynamic feedbacks available as control elements 
EMAS can be configured as linear or rotary actuation systems and in 
either velocity or torque summer configurations. Various redundancy lev-
els may be accommodated in the designs, although,as is also true in dual 
tandem hydraulic actuators, the redundancy level is generally reduced to 
dual in the last stage and the final connection to the control surface is 
a single structural load path. 
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The major EMAS programs that have been recently completed or are now 
underway are: 
• Boeing Military Airplane Co. Study - AFWAL funded "Airplane Acuator 
Trade Study". 
• Rockwell International Study - AFWAL funded "Airplane Actuator 
Trade Study: 
• Honeywell/Inl and Motors Pro9ram to develop an EMAS for the Space 
Shuttle Elevon 
• NASA/Johnson Spacecraft Center EMAS Development Program for the 
Space Shuttle Elevon 
• Lockheed California Co. Studies of "All Electric" Transport 
Aircraft 
• Boeing Commerical Airplane Co. Studies of "All Electric" Transport 
Aircraft and EMAS Development, Test and Flight Test Programs 
• Grumman Aerospace Corporation. EMAS Studies, Development and Test 
Programs - Funded by Naval Air Development Center. 
The two AFWAL funded "Airplane Actuation Trade Study" programs are 
scheduled for completion in late 19A1 or early 1982. The baseline air-
craft are Air Force advanced fighter concepts. The studies are comparing 
advanced hydraulically powered actuation systems with electromechanical 
actuation systems and with Integrated Actuator Packages (lAP). 
The Honeywell/Inland Motors program is jointly funded by the two con-
tractors and NASA/JSC. The program is directed toward development of an 
EMAS for the Shuttle inboard elevon. Prototype hardware has been manu-
factured and is currently being tested at Honeywell's Clearwater, Florida 
facility. The actuator is a direct replacement for the hydraulic actuator 
now used to drive the elevons on the shuttle. It fits within the space en-
velope, meets the performance requirements, utilizes the same structural 
mounting and drive interfaces and uses significantly less power. 
The Lockheed California Co. study was funded by NASA/JSC and the final 
report was published in July 1980. The study evaluated EMAS for 3 classes 
of commercial transports: 
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• An Advanced Transport Airplane (ATA), a 500 passenger advanced 
version of theL-1011 airplane 
• A short haul 50 passenger airplane 
• A short haul 30 passenger airplane. 
The study showed significant savings in energy, fuel, life cycle costs 
and weight based on the combination of EMAS and the elimination of engine 
bleed air. In all, 29 flight control actuator configurations were studied 
and 3 types were designed. 
The Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. program is directed at 100 to 500 
passenger "all-electric"transport aircraft. Key developments are an all 
electronic cockpit, EMAS for primary flight controls, elimination of engine 
bleed air, digital FBW and extensive use of a digital data bus system and 
voice acquisition to computers and voice synthesizing for alert and warning 
messages. Current plans include a flight test program with EMAS driving 
roll control surfaces in the wing ann later one of the two rudder surfaces 
on a 727 aircraft. 
The Grumman study is currently funded by NADC and in prior phases has 
evaluated: 
• An EMAS to power and control the canard control surfaces on the 
Grumman Design 623-1024, a Navy Type B V/STOL supersonic fighter 
airplane. 
• A modified AFWAL/AiResearch EMAS to power and control one of the 
two rudders on an F-14, in a flight test demonstration program. 
To date, the program has shown that the EMAS approach is feasible for 
a high performance fighter/attack airplane and that an EMAS can be designed 
for the critical application (canard) without resorting to active cooling 
or energy storage techniques and that all performance requirements can be 
satisfied. The F-14 flight test program is planned for late 1984 or early 
1985. 
The AFWAL funded AiResearch program was conceived in 1972 and cul-
minated in development of a dual motor, velocity summed EMAS using 270 VDC 
samarium-cobalt, inside out, brushless motors. The EMAS includes the 
actuator, solid state SWitching/inverter assembly and a controller. 
Features include: electronic commutation; current limiting; rotor posi-
tion, current, rate, motor and actuator position feedbacks. The unit 
weighs 35 lbs and has undergone environmental and performance testing. 
Specific performance data is: 
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• No load rate - 95 deg/sec 
• Stall load - 70,400 in-lb 
• Bandwidth - 13 Hz @ ~ 1 deg 
• Peak output power - 8 HP 
The qeneral conclusions of all the programs to date were summarized at 
a NASA workshop in Hampton, VA in June 1981. The general conclusions were: 
• Lockheed & Boeing have proven feasibility and benefits for 30 to 
500 passenger airliners 
• Honeywell and Johnson Spacecraft have proven feasibility, benefits, 
and design for Space Shuttle 
• Grumman has shown feasibility for Supersonic Fighter/Attack 
Aircraft 
• Numerous.systems/hardware suppliers have the know-how, expertise, 
and developed technology to proceed 
But Proceeding Means 
• Refinement and, in some cases, development of hardware to unique 
fliqht control, system requirements 
• Demonstratin~ reliability of gear boxes and power switching 
/inverter modules 
• Developinq fault tolerance, reliability, redundancy, and redun-
dancy management philosophies 
• Developing electrical power supply requirements, configurations, 
laboratory, and simulation test systems as well as systems for 
flight test evaluation. 
The general consensus of opinion was that an "All Electric" demon-
strator aircraft should be developed and flight tested and that one or more 
limited flight test programs should be completed as a build up to the "All 
Electric" demonstrator. No one expected that a committment to incorpor-
ation of EMAS into a production aircraft design could be made prior to 
1990. 
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4.4.3 Direct Drive Valves 
A direct drive valve has heen defined as a conversion and amplifi-
cation device in which an electronically signalled motor directly positions 
a main control valve. Figure 11 shows the typical 2 stage EHV mechani-
zation, the direct drive valve mechanization and a compromise "staged" 
direct drive valve. 
Benefits of the direct drive valve concept are: 
• Reduced servo actuator complexity/cost eliminates ~ydromechanical 
fai 1 ure monitors 
• Reduced electric wire count 
• Reduced maintenance 
• Hydraulic systems savings 
- Eliminates EHV null flow losses 
Reduced heat exchanger requirements 
• Substantial weight savings 
• Simplified interface of multiple signal channels with 2 hydraulic 
systems 
Problem areas or potential concerns are: 
• Increased electrical power level 
• Electromagnetic interference of power switching electronics 
• Reliability base for jam-free motor and valve combination 
• Chip shear forces tend to be low 
There are several direct valve programs underway. Some are company 
funded efforts and others are funded by AFWAL or NADC. Figure 12 pre-
sents a summary of some of the programs recently completed or now underway. 
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4.4.4 Integrated Actuator Packages (lAP) 
lAPis have been defined as an electrically powered and (usually) 
electrically controlled package ocnsisting of an electric motor driven 
hydraulic pump which provides power to a hydraulic actuator; hydraulic 
circuit is complete including filters, reservoir, heat exchanger, etc. 
Control is usually provided by a servo valve which either modulates the 
pumo yoke and, therefore, actuator flow (servo-pump lAP), or modulates the 
actuator by means of a servo valve supplied by a pressure compensated pump 
(servo valve lAP). 
Figure 13 presents a simple comparison of the conventional central 
hydraulic system(s) approach with the lAP approach. 
Boeing Military Aircraft Co., Sperry Vickers, Bendix Electrodynamics 
and North American Rockwell are evaluating lApis, for use in military or 
commercial transport aircraft. Boeing plans to convert the YC-14 to an all 
EMAS aircraft. There are several different types of lApis under considera-
tion and in evaluation in the current programs. Results of the current 
programs should establish the feasibility of the concept and the advisabil-
ityof incorporating lAPis into new aircraft. 
4.4.5 Light Weight (High Pressure) Hydraulic Systems 
NAVAIR and NADC have funded studies underway that involve North 
American Columbus Division of Rockwell International, Vought, Grumman and 
several equipment suppliers. The program objectives are: 
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• Develop an 8000 psi hydraulic system 
• Provide substantial weight and space savings 
• Improve Maintainability and Reliability. 
The program goals and benefits are achieved by: 
• Specification changes 
• Specific vehicle design ground rule changes 
• Changing design pressure from 3000 psi to 8000 psi. 
A general summary of the findings to date are: 
• Weight savings of 27-30% possible with changes to current 
military specification requirements 
• Changing design margins/ground rules will make hydraulic systems 
lighter without impacting reliability 
• Light aircraft appear to have approximately the same percentage 
weight savings as larger aircraft 
• Testing of tubing, fittings, actuator, valves, and seals have been 
satisfactory todate and no obvious technical problems have surfaced 
• Most aircraft in the design phase go for all possihle weight 
savings due to program incentive 
• Airlines pursuing 100 and 200 lb weight savings to improve fuel 
consumption statistics. 
The present phase of the NAVAIR/NADC proqram will culminate in an 8000 
psi flight test program in an A-7 aircraft. Laboratory testing is continu-
ing at Rockwell, Vought and Grumman. 
4.4.6 General Discussion 
Electromechanical actuation systems should be developed and flight 
tested as separate programs to prove the feasibility of the concept and to 
demonstrate the benefits and savings discussed previously. The flight test 
program should include one or more limited programs, limited meaning flight 
test on one axis and on a non-flight critical application, such as one rud-
der on an aircraft with two rudders. Following the limited flight test 
program, it is recommended that a full, 3 axis EMAS, airplane test program 
be performed. 
Direct drive valves probably represent the next actuation system re-
lated technology to be developed and incorporated into new aircraft. As 
noted previously there are several valve development programs in existence. 
Generally speaking these are valve hardware development programs and in most 
cases, little has been done to integrate them into actuation systems and/or 
the overall FBW FCS. The problem areas noted previously, i.e., increased 
signal power levels, EMI, reliability base for jam free operation and chip 
shear force level requirements all need further investigation, system inte-
gration studies and eventually flight test, not as individual valves in 
limited fliqht test programs, but in a total integrated flight test program. 
The required program would complement this program in a very positive 
manner. 
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IAP's would also complement this program in a very positive way. How-
ever, the results of currently planned programs should be available before 
a decision should be made. At the present time the Boeing YC-14 program 
probably will not be completed in time for the planned program. If the 
YC-14 program plans do not materialize prior to start of this pr09ram, 
IAP's should be re-evaluated for incorporation. 
The North American Rockwell Columbus Division and Vought program on 
light weight, 8000 psi hydraulic systems is quite comprehensive and should 
produce answers to the critical questions. Therefore, it would not be of 
any significant benefit to incorporate a light weight hydraulic effort into 
the planned NASA program from a technology point-of view. 
Rotary actuation systems, whether electrohydraulic or electromech-
anical could be a part of any of the previously described programs. For 
instance, Bendix Electrodynamics is developing a rotary, hinge line hydrau-
lic actuator that has a redundant, rotary direct drive valve. IAP's could 
also include rotary hydraulic actuators in appropriate applications such as 
rudder, aileron or spoilers. It is therefore appropriate that final 
decisions regarding use of rotary actuators be made in the early definition 
phase of the planned program. The appropriateness of rotary actuators are 
very configuration dependent and the flight test vehicle and control 
surface complement would have to be known and studied in some depth. 
4.4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
We recommend that the proposed program address advanced actuation 
systems since they are a key element in overall FCS development and 
technology. Actuation systems are the last link in the FCS chain and are 
the interface between the 3 and 4 channel FBW system, three hydraulic 
systems, generally a dual (tandem) actuator and usually one control sur-
face. In addition, the fault tolerance, fault detection and fault iso-
lation capabilities can, if fully expoited, significantly influence the 
upstream elements. 
The short term solution to simplicity, high reliability, and low main-
tenance appears to involve use of direct drive electrohydraulic control 
valves. Due to their inhere~t simplicity and reliability, they represent a 
significant step toward satisfying the goals of this program. 
The long term and more significant approach that is recommended is the 
use of electromechanical actuation systems (EMAS). EMAS benefits accrue 
primarily because they are the key to the all-electric aircraft in which 
aircraft power/energy sources are consolidated into one medium, electrical 
power. Rather drastic improvements occur in reliability, energy conser-
vation and, to a lesser but quite significant extent, in cost. The key reasons 
for this are: 
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• Elimination of all hydraulic systems, components, and ground 
support equipment. 
• Elimination of engine bleed air and bleed air systems. 
• The overall efficiency of current and future state of the 
art electrical power systems and electromechanical actua-
tion systems. 
We recommend that actuators with direct drive valves be incorporated 
in any immediate Advanced Flight Control proqram for the following reasons: 
• Direct drive valves will force a major change in overall 
philosophy and design requirements for actuation systems. 
• Direct drive valves will probably be the next major break-
through in hydraulic actuation system design and will prob-
ably be incorporated into 1985 to 1988 designs. 
• Direct drive valves impact the FBW system due to the higher 
signal current levels required and the lack of fault de-
tection and isolation within the actuator. 
• The benefits of direct drive valves are: 
- Simplicity 
- Increased reliability 
- Minimized quiescent flow 
• Reliability and maintainability must be addressed prior to 
application of the concept. 
• An overall aircraft program could evaluate two or more direct 
drive valve designs on the different control surfaces in-
volved. 
It is also recommended that a longer term EMAS study be conducted in 
parallel with the electrohydraulic actuation system studies noted above. 
The plan would be to phase EMAS into the demonstrator aircraft on an 
axis-by-axis basis in the 1985 to 1986 to 1989 time frame. Early efforts 
are recommended in the following areas: 
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• Evaluation of current and proposed electrical power systems 
followed by a preliminary design effort in development of a 
recommended total electrical power system. 
• EMAS application study on the demonstrator aircraft including 
definition of requirements, evaluation of linear vs. rotary 
hinge line configurations for each axis of control and force 
vs. velocity summing for each application. The effort would 
include an evaluation of the impact on aircraft structure, 
minimal or acceptable rework of aircraft, cost, safety con-
siderations and provisions as well as schedule and state of 
the art implications. 
• Determination of power switching/inverter reqUirements, evalua-
tion of current and future (1985-1988) state of the art com-
ponents and systems and preliminary design of candidate hard-
ware. 
4.5 Network and Parallel Data Bussing 
Current airborne digital systems require a variety of communications 
between aircraft SUbsystems. The communications encompass a large 
assortment of signals and signal characteristics. The increasing demand 
for high performance and high reliability and the attendant increase in 
data transmissions has exposed the limitations of the conventional network. 
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These limitations include: 
• The use of dedicated, hardwired interfaces which impose 
significant weight, volume and power penalties, particularly 
in large, distributed systems. 
• The use of unique signal conversion/conditioning hardware to 
permit interface compatibilit.Y. 
• The large variety of signal characteristics and formats in use 
throughout the system. 
• Effective redundancy requires hardware duplication. Subsystems 
must interface with multiple busses for purposes of cross-
strapping, enhanced reliability and reconfiguration. 
• The conventional flight control system architecture is 
often times unique to a particular application, employs 
non-standard hardware and allows little freedom for growth. 
The selection of a communications network for an advanced flight 
control system w~s influenced by a number of factors: 
• Standard (hardware, formats and protocol) 
The potential for standardization was considered an essential 
aualification of the bus. Standardization would result in 
low cost, high reliability and industry acceptance. 
• Reliability 
The reliability of the bus network must support the 10(-10)1 
hour survivability of the advanced flight control system. 
• Economy 
The network must be economical in terms of hardware costs, 
maintainability, wire weight and power. 
• Bandwidth 
The network must accommodate not only the flight control system 
but eventually the avionics system, as well. Consequently, its 
bandwidth should be expandable as technology improves with a 
minimum impact on system architecture and operation. 
• Resource Pooling and Reconfiguration Capability 
The network must accommodate the pooling of resource and be 
compatible with a wide range of reconfiguration strategies. 
• Growth 
The network must allow for system growth with a minimum 
impact on system architecture and operation. 
• Flexibility 
The network must be flexible and capable of accommodating 
a variety of system and subsystem architectures such as 
central and distributed, sequential or parallel processing, 
etc. 
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4.5.1 Bus Selection 
Busses can be classified as serial or parallel, multiplexed or 
dedicated. In the interest of economy, parallel and dedicated busses were 
eliminated at the outset or until it was established that serial and 
multiplexed busses proved to be infeasible. 
The bus network selected for this program employed the MIL-STD-1553B 
standard (Ref. 10) for the primary bus. Despite it~ shortcomings the 1553B 
bus represents a mature design, is easily, and maintained has demonstrated its 
flexihility in numerous applications (Ref. 8), and 
• it employs standard, reliable and relatively inexpensive 
hardware; 
• there exists a large collection of bus control and interface 
software; 
• it is generally accepted, as a standard, by the avionics 
industry. 
The most significant shortcomings of 1553B, in the context of a 
flight control system, are 1) the limited number of interconnecting 
terminals, 2) limited bandwidth and 3) vulnerability to single point 
failures. 
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1. Limited Number of Interconnecting Terminals 
A 1553B bus can handle, at most, 31 terminals. This limitation 
is the results of a) terminal coupling techniques that do not 
allow the handling of more than 31 terminals or b) bus protocol 
which allows address space for no more than 31 remote 
terminals. As a result, remote terminals may need to service large 
sets of sensors and actuators. As a consequence, a failed 
terminal could result in a loss of a significant proportion of 
the resources of the system. Perhaps the worst effect, from 
the standpoint of the present study, is that 1553B cannot 
accommodate a widely distributed system on a single bus, 
irrespective of available bandwidth and reliability. It is 
possible however,by appropriate use of repeaters on bus 
buffers,to eliminate the electrical constraint on numbers 
of terminals which can be interconnected and still 
maintain functional compatibility with 1553. It is not 
possible, however, to eliminate the protocol constraint 
without some modification to 1553. 
The terminal limitation of a 1553 bus, while potentially a 
serious obstacle in implementing a widely dispersed system, 
was considered tolerable for the purpose of 
demonstrating feasibility of an advanced architecture. 
If feasibility can be demonstrated, subject only to this 
constraint, then attention can be given to modifying 
the capabilities of 1553. 
2. Limited Bandwidth 
The bandwidth of 1553B is presently specified at 1 Mhz. 
Any increase in this rate requires a technology improvement 
in the interface hardware. The present bandwidth is expected 
to improve as new technology becomes available. Present 
multiplex data bus technology offers two basic configuration 
options: the first of these, the bipolar, Manchester coded, 
wire pair electrical multiplex bus, has demonstrated data 
rates up to 10 Mhz. Considerable effort, however, must still be 
expended to guarantee its performance in a typical aircraft 
environment. Some of the typical problems encountered are 
ground loops, radiated and induced noise, amplitude variation 
and the cost and weight of coupling devices and wire cable. 
The second configuration, the optical multiplex bus, 
represents a rapidly maturing technology. Such a bus has the 
inherent capability of operating two orders of magnitude 
faster than the electrical bus. In addition, it provides 
freedom from the conventional EMI problems of noise, cross-
talk and ground loops. The connectors, fiber optic cables, 
light emitting diodes and silicon photo diodes necessary to 
realize a multiplexed data bus are available. 
As a consequence of these technology improvements a dramatic 
increase in 1553 bandwidth can be expected in the near future. 
Meanwhile, bus loading estimates indicate that the present 
1 Mhz data rate can sustain the proposed flight control 
system candidate architecture. 
3. Vulnerability 
The most serious deficiency of 1553B in the present context 
is its vulnerability to single-point failures. Such a 
failure can disable the entire bus. Single-point failures 
are caused by 
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• physical damage due to fire, explosion, etc. 
• a terminal talking out of turn (babbling terminal) 
• a faulty bus controller 
Physical Damage 
From data obtained from a survey of all air carrier accidents 
from 1964 to 1975(Ref. 7) the probability of damage to the 
communication system was estimated. The results showed that 
the probability of a damage event per hour is 
• 2.4 x 10(-7) for one line 
• 7.5 x 10(-8) for two lines 
• 6 x 10 (-9) for a control center. 
The survey assumed that no unusual precautions were taken to 
protect against damage. As a consequence, the effects of 
wire protection devices and wire separation are unknown. For the 
purpose of configuring the bus network it will be assumed 
that, due to physical damage, 
• the probability of loss of a single bus is 2.4 x 10(-7)/ 
hour; 
• the probability of loss of a single bus controller processor is 
2.4 x 10(-7) hour; 
• two busses can be sufficiently separated to preclude 
loss of both busses by a single damage event. 
A Babbling Terminal 
1553B incorporates several mechanisms for preventing a faulty 
terminal from talking out of turn, the most effective of which 
is the use of a standby redundant bus together with a "selected 
transmitter shutdown" control mode command. This command 
requests the designated terminal to disable the transmitter 
associated with the specified bus. If the bus is used in such 
a way that a single-point failure can cause loss of a critical 
function and, hence, loss of the aircraft, then it must be 
demonstrated that the probability of such an event is of the 
order of 10(-10)/hour. To establish an order-of-magnitude 
reliability of a 1553 bus, a preliminary assessment was performed 
for this study. 
Preliminary Reliability Assessment of 1553B BUS 
The objective was to estimate the probability of a remote 
terminal talking out of turn for excessive periods of time 
and disabling the bus, as a result. Implementation of the 
1553 bus requires that lithe terminal shall contain a hardware-
implemented time-out to preclude a signal transmission of 
greater than 800 microseconds". The intention of this is'to 
prevent ~ remote terminal from transmitting excessively due 
to a single failure. Analysis of a typical 1553 remote 
terminal circuit schematic indicated that no single device 
failure could result in babbling. It was determined, however, 
that certain combinations of failures could do so. Assuming 
the worst case, i.e., that the first failure did not result 
in detection and disengagement of the faulty terminal, it was 
established that the probability that a single remote terminal 
will babble as a result of two failures in a one hour flight 
is of the order of 3.9 x 10(-12). This analysis used failure 
rates from MIL-HDBK 217C, at 125 degrees C, uninhabited 
environment. Accordingly, the probability of at least one of 
31 remote terminals babbling is 1.2 x 10(-10) per hour of flight. 
It is emphasized that these estimates are based on a 
preliminary analysis of the terminal circuits and, 
consequently, should not be accepted as definitive. It will 
be proposed, subsequently, to corroborate the~e estimates by a 
detailed and comprehensive evaluation, as a follow-on to the 
present program. The suggested approach is to emulate the 
bus, bus controller and remote terminal at the gate-level, 
including the bus controller and remote terminal software. 
The above estimates did not account for the possibility of 
disengaging the babbling terminal via the terminal shut-down 
procedure provided by 1553B. Using this procedure the bus 
would be dual, with the second bus being in a standby (i.e., 
listening) mode. Using a round robin strategy, the bus 
controller would direct each RT on the standby bus to shutdown 
its associated RT which interfaces with the babbling bus. 
The errant terminal is identified when the babbling stops, 
following a shutdown. 
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The effect of this procedure will be to improve the bus . 
reliability by many orders of magnitude beyond the 2.34 x 
10(-10)/hour cited previously. Thus, it would appear that 
the prohability of a babbling terminal disabling a dual-bus 
is remote relative to 10(-lO)/hour. In this connection we 
should note that one authority (ref. 7) cites an example of a 
single failure that actually occurred in the field and disabled 
an entire dual-bus system. Time did not permit an anlaysis of 
this event but it clearly establishes the need for a 
comprehensive study of the failure mechanisms of the 1553 bus. 
Faulty Bus Controller 
The most serious and critical failure event of a 1553 type bus 
structure is a failure of the bus controller or its associated 
bus interface hardware. Such an event has a relatively high 
probability of occurrence and could disable the entire bus. 
The conventional solution is to employ a combination consisting 
of 
• bus controller self-test 
• an independent bus monitor/standby bus controller. 
In a typical scenario the standby bus controller assumes 
command of the bus if it receives a NO GO discrete from the 
active bus controller. This discrete can be activated by one 
of several failure conditions such as 
• time-out of the watchdog timer, 
• loss of power, 
• inability to execute, pass, or complete self-test. 
In addition, the bus monitor can monitor the active bus 
directly and request the active bus controller to relinguish 
control when a failure condition is detected. This approach, 
while effective in extending the operational life of the bus, 
is not likely to result in a bus controller reliability of 
the order of 10(-lO)/hour. 
In summary, the most serious deficiency of a 1553 bus from 
the standpoint of the objective of the Advanced Flight 
Control System, is its vulmerability to single point failures, 
in particular, to failures of the bus controller. 
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4.5.2 Bus Network Selection 
In addition to the considerations discussed previously, the 
selection of the bus network for an Advance Flight Control System was 
motivated by the realization that the design, development and evaluation of 
a new bus and bus network was not a practicable venture. Considering that 
MIl-STD-1553 has been in development for a decade, prognosis for success and 
eventual industry acceptance of a new bus/bus network was not encouraging. 
As a consequence of these considerations, 15538 was selected as the primary 
communication bus and the recommended bus network is, essentially, a dual 
(triplex, if necessary) 15538 bus which interconnects all of the critical 
and redundant subsystems comprising the flight control system. It was 
realized, however, that the vulnerability of 1553B would have to be overcome 
before this approach could be justified. 
An Ultrareliable Bus Controller 
In the absence of a reliable bus controller the network design 
must incorporate redundant and independent busses. This is the 
classical solution to the data transmission problem. Typically, 
the flight control computers function as bus controllers for 
critical signals, directing traffic on independent and dedicated 
communication links. The resultant redundancy management 
strategy demands that remote subsystems such as sensors and 
actuators interface with redundant busses. 
The availability of an ultrareliable bus and bus controller 
greatly simplifies the communications problem. Postulating such 
a bus, it is now possible to interconnect the entire flight 
control system to a single bus and still achieve the requistie 
survivability. If the capabilities of the bus controller were 
expanded it could 
• service and control bus traffic; 
• monitor redundant signals transmitted on the bus; 
• maintain system fault status; 
• manage reconfiguration by reallocating resources 
and bypassing faulty subsystems; 
• supply an accurate clock to all sUbsystems. 
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Essentially, the recommended bus controller is a SIFT-like, 
fault-tolerant multiprocessor which controls data transmission 
throughout the system. Because of bandwidth limitations, it may 
be necessary to introduce multiple busses particularly if it is 
desired to include the avionics system, as well. The resultant 
bus network is shown in Figure ]4. It is noted that the 
network does not necessarily preclude a hierarchical bus 
structure, i.e., dedicated and essentially private communication 
may be employed by a subsystem. 
Interface for Bus Control 
Initially, a set of redundant processors is assigned control of 
a bus but only one processor actually controls the bus at any 
given time. The other processors monitor the active bus 
controller by continually listening to the bus transactions. 
When a fault is detected and attributed to the bus controller 
by a majority vote, the faulty controller is physically 
disengaged from the bus and an alternate is engaged. This is 
accomplished by means of an independent switching network which 
is functionally equivalent to a multiplexer. The multiplexer 
address is supplied by majority logic from the multiprocessors. 
A functional schematic of the interface for bus control is shown 
in Figures 15 and 16. 
Referring to Figure 15, the active bus controller controls a 
"local network" consisting of a dual bus, one of which is a 
standby, and continues to do so until it fails. Bus switching is 
effected by two, tandem switches one of which is activated by the 
associated processor (the isolator in Figure 16 is set to a 
high impedance state) and the other by hardwired logic to the 
multiplexer. A monitoring processor would, nominally, be 
disengaged from the bus by both switches, but in the event of a 
failure of either switch it would remain disengaged. 
We note that the hus interface hardware could be used to imple-
ment other types of bus networks, if desired, e.g., the busses 
could be grouped into triads of independentcy controlled and 
continuously active busses instead of the active/standby 
arrangement favored here. 
Interface for Bus Monitoring 
There are three candidate configurations for bus monitoring. 
Configuration #1 (Recommended) 
This arrangement is shown in Figure 17. In this configuration 
a processor can listen to any pair of busses, simultaneously. 
When a triad of processors has been assigned control of a 
network, one processor will function as bus controller and the 
other two will select the network for listening. 
• Advantages 
• only two extra receivers on the network (in non-failure case) 
• direct listening 
• minimum number of receivers 
• no restriction on triad membership 
• Disadvantages 
Configuration #2 
• a processor can only listen to two busses, 
simultaneously 
• requires additional multiplexers 
This arrangement is shown in Figure 18. In this arrangement 
any processor can listen to one or more local networks 
simultaneously. 
• Advantages 
• direct listening 
• a processor can listen to all networks 
• no restriction on triad memhership 
• no bus switching logic for listening 
• Disadvantages 
• adds a terminal for each processor 
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Configuration #3 
This arrangement is show in Figure 19. In this arrangement 
any processor can monitor one or more bus transaction, but not 
directly, as in the previous configuration. 
• Advantages 
• a processor can listen to all"bus transactions 
• no restriction on triad membership 
• no bus switching logic for listening 
• no extra network terminals 
• Disadvantages 
• requires extra receivers and intercomputer data 
links 
• indirect listening 
4.5.3 Summary Properties of Bus Network 
1. Network Architecture 
The bus network consists of a set of local networks, each 
consisting of at least a pair of 1553B busses. Each bus 
may be assigned a separate function such as flight control, 
avionics, engine controls, etc. At least one local network 
will be dedicated to flight controls and will interconnect 
all of the necessary, critical and redundant subsystems 
which comprise the flight control function. 
2. Ultrareliable Bus Control 
The local networks are controlled by a fault-tolerant, 
multiprocessor system which performs the following 
functions: 
• services and controls bus traffic 
• monitors redundant signals transmitted on the bus 
• maintains system fault status 
• manages reconfiguration by reallocating 
resources and by-passing faulty components 
• supplies an accurate clock to all subsystems 
We note that the bus controller is essentially a passive 
device, i.e., except for the clock it does not transmit 
data to any subsystem. Thus, a malfunctioning bus control 
will, in the worst case, suspend communications unil it 
is replaced. 
3. 1553B Busses 
Each local network consists of a least two 15538 busses, 
one of which is a standby. The pertinent (from the 
standpoint of this study) characteristics of the bus are: 
• 31 terminals, maximum 
• 960 distinct labels 
• 30 distinct messages 
• 1 mhz bit rate 
• maximum error rate = 1 word in 10(7) (Ref. 10) 
• undetected bit error = 1 bit in 10(-12) (Ref. 10) 
• probability (estimated) of a babbling terminal is less 
than 3.9 x 10(-12)/hour 
• probability of one of 31 terminals babbling is less than 
1.2x 10(-10)/hour, exclusive of the use of a shut-
down procedure 
• standby bus (if available) can be used to shut-down a 
babbling terminal 
• expandable to a fiber optic bus @ 20 mhz 
• can accommodate synchronous and asynchonous computations 
• transparent to application processors 
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4.6 FIBER OPTIC COMMUNICATION MEDIA 
1. Current State of the Art in Electro-Optics 
Present multiplex data bus technology offers two basic system 
configuration options. The first of these, the bipolar, Manchester coded, 
wire pair electrical multiplex bus, has been described and built numerous 
times. While it performs adequately in systems with data rates up to 10 
Mhz considerable effort must be expended to guarantee its performance in 
typical aircraft environments. Some of the specific problems encountered 
are qound loops, radiated and induced noise, amplitude variations and the 
cost and weight of coupling devices and wire cable. 
In contrast, the optic~l multiplex bus, represents an inherently 
powerful, rapidly maturing technology. Although MIL-STD-1553B specifies a 
data transfer rate of 1.0 Mhz, this system has the potential of operating 
two orders of magnitude faster. In addition, it provides freedom from the 
conventional EMI problems of noise, cross-talk and ground loops. The 
connectors, fiber optic cable, light emitting diodes and silicon 
photodiodes necessary to realize a military multiplex data bus system are 
available now. 
Other significant advantages of fiber optic cable are its excellent 
radiation resistance and low weight. Typically, fiber optic cable weighs 
only one-tenth as much as its copper counterpart. 
Problems associated with fiber optics include cable cost, 
terminations, losses in multipart systems and vibration. While typical 
prices of fiber optic cable are 3 or 4 times that of conventional cable, 
part of this is offset by easier installation. For airborne applications, 
the lower weight increases range and/or payload capability. This, also, 
results in a cost saving. It is anticipated that, as fiber optic cable is 
manufactured in greater quantities, the prices will decrease significantly. 
Coupling losses are encountered in two areas. First, the small 
diameter of fiber optic cables required precision-made connectors and 
terminations which must be ground and polished correctly to minimize 
coupling losses. Second, multiport systems result in losses which are 
minimized by the selection of optimum coupling devices (e.g.-star 
couplers). In addition, the losses are compensated for in the design of 
the electro-optic transmitters and receivers. 
While various fiber-optic systems have been flight tested 
successfully, information on long term exposure to shock and vibration is 
required. This information will permit the development of appropriate 
techniques for fiber optic cable and harness installation in the aircraft 
environment. 
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A survey of the current generation of electo-optic cables and 
interface components shows a wide selection of devices. Low loss cables 
for transmission over distances in excess of 50Km are available. Emitters, 
detectors and support electronics for the transfer of data at clock rates 
of 100 Mhz and higher are also available. The only limitation, at present, 
is that there are few systems specified for operation from -55 degrees C to 
+125 degrees C. 
2. Fiber Optic Bus Feasibility and Performance 
Replacing the 1553 bus by a fiber optic equivalent is not only 
feasible but has been demonstrated several times. One of these fiber optic 
replacement systems operated at a data rate of 10 Mhz while preserving the 
1553 protocol and formats. Fiber optic links to digital flight control, 
computer peripheral and air data computer systems have been flight tested. 
The military committment to electro-optics is underscored by a wide range 
of bus oriented study and hardware development programs. Wright Patterson's 
microelectronics branch has developed its own transmitter and receiver 
chips for data transfers to 10 megabits per second. 
Bit error rates in electro-optic systems are a function of the 
signal-to-noise ratio present at the input to the receiver. Therefore, a 
bit error rate is selected during the design of a system as a function of 
the data rate, emitter, detector and temperature requirements. 
The bit error rate is usually chosen to be approximately 10(-8) to 
10(-9). These values do not appear to pose a problem in a 10 Mhz system. 
3. Technical Forecast 
The development of a 10 Mhz, 1553 style, fiber optic data bus will 
alleviate the increasin~ bus congestion in the 1 Mhz systems of today. 
However, with the proliferation of distributed processing, the growing 
complexity of avionics systems and the demand for greater reliability in 
these systems, it is extremely probable that, in 10 years, we will find 
ourselves chafing at the restrictions imposed on us by a 10 Mhz bus rate. 
The history of electronics has shown that as our capabilities increase so 
does our utilization of these capabilities. This, in turn, generates the 
need for even ~reater capabilities. One advantage of electro-optics is its 
inherently large bandwidth. This will allow an easier transition to even 
higher data transfer rates than would be possible in a solely electrical 
configuration. 
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4.7 INTEGRATED SENSOR TECHNOLOGY 
4.7.1 Introduction 
Inteqrated sensor technology for advanced aircraft applications is 
being studied by the Air Force and the Navy. These programs were reviewed 
and a brief description of each program is included in this survey. Table 
1 contains a summary of the characteristics of the different approaches and 
a statement of the developmental status of the program. A description of 
the recommended sensor configurations is qiven in Appendix D. 
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4.7.2 Integrated Sensor Confiqurations 
1. Ouad In-L i ne 
The most direct approach to obtaining two fail-op redundancy for 
inertial sensor data is to use quad redundancy. For fliqht 
control application this requires twelve (12) gyros; four (4) 
per axis aligned with the aircraft pitch, roll and yaw axes, as 
well as eight (8) accelerometers, four (4) each for the measure-
ment of normal and lateral accelerations. These redundant sensors 
can be readily dispersed for survivability by the application of 
state estimation techniques. The state estimation is used to 
remove the aircraft bending kinematic acceleration effects which 
may differ at different sensor locations. 
For AHRS applications, the quad redundant approach will require 
twelve (12) gyros and twelve (12) accelerometers of higher quality 
than the flight control application. For navigation functions, 
the same number of sensors is required; however, they must be of 
inertial naviqation quality with the attendant high cost per 
sensor. 
The redundancy manaqement, including fault isolation, for the 
quad-redundant sensor set can be performed in dedicated micro-
processors or integrated into the flight control computers. 
Redundancy management algorithms have been developed for the 
three computer and four computer configurations. 
?. Inteqrated Sp.nsory System (ISS), Single Degree of Freedom (SDOF) 
Gyro r.onfiguration (Reference 2?) 
The ISS is composed of three elements. The first is a sensor set 
consisting of hard-mounted skewed and dispersed rate integration 
gyros and accelerometers, low and high speed air data probes 
(which are planned to be located in close proximity to modularized 
air data transducers) an Inertial Navigation System, pilot command 
sensors, surface and engine position transducers, and a set of 
radio navigation devices and landing aids. The second element is 
a reliable and survivable input-output (I/O) system that links the 
data from the redundant sensors to redundant flight control 
computers. The third element is a group of computational subrou-
tines that reside within the redundant computer complex, which 
performs the various data handling functions such as redundant 
data management, "best" estimate and output parameter computations. 
The inertial sensor set consists of six SOOF gyros and six 
accelerometers with the input axes arranged in cone configurations 
as shown in Figure 20. The inertial components are medium grade 
types of instruments (i.e., gyro accuracy = 10 degrees/hr.; 
accelerometer accuracy ~ .002g). In addition to body rate and 
acceleration data utilized for inner loop FCS functions, the inertial 
instruments provide the reference data for computer attitude and 
heading. 
The two fail operational inertial sensor set is packaged into 
three Inertial Component Assemblies (ICA) which are dispersed, as 
shown in Figure 21 to assure a survivable sensor system. 
Each ICA contains two gyros, two accelerometers and associated 
interface electronics. State estimation algorithms contained in 
the data handling software are used to remove dissimilar body 
bending and kinematic effects that are sensed by the dispersed 
ICA's. 
3. ISS - Two Degree of Freedom (TOOF) Gyro Configuration 
The ISS skewed inertial sensor cone configuration can be imple-
mented with TOOF gyros. This configuration has two TOOF gyros 
and 3 accelerometers in each of two Inertial Reference Assemblies 
(IRAs). The gyro input axes are configured on a 45 degree cone 
with its axis along the aircraft roll axis as shown in Figure 20. 
The accelerometers form a cone identical to the SOOF ISS config-
uration when the IRA's are installed as shown in Figure 22. 
The rate and acceleration outputs from the two IRS's are fed to 
each of the three computers in a redundant flight computer set 
in a similar manner to th~ ISS SOOF configuration. The sensor 
redundancy management is performed in each of the computers and 
the results interchanged and compared between the computers. 
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4. lISA (Integrate~ Inertial Sensor Assembly) (Reference ?2) 
The Integrated Inertial Sensor Assembly Advanced Development Model 
(ISSA-ADM) is an integrated reference and navigation system using 
Ring Laser Gyros (RLGs) in a strapdown configuration. The primary 
objective in the design of this assembly is to provide a naviga-
tion, flight control and weapon delivery capability with a lower 
cost avionics system which satisfies the performance, redundancy 
management and physical requirements of advanced aircraft 
applications • 
. The lISA would be comprised of two Inertial Sensor Assemblies 
(ISAs), and two Digital Computer Assemblies (DCAs) (see Figure 
23). 
The ISAs would contain a sensor array consisting of three RLGs, 
three accelerometers, navigation electronics, and flight control 
electronics. Each ISA shall be rectangular in shape and aligned 
with the aircraft axes to simplify installation. Within each 
unit, the three sensor axes shall be held orthogonal with respect 
to each other but skewed with respect to the aircraft axes. The 
sensor array shall be mounted so that each sensor axis is at an 
anqle of 54.7 degrees with respect to the aircraft yaw axis. The two 
ISAs shall be mounted in the aircraft with a 180 degrees rotation 
between them so that no three of the six sensor axes are coplanar. 
As a result, the redundancy level for flight control shall be 
equivalent to a hexad sensor array. 
Each of the two DCAs shall contain two independent flight control 
processors, electronics, and one navigation processor. The DCA 
redundant electronics in conjunction with the hexad sensor array 
shall provide a fail operational/fail safe fault tolerance capa-
bility for flight control inputs. The ISAs shall output redundant 
flight control (FC) sensor data to both DCAs. The navigation 
information shall be independent from each of the other respective 
lISA channels. 
The skewed sensor redundancy management including fault detection 
is performed in the dual flight control processors contained in 
each DCA. 
5. Multi-Function Inertial Reference Assembly (MIRA) (Reference 24) 
The MIRA configuration is a single line replaceable unit (LRU) as 
shown in Fiqure 24 which contains the redundant inertial sensors 
and associaied electronics. The inertial sensor assembly contains 
either four two-degree-of-freedom tuned rotor gyros (TRG) or five 
single-degree-of-freedom tuned rotor gyros (TRG) or five single-
degree-of-freedom ring laser gyros (RLG) and five accelerometers. 
The inertial sensors are high accuracy instruments to perform the 
navigation functions in addition to providing FCS stabilization 
data. 
MIRA has five sensing vectors, as shown in Figure 25. The 
geometry of the five sensing vectors is such that three of them 
are aligned with the three aircraft p, q, and r axes. A favorable 
location for a fourth axis is along the axis of a cone on whose 
surface the three primary axes lie. With this orientation, the 
fourth axis lies at a 54.7 degrees angle relative to each of the 
p, q and r axes. The fourth axis can thereby sense a large component 
relative to the other four axes. If a fixed orientation for the fifth 
axis needed to be defined for both TRG and RLG applicability, 
location could be perpendicular to the fourth axis and rotated 
30 degrees about the fourth axis from the plane containing the fourth 
and the p axes. Gyro and accelerometer input sensing axes are mounted 
oarallel with the five above-described directions. 
Two built-in navigation microcomputers perform computations for 
gyro and accelerometer compensation; for alignment, coordinate 
transformation, navigation, flight control, built-in-test, input-
output, failure detection fault isolation, fault coverage, and 
MIL-STD-1553A MUX bus compatibility; and for executive and sub-
routine service. Two additional microcomputers perform necessary 
safety-of-flight control computations. 
It is to be noted that the MIRA Program was a concept feasibility 
study performed for the Air Force. The follow-on effort, lIRA 
(Integrated Inertial Reference Assembly) will perform the system 
architectural trade-off necessary to achieve the redundancy/ 
survivability requirements of advanced aircraft applications. 
The MIRA program recommended that a flight test program be con-
ducted to evaluate redundancy management of navigation quality 
ring-laser gyros and accelerometers under high dynamic conditions 
with particular emphasis on flight control. In May 1980, AFWAC/FI 
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awarded the Multifunction Flight Control Reference System (MFRCS) 
program contract to McDonnell Douglas Corp. for incorporation into 
a F-15 aircraft. The primary goal of the MFCRS program was to 
verify that the outputs of inertial grade sensors in a strap-down 
configuration can be processed by a digital computer and used as 
the flight control feedback reference in a modern fighter. 
4.7.3 Recommendation 
A review and assessment of current integrated sensor technology 
configurations results in the conclusion that the Integrated Sensory System 
(ISS), (See below) Single Deqree-of-Freedom (SDOF) gyroconfiguration is the 
recommended candidate program for the Advanced Flight Control System Study. 
This conclusion is based, in part, on a preliminary assessment of the 
system design and in-house laboratory and flight testing. Further 
technical support is required to finalize the recommended system by an 
in-depth review of the following associated factors: 
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• Reliability 
- Trade-offs 
System Reliability 
Safety Reliability 
Design Maturity 
Dispatch Reliability 
• Performance 
Effects of Environment 
Physical Configuration, Dispersion 
Expansion Capability 
-- Navigation, Autoland, etc. 
• Survivability 
- Dispersion 
- Commercial vs. Military 
• Maintainahility 
- Failure Isolation 
- Spares Requirements 
- Level of Maintenance 
-- Organizational 
-- Intermediate 
The results of the above in-depth review, with proper weighting of the 
various factors, should result in an affirmation of the recommendation. 
4.8 Multifunction Displays 
The cockpit envisioned for the Advanced Flight Control System aircraft 
will incorporate six Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) displays that provide the means 
for combining large amounts of information into integrated displays. These 
units will be furnished with full color capability using a shadow mask CRT. 
Not only is the display content increased but the use of constrasting 
colors results in significant advantages in display information separation. 
Thus faster identification of data, with reduced error, is possible. This 
reduces the pilots overall workload. 
In addition, the capability for transferring information from one 
display to another, inherent in the design of the system provides multiple 
levels of redundancy. For example, the attitude indicator (ADI) and 
navigation indicator (HSI) can be combined in an emergency, each providing 
a backup for the other. 
The ADI and HSI displays (see Figure 26) are dedicated functions for 
the pilot and copilot. These make up four of the six displays. The 
remaining two units will be used in a multifunction role to display and 
control autopilot mode selection, warning and caution data, preflight and 
postfliqht checklists, emergency procedures, and any additional data that 
will facilitate the pilot's decision making ability and reduce his 
workload. Control of the r~ultifunction Displays (MFD) is achieved by means 
of momentary switches located around the periphery of each MFD (see Figure 
27) • 
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The requirecl number of preproQrammecl checklist, procedure, ancl 
performance data will be stored and recalled when required. The system's 
emergency checklists are automatically displayed when an emergency 
conclition arises. This is also true of the warning and caution data, which 
appears on the clisplay when the failure condition occurs. 
The six displays provide the pilot with most of his contact with the 
airplane electronic systems. Display generation and the control redundancy 
designed into the proposed system assure the pilot's continuous awareness 
of and means for control of the airplane situation via its electronic 
systems. 
Associated with these displays is a data entry panel (Figure 28) to 
provide the pilots with the means for manual data entry into the system. It 
will be used primarily for preflight checkout and system calibration. In 
flight, mode selection and other pilot functions will be performed through 
the switches on the MFn's. 
Each display is a 5 inch by 5 inch full color, shadow mask CRT unit. 
Each has the capability of being driven in stroke, raster or raster/stroke 
overlay modes. Two of the clisplays will have twenty push buttons and four 
rocker switches located around the periphery of the unit for mode control 
and display selection. Fifteen of the push buttons are encoded internally 
and transmitted to the processor via a dedicated broadcast data link. The 
remainder of the push-button outputs are available for use by the processor 
or by other external equipment. A Block Diagram of the display unit is 
shown in Figure 29. 
Phosphor protection circuitry is provided in each display unit. It 
monitors power, CRT bias voltage, and sweep. A failure will inhibit beam 
current to prevent permanent damage to the CRT. 
The control unit, shown on the bottom section of the display (Figure 
27) contains the display power switch, brightness, contrast, and balance 
controls and can be remotely located if desired. Pertinent physical and 
electrical characteristics of the display unit are presented in Table 
n. 
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TABLE 1 
INTEGRATED SENSOR SYSTEM SUMMARY 
PROGRAM # OF SENSORS CAPABILITIES DESIGN STATUS 
Baseline 12 Gyros Fail op, fail op N/A 
configura- 12 Accelero- data for flight 
tiond (Quad- meters control, algorithms 
in-line) can be provided 
depending on the 
quality of sensors. 
(1) 
ISS 6 SDOF Gyros Same as baseline - Skewed gyro redundancy 
(SOOF 6 Accelero- management developed & 
config.) meters successfully flight 
tested. 
- Skewed gyro and accel-
erometer redundancy 
management developed & 
laboratory demonstrated 
with flight control 
sensors. 
- Lab demonstration of 
flight control & AHRS 
capabilities is cur-
rently in progress. 
- Navigation integration 
with GPS and other NAV 
systems is under 
development. 
ISS 4 TDOF Gyros Same as baseline Detail system synthesis 
(rOOF 6 Accelero- - The two-box & lab demonstration is 
Config.) meters packaging makes scheduled for calendar 
this configura- year 1981. 
tion less 
survivable/ 
reliable than the 
three-box config-
uration for the 
SDOF gyros. 
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TABLE 1 
INTEGRATED SENSOR SYSTEM SUMMARY (CONT'D) 
PROGRAM # OF SENSORS CAPABILITIES DESIGN STATUS 
I I SA 6 Gyros - This system uses - The system definition 
(Laser) inertial quality chase of this program 
6 Accelero- sensors and thus is complete. 
meters provides naviga- - The effort to develop, 
tion AHRS and build and demonstrate 
flight control hardware is scheduled 
- The two-box sensor to begin in calendar 
configuration is year 1981. 
less survivable/ 
reliable than the 
three-box 
configuration. 
MIRA 5 Gyros - This program also - Exploratory development 
(Laser) uses i nerti al efforts and lab demon-
S Accelero- quality sensors stration phases have 
meters and will therefore been completed. 
provide naviga- - The follown-on effort, 
tion, AHRS and lIRA is scheduled to 
fl i ght control begin in calendar year 
system capability. 1981. This program 
- The single box will define a system & 
configuration and hardware configuration 
the reduced number that will eventually 
of sensors used in be flight tested. 
this program 
decreases surviv-
abil ity and 
reliability. 
( 1 ) GYRO BIAS ERRORS ACCELEROMETER BIAS ERRORS 
Flight Control 60° /Hr 10 mq 
AHRS 50 /Hr 2 mg 
Navigation O.Olo/Hr 0.1 mg 
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Draper Labs 
Boeing 
General 
Dynamics 
Lockheed 
Honeywell 
100 
TABLE 2 
INDUSTRY SURVEY: ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY EFFORTS 
Draper labs has been heavily involved with NASA-DRYDEN on 
the F-8 DFBW aircraft program, specifically in the areas 
of reliability and redundancy management. The most recent 
paper by Deckart summarizes F-8 flight test results for 
an analytic redundancy management system. The conclusions 
were: 
1. Analytic redundancy sensors FDI is sensitive to sensor 
modeling errors. 
2. Elaborate failure mode modeling may be necessary. 
3. Sensor bias effects can have significant effects 
on failure detection rates, but can be accounted 
for by use of proper techniques. 
4. Analytic redundancy is a viable approach. 
Boeing has performed work for NASA on ARCS-Airborne 
Advance Reconfigurable Computer System. 
Utilizing the YF-16 with canards, General Dynamics has 
performed design studies on reversion modes during surface 
failures. Also performing AFTI F-16 program. 
Lockheed is involved in the concept studies for the all-
electric airplane and has done some work in redundancy 
management of this system in transport aircraft. 
Honeywell has been involved with the F-8 program and has 
also performed work in other aircraft design studies 
(A-7D, F-14A, etc.). 
NASA-Dryden 
TABLE 2 
'INDUSTRY SURVEY: ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY EFFORTS (CONT'D) 
NASA flight test facility F-8 program, FSW, etc. summary 
of a F-8 flight experience notes the following: 
1. Confirmation of validity AR concept. 
2. Need for high quality sensor models for AR. 
3. Existing technology can provide low probability 
of common mode failures in multichannel systems. 
Northrop/McDonnell Douglas 
Grumman 
Aerospace 
F-18 DFBW fighter design; assume AR studies 
have been performed for this aircraft. Also 
~1FCRS skewed sensor program. 
GAC has performed successful studies in skewed. 
redundant reconfigurable digital flight control 
systems (ASSET, ISS, DRDFCS). ASSET was a flight 
tested article while ISS and DRDFCS have been 
demonstrated in laboratory utilizing flight hardware. 
Resulting conclusions are: 
1. AR concept is valid. 
2. AR can be used to reconfigure flight control 
system to maintain aircraft operation. 
3. AR can be used in air data systems technology. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY TECHNIQUES 
• Like signal differences for fault detection. 
• Unlike signals used to isolate faulty sensor (e.g. derived 
or estimated signals). 
• Signal comparison with derived signals either from other sensors 
or observers/estimators. 
• Blended signals either from direct sensor outputs or combination 
of sensor, state estimators or observers. 
• Modified Sequential Probability Ratio Tests (MSPRT) used in 
detecting low frequency sensor effects (i.e. bias failures, 
modeling errors, etc.). 
• Elapsed time windows/modified log likelihood tests for 
transient failure detection. 
• Diagnostic Filters - assesses sensor family health. (DF) 
state estimation technique. 
• Super Diagnostic Filter - a OF which can assess a single 
sensor. 
• Interchangeable and non-interchangeable sensors utilizing 
analytical decision techniques. 
• Data reasonableness tests. 
• Hypothesis testing - signal whiteness, correlation and 
mean tests. 
• Multiple Hypothesis tests - postulates failure modes and 
determines likelihood functions. Uses multiple State 
estimators. 
• Parameter identification - use PI to determine sensor 
parameters for failure indications. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF ANALYTIC REDUNDANCY TECHNIQUES (CONT'D) 
• Generalized likelihood - use single Diagnostic Filter 
assuming that failures have particular signatures which 
are detectable. 
• Jump process analysis - failures cause recognizable 
transient in otherwise stochastic system. 
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TABLE 4 
PROPOSED FLIGHT DEMO GOALS AND METHOD 
Analytic Redundancy Management 
In presence of detected sensor failure -
• Replace failed sensor with alternate sensor of same type. 
• Replace failed sensor with derived signal from similar sensors 
(skewed technolo~y). 
• Replace failed sensor with derived signal from dissimilar 
sensors (ISS, DRDFCS). 
• Reconfigure FCS to perform without signal from failed sensors. 
Recommendations 
For a flight demo in 1985 -
• Generalized Likelihood Ratio Method 
- single State estimator which detects failures by their 
signature. 
utilization of extensive experience in State estimator 
design and extend to formulation of likelihood functions. 
• Reconfiguration techniques similar to ISS, DRDFCS. 
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TABLE 5 
ACTUATION SYSTEMS SUMMARY 
BENEFITS/FEATURES/ADVANTAGES STATUS & FORECAST FOR 
CONFIGURATION/PROGRAM AND DISADVANTAGES FUTURE APPLICATION 
ELECTROMECHANICAL 
ACTUATION SYSTEMS: 
• Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Co. 
• Boeing Military 
Aircraft Co. 
• Lockheed Cali-
fornia Co. 
• Grumman Aerospace 
Corp. 
• Honeywell, Clear-
water, Fl. 
• Airesearch, 
Torrance, Ca. 
• AFWAL; NADC; NASA 
Headquarters; NASA 
JSC; NASA DFRC 
BENEFITS/FEATURES/ADVANTAGES 
• Increased Energy Efficiency 
• Reduced Life Cycle Cost 
• Reduced Weight 
• Significantly Less Fuel 
Consumption 
• Improved Dispatch Relia-
bility or Operational 
Readiness 
DISADVANTAGES 
• Probable Higher Initial 
Cost 
• High Cost, Moderate Risk 
Development Program 
Required 
• Single axis flight 
test program from 
1982 thru 1984 -
roll & yaw axes 
• Pitch axis & 3 
axis flight test 
programs 1984 
thru 1988. 
• Viable candidate 
for consideration 
for a new aircraft 
design in: 
- 1988 thru 1992 
for a small to 
medium size, 
subsonic air-
craft - up to 
150 passenger 
transport, AEW, 
ASW or s imil ar 
aircraft. 
1992 - 2010 for 
large transports 
or fighter/ 
attack aircraft. 
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TABLE ~ . 
ACTUATION SYSTEMS SUMMARY (CONT'D) 
BENEFITS/FEATURES/ADVANTAGES STATUS & FORECAST FOR 
CONFIGURATION/PROGRAM AND DISADVANTAGES FUTURE APPLICATION 
DIRECT DRIVE VALVES 
• North American -
Columbus Division 
• McDonnell Douglas 
• Most Hydraulic 
Actuator Suppliers 
- MOOG; National 
Water Lift; Bendix 
Electrodynamics; 
Bertea; etc. 
• NADC; AFWAL 
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BENEFITS/ADVANTAGES 
• Increased Reliability 
• Reduced Cost, Complex-
ity, Weight 
• Reduced Maintenance 
• Eliminates EHV Null Flow 
Losses 
• Simplifies Interface with 
Hydraulic Systems & 
Redundant FBW System 
DISADVANTAGES 
• Increased Electrical Power 
Levels Req'd 
• Chip Shear Forces tend to 
be Low 
• Reliability Base for Jam 
Free Motor 8 Valve 
Combination 
• EMI Generation 
• First generation 
flight test pro-
grams 1981 thru 
1982. 
• Second generation 
flight test of 
production type 
hardware ]982 -
1984 
• Integrated studies 
& test programs -
1983 to 1986. 
• Production appli-
cation decision 
point - 1985 to 
1987. 
TABLE 5 
ACTUATION SYSTEMS SUMMARY (CONT'D) 
BENEFITS/FEATURES/ADVANTAGES STATUS & FORECAST FOR 
CONFIGURATION/PROGRAM AND DISADVANTAGES FUTURE APPLICATION 
INTEGRATED ACTUATOR 
PACKAGES (rAP): 
• Boeing Military 
Aircraft Co. 
• North American Div. 
of Rockwell 
International 
• Sperry Vickers 
• Bendix 
Electrodynamics 
• AFWAL 
BENEFITS/ADVANTAGES 
• 80% to 90% Efficient 
vs. 50% to 60% for 
Conventional Approach 
• Controlled Variable is 
usually Pump Displacement 
- is a Power Demand Device 
• Negligible Velocity Varia-
tion with Load 
• Approximately 70% Power 
Savings 
• Up to 400% Reliability 
Increase 
• Up to 55% Weight Savings 
• As much as 2x Survivabil-
ity Enhancement 
DISADVANTAGES 
• More Complex & Probably 
More Costly 
• Thermal Problem in Some 
Applications 
• Successfully used 
on VC-I0 
transport. 
• New generation 
hardware in early 
development 
stages. 
• Flight tests 
planned in 1982 
through 1984. 
• Transports & other 
subsonic aircraft 
would be candi-
dates in 1983 -
1986. 
• Questionable for 
application to 
fl i ghter/ attack 
aircraft due to 
heat problem. 
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TABLE 5 
ACTUATION SYSTEMS SUMMARY (CONT'D) 
BENEFITS/FEATURES/ADVANTAGES STATUS & FORECAST FOR 
CONFIGURATION/PROGRAM AND DISADVANTAGES FUTURE APPLICATION 
LIGHT WEIGHT/HIGH 
PRESSURE HYDRAULIC 
SYSTEMS - U.S. NAVY 
PROGRAM: 
• North American, 
Columbus Division 
of Rockwell 
International 
• Vouqht 
• Grumman 
• Numerous Equipment 
Suppliers 
• NAVAIR; NADC 
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BENEFITS/ADVANTAGES 
• 25% to 30% Weight Savings 
Possible 
• Significant Reduction in 
Volume 
• Increased Survivability 
• Improved Reliability & 
Maintenance 
DISADVANTAGES/PROBLEM AREAS 
• Actuator Stiffness 
• Development Risk 
• Reliability 
• Standardization & Safety 
Considerations 
• All New Ground Support 
Equipment Req'd 
• Heat Rejection 
• Preliminary flight 
test program 
completed. 
• More extended but 
limited flight 
test program 
scheduled in 1981 
- 1983. 
• Possible produc-
tion decision 
point in 1983 -
1985. 
TABLE 5 
ACTUATION SYSTEMS SUMMARY (CONT'D) 
BENEFITS/FEATURES/ADVANTAGES STATUS & FORECAST FOR 
CONFIGURATION/PROGRAM AND DISADVANTAGES FUTURE APPLICATION 
ROTARY ACTUATORS: 
• Electromechanical 
- Airesearch, 
Torrance, Ca. 
- Grumman 
- AFWAL 
- NADC 
• Electrohydraulic 
- Hydraulic Units, 
Inc. 
- Bendix Electro-
dynamics 
- McDonnell Douglas 
BENEFITS/ADVANTAGES 
• Ideal for Thin Wing & 
Restricted Space Envelope 
Applications 
• Usually Designed as Hinge 
Line Units 
DISADVANTAGES 
• Generally More Costly 
• Long Development Time 
Req'd 
• Small to Moderate Risk 
Involved 
• Electrohydraulic 
used on rudder of 
F-15. 
• Electromechanical 
type mechanization 
used on flap/slat 
drives of F-16 
and/or F-18. 
• Technology avail-
able now for some 
applications 
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TYPE NO: 
INPUT POWER: 
WEIGHT: 
CRT: 
OPERATING MODE: 
INTERFACE SIGNALS: 
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TABLE 6 
OISPLAY UNIT CHARACTERISTICS 
3775073-] 
115 VAC, 3 Phase, 400 HZ at 100W, 
28 VDC at .07A 
12.5 Lbs. 
5 x 5 shadow mask 
Vertical 5.0 inches 
Horizontal - 5.0 inches 
Diagonal - 6.7 inches 
Neutral density filter 
Stroke 
Raster (525 line std.) 
Raster with stroke overlay 
Horizontal Deflection 
Vertical Deflection 
Raster Red Analog Video 
Raster Green Analog Video 
Raster Blue Analog Video 
Stroke Red Logic 
Stroke Green Logic 
Stroke Blue Logic 
81 ankinq Logic 
Raster/Stroke Logic (Source/Mode Switching) 
PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS: 
Bezel: 
Display Unit: 
Control Unit: 
RELIABILITY (MTBF) 
TABLE 6 
DISPLAY UNIT CHARACTERISTICS (CONTID) 
Height - 6.75 inches 
Width - 6.50 inches 
Hei~ht - 6.63 inches 
Width - 6.38 inches 
Length (excluding connector) - 13.58 inches 
Height - 1.1 inches 
Width - 6.5 inches 
Length - 2.4 inches 
6062 HOURS 
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5.0 FORMULATION AND DESCRIPTION OF ADVANCED ARCHITECTURE CONCEPTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed the accelerating use of digital 
technology in aircraft systems. Low cost, greater reliability, and en-
hanced performance coupled with the emergence of active controls and energy 
efficient aircraft were the major factors influencinq this trend. One 
objective of this study is to assess recent developments and new directions 
in digital technology which show promise in supporting the goals of 
full-time, full-authority and highly reliable control systems. 
As control systems evolved through several generations of aircraft, it 
was recognized that full-authority controls could provide significant 
benefits in performance and economy. However, such systems are necessarily 
flight critical since a malfunction could result in loss of the aircraft. 
As a consequence, survivability has become the paramount consideration in 
their employment. For purposes of this study a "highly reliable system" is 
one which has a survivability rate no less than 10 -IO/hour of flight; this is 
several orders of ma~nitude beyond the goal of current FBW control systems, 
(Typically, 10 -7/hour). Failure rates of digital components are not 
expected to improve sufficiently to meet either of these goals without 
employing some degree of fault-tolerant capability. Thus, an advanced 
architecture will consist of a computing complex that must survive its own 
failures, detect and isolate failures throughout the system and manage the 
reallocation of surviving resources. The responsibility for containing 
faults and maintaining access to surviving resources wil fall heavily on 
networks which carry data signals to the dispersed elements of the system. 
Thus, we have the two essential elements of the highly reliable system: 
• A communications network capable of supporting the requirements of 
data transmission, failure management and reliability 
• A fault-tolerant computing complex 
It is our considered opinion that, with few exceptions, the technology 
base necessary to support the goals of an advanced control system exists. 
It is only necessary to apply that technology in new and innovative 
directions. 
5.2 Conventional Architectures 
Some of the deficiencies of conventional architecture have already 
been alluded to in Section 4.5. These and others are briefly summarized: 
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Deficiencies of the Conventional Architectures 
• Dedicated, hardwired interfaces 
• Unique signal conversion hardware 
• Large variety of signal formats 
• Effective redundancy requires hardware duplication (e.g. for cross-
strapping) 
• Little or no sharing of resources 
• Poor qrowth capability 
We can roughly describe the conventional flight control system as 
consisting of dedicated sensors, computers and actuators with dedicated and 
soecialized communication links between the sensors and computers, between 
the computers and actuators and between the computers, themselves. 
Sensors are monitored by the computers which employ relatively complicated 
voting and monitoring algorithms for this purpose. Actuators are monitored 
by internal mechanical or hydraulic logic and/or by the computers. And the 
computers always monitor each other. The result of this is: 
• A large proportion of real time is used to input, output and 
monitor system variables. 
• Reconfiguration is reduced to the simple strategy of disengaging a 
failed element. 
• Expansion is difficult and usually requires a significant system 
redesign. 
• Spare subsystems are not easy to incorporate, even if available. 
The impact of these properties will be assessed in Section 6.0. 
5.3 Advanced Architecture 
Apart from the threshold qualifications of economy and reliability, the 
key factor in the selection of an advanced architecture is its ability to 
provide a communications structure that is flexible and allows the 
designer maximum scope in implementing a control concept. Thus, for 
example, the structure should accommodate a centralized or distributed 
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system; sequential or parallel processinq; hierarchial bus structure; 
centralized or distributed monitoring; synchronous or asychronous control; 
voting and masking failures, etc. In addition, it is desirable that the 
structure consist of familiar and accepted technologies. 
The advanced architecture consists of the following elements: 
1. a bus network; 
2. an ultrareliable multiprocessor bus controller; 
3. a set of sensors and sensor interface processors; 
4. a set of actuators and actuator interface processors; 
5. a set of application processors; 
All of these elements would be connected to a single, local network 
consistinq of dual, 1553B busses. If a single local network did not have 
sufficient bandwidth it would be necessary to employ a second network. An 
examole of the structure is shown in Figure 30 for the subsystems of a 
typical fliqht control system. The levels of redundancy shown in the 
diagram are for illustrative purposes, only, and do not necessarily imply 
firm requirements. 
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM ELEMENTS 
1. Bus Network 
The bus network consists of local networks of dual, 1553B busses, 
as described in Section 4.5. The principal issues associated with 
the bus network are: 
• available bandwidth, 
• quantity of remote terminals accommodated, 
• vulnerability to single point failure, 
• transmission errors 
Bus loading estimates are given in Appendix A. There it is shown that 
bus utilization for a typical flight control system for a commercial 
transport is 86%, assuming a single bus at a 1 MHZ transmission rate. 
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Although this estimate is conservative, it does indicate that at least two, 
independent busses would be required. A modest increase in bus bandwidth, 
e.g. to 4 MHZ, can be expected in the near future. A 4 MHZ bandwidth will 
certainly be sufficient for flight controls for current aircraft. 
The terminal limitations (e.g. 31 terminals, maximum) is more 
difficult to overcome since any expansion requires a modification of the 
1553B protocol. The restriction to 31 terminal limits the degree of 
distributed processing that the network can accommodte. 
The vulnerability of 1553B to single point failures can be overcome by 
providing dual or triplicated busses, only one of which is active at 
any given time. Preliminary analysis of bus and terminal failure modes 
indicates that a dual bus would provide the necessary survivability. 
There are two kinds of transmission errors associated with 1553B: 
detected and undetected bit errors. The detected errors are characterized 
by the word error rate (WER) which is specified in (Ref (10) to be 
WER = 10(-7) errors/word. 
Since the bus protocol allows for an immediate retransmission of the 
faulty data, the detected errors have a negligible effect on system 
operation. 
The undetected errors are characterized by the bit error rate (BER) 
which is specified in Ref (10) to be 
BER = 10(-12)/bit, 
which is equivalent to 3600 x 10 (-)6 errors per hour at a 1 MHZ transmission 
rate. The intended failure detection strategy employs persistence counting 
before a subsystem element is permanently disengaged" e.g. it is 
disenqaged only if the error persists for a prescribed number of frames. 
As a consequence, if voting is employed by subsystems using this data then 
the fault can be masked during the persistence counting. This assumes that 
the persistence count is not so long and the probability of a second, 
independent failure so high that it would defeat the voter. This is 
usually the case. Thus, under normal conditions, undetected bit errors have a 
negligible effect on system operation. 
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2) An Ultrareliable Bus Controller 
The advantages of an ultrareliable bus controller are: 
• Redundant, critical components can be connected to a single local 
network. 
• The bus controller can be used to monitor all system variables and 
monitor system status. 
• The bus controller can function as the system reconfiguration 
manager. 
• The bus controller can supply an accurate clock to the system. 
All of these functions are critical and require, for their 
implementation, an ultrareliable bus controller, i.e. 10 (-10)/hour 
probability of functional failure. 
It is intended to use a SIFT-type multiprocessor to perform the 
functions of bus control for the entire system. The interface between the 
bus controller and the local network has already been described in Section 
4.5. As indicated in that section, a redundant set of processors is assigned 
control of a local network but only one processor actually controls the 
network at any given time. When the controlling processor fails, it is 
disengaged from the local network by an independent switching network. The 
switching logic is obtained by majority-voting failure discretes supplied by 
the SIFT processors. The functional schematic of this interface is shown 
in Figure 31, two possible implementations are shown in Figure 32, one of 
which employs mechanical and the other, solid state switching. Since a 
processor remains in control of a local network until it fails, the duty 
cycle of a switch will be small and the switching transient will have a 
negligible effect on systems operation. 
He note that the proposed bus interface hardware can be used to 
implement a system of independent, redundant busses. However, the approach 
taken in this study is to transmit redundant data over a single local 
network rather than over several such networks. 
The reliability of the proposed interface has yet to be determined but 
it is expected to be at least 10 (-10)/hour. The principal failure modes are: 
• a normally open switch closes; 
• a switch remains open; 
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• an isolation amplifier shorts; 
• the address logic fails. 
Normally, each processor sets its isolation amplifier to its high 
impedance state when it is not in active control of a local network. As a 
consequence, a normally open switch closure will have no effect even if the 
associated processor eventually takes control of the bus (the switches are 
assumed to be independent). 
A switch that cannot close will result in the inabiity of the 
associated processor to control the bus. This failure will be detected by 
the bus control monitors when the affected processor eventually assumes 
control of the bus. 
A failed isolation amplifier can have several effects, depending upon 
the nature of the fault. In the worst case it will result in disengagement 
of the" associated processor when it assumes active control of a bus. 
A fault in the address logic will connect an unassigned processor to 
the bus and disengage the assigned processor. The unassigned processor's 
isolation amplifier will be in the high impedance state and, consequently, 
the fault will appear to be a failure of the bus. The assigned processor 
will then revert to a standby bus for subsequent communications. 
The oroposed interface circuitry is clearly sufficient to prevent 
single failures from disabling a local network. The potential risk is 
combinations of faults that can do so, for example, a normally open switch 
closure followed by a processor failure which activates the isolation 
amplifier associated with the failed switch. If the faulty processor is 
malicious it could direct all remote terminals to disengage themselves from 
the standby busses, thus, effectively disabling the entire local network. 
While such failures are undoubtedly highly improbable, a detailed failure 
analysis is required before any proposed arrangement can be considered 
fir~. 
Several interface configurations for bus monitoring have been proposed 
in Section 4.5. The recommended configuration is shown in Figure 17. 
In this arrangement a processor can listen to any local network but only 
one network at any given time. Normally, at least three processors will 
listen to the traffic on a local network for the purpose of: 
• monitoring the bus controller, 
• monitoring redundant system variables 
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Monitorinq The Bus Controller 
Since each processor listens directly to the bus transactions, it can 
monitor the bus controller independently of the other processors. Thus, 
monitoring can be made effective and timely. Because the bus controller is 
passive, i.e it does not transmit data, a faulty bus controller can, at 
worst, inhibit bus transactions until it is disengaged. Thus, the time to 
detect and diagnose a faulty bus controller is determined by the effect of 
this hiatus on system performance. While this effect will depend upon the 
system characteristics it is reasonable to assume that a hiatus equal to 
the smallest iteration interval of a critical subsystem is acceptable. In 
the case of a flight control system for a current commercial aircraft, this 
could be as large as 50 miliseconds. If we assume an average of 10 
words/message in a typical RT to RT transaction, then a single message 
requires 306 microseconds for completion (see Appendix A for bus 
transaction times) or, approximately, 3 messages per milisecond or 150 
messages per primary cycle. This is ample data on which to base a 
detection strategy. 
Monitoring Redundant Variables 
It is intended that all redundant variables transmitted on a local 
network will be monitored by the bus controller. This relieves the users 
of a very considerable real time burden and makes the bus controller 
responsible for the integrity of data transmitted on the bus. 
A preliminary analysis indicates that, even under the most pessimistic 
conditions, the bus controller has sufficient time to perform the 
monitorinq task. To assess this capability we assume that a message of 32 
words is sent in triplicate via an RT-to-RT transmission at the maximum 
rate of 1 MHZ. The time to transmit the three messages is 2238 microseconds 
(see Appendix A). Thus, the time to transmit a single variable, in 
triplicate, is 
2238/32 = 69.94 microseconds 
Rased on a comparison-monitoring algorithm developed by Bendix and 
executed on a Bendix BDX-930 processor, the time to perform a 3-way 
comparison is 48 microseconds. Thus, even in the most improbable scenario 
(i.e. 32, triple redundant variables with a refresh time of 2238 
microseconds) there is sufficient time to perform the monitoring task. 
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In practice, it is proposed to monitor each redundant variable during 
its minor cycle transmission, i.e. the minimum refresh time. As a conse-
quence, the variable could be in error during this time and not be identified 
as such. Subsystems using this data would have to either tolerate the error 
or incorporate input voting to mask the error. When an error is attributed 
to a source the bus controller will: 
• inform all users of the error and/or, 
• supply an alternate variable and 
• continue to monitor the variable for persistence. 
Bus Protocol 
Bus protocol will consist primarily of RT-to-RT and broadcast 
transmissions. Although the bus protocol can accommodate asynchronous 
transmission, it is expected that, in the majority of cases, the bus 
controller will direct transmission in a fixed, periodic sequence, the 
update rate of each variable being determined by the performance 
requirements of the users, i.e. effects of transport delays. 
Redundant data can be transmitted in several ways: 
1. Each redundant variable is associated with a different user and is 
transmitted to that user via the RT-to-RT mode. The other users, 
meanwhile, input the variable as in the broadcast mode. The 
assigned user is responsible for return of the "STATUS" word. 
2. All redundant variables are transmitted in the broadcast mode. 
The bus controller assumes responsibility for the integrity of the 
data. 
The former protocol is preferred even through it requires a 
modification of terminal decoding and response procedures. This approach 
a' insures that at least one user receives the data correctly and 
b) provides redundant data for input voting without the penalty of 
redundant transmissions. 
3) Sensors and Sensor Interface Processors 
Sensors are grouped into dissimilar sets with each set serviced by a 
sensor interface processor. Each processor would: 
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• input a sensor, 
• provide the appropriate signal conditioning, 
• format and transmit the encoded signal to the local network. In 
a totally distributed system each processor would be dedicated to 
a single sensor. Signal conditioning would take cognizance of the 
users' requirements and the dynamics of the digitizing process would 
be documented and made available to all users. 
A typical triply redundant sensor interface is shown in Figure 33. 
As indicated previously, the proposed architecture does not preclude 
private busses between sUbsystems. Although it is intended that the bus 
controller will monitor redundant variables it is recognized that in some 
instances this may not be practical, i.e. in the case of skewed sensors. 
In such cases the interface processor could perform this function, using a 
dedicated bus for interprocessor communications. 
One of the advantage of the sensor arrangement is that spare sensors 
can be incorporated by simply connecting their associated processors to 
the local network. In this way any number of spares can be accommodated 
with a negli9ible impact on the system architecture. 
4) Actuators and Actuator Interface Processors 
The proposed architecture imposes no constraints on the actuation 
system other than that it must provide sufficient survivability and be able 
to incorporate spare units as may be required by the maintenance strategy. 
Indeed, it is intended that the actuator configuration he transparent to 
other subsystems. It is only required to provide an interface between the 
actuator and the local network. One possible arrangement is shown in 
Figure 34 for a single primary actuator. The secondary actuators are 
quadruplex and mechanically summed and each is serviced by an actuator 
interface processor. An interface processor could service several 
different actuators, depending upon the degree of dispersal desired. Each 
actuator processor would, as a minimum, 
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• input actuator commands from the local network, 
• provide the appropriate signal conditioning for the selected 
command, 
• transmit this command to the secondary actuator. 
I\ct.uator commands are monitored by the bus controller. As described 
previously. pach 'redundant command is associated with a dedicated interface 
processor and is sent to that processor via an RT-to-RT transmission; the 
other processors receive the same data as in the broadcast mode. All 
processors would perform input voting to mask a command error. 
Monitoring the actuators and actuator interface processors is the 
responsibility of the respective subsystem. It is expected that monitoring 
techniques will be similar to those employed in conventional systems. 
5) Application Processing 
The application processors perform tne control computations for the 
system. As stated previously and emphasized repeatedly, the bus structure 
provides the maximum flexibility for implementing a control concept and this 
applies particularly to the application processors. This flexibility is 
illustrated in the following paragraphs. 
SIFT Multiprocessor Systems 
The proposed architecture can accommodate a SIFT-type system by simply 
connecting the individual processors and standbys to the local network. The 
processors could perform the same control computations, voting, and monitoring 
as formerly, using the dedicated broadcast busses for interprocessor 
communication. The only difference is that, in the proposed architecture, 
there exists a "smart", independent and ultrareliable bus controller to 
monitor inputs and outputs to the local network. Now, when an individual 
processor fails, the failure status is communicated to the bus controller 
which then takes the appropriate reconfiguration action. This consists 
primarily of substituting the outputs of another processor for those of 
the faulted processor. It is no longer necessary to have user subsystems 
monitor SIFT outputs and failure status. 
The proposed architecture and the expanded role of the bus controller 
are entirely compatible with the SIFT concept. A typical applications 
processor interface is shown in Figure 35. 
Distributed System 
SIFT performs all of the control computations for the system and is 
directed in this activity by a Central Executive program that is replicated 
on each SIFT bus controller. While SIFT is effectively a centralized system 
its component processors could be physically dispersed along the local 
network. In a distributed system, on the other hand, the control tasks 
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are partitioned among sets of application processors, each at a level 
of redundancy commensurate with the criticality of the task. These 
subsystems perform reduced tasks and operate more or less independently of 
each other. The vulnerability of the distributed system to single faults 
is less than in the larger computer complex since there are fewer "eggs in 
one basketll. Moreover, the complexity of applications software is reduced 
since the control functions are partitioned over small, independent modules 
instead of being time shared in a single centralized computer. The 
proposed separation of sensor and actuator interface processors is a 
further step in the direction of distributed processing, and distributed 
software. 
The physical arrangement of distributed application processors would be 
identical to that of Figure 35 except that there would be many such 
subsystems connected to the local network. 
Monitoring the application processors can be performed by the bus 
controller or by the subsystem, itself. As with other subsystems the bus 
controller monitors all outputs to the local network. When an error is 
detected, the bus controller, thereafter, ignores the errant processorls 
outputs and delegates an alternate or standby unit to perform the same 
function and arranges a transfer of initializing data from an on-line to 
the standby processor. Another approach is to allow each subsystem to 
monitor itself. When a fault is detected the subsystem communicates the 
fault status to the bus controller for reconfiguration action. 
Another approach to control of either the centralized or distributed 
system is parallel processing. This approach is described in Section 6. 
5.4 PHYSICAL LOCATION OF ELECTRONICS 
A trade-off of alternate locations of flight control and avionics 
electronic equioment for a transport aircraft was conducted in (Ref (7) 
from the point of view of a) damage tolerance, b) wire length/cost savings, 
c) environmental conditions and d) maintainability. The configurations 
considered were: 
One Bay 
Two Bay 
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LOCATION ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
One primary electronics area located near nose under 
cockpit. 
Primary electronics separated as much as possible into 
two areas preferably separated by a bulkdead to increase 
damage tolerance. 
Three Bay Same general location as two bay with reduced fault 
tolerance within each bay. 
Six Bay Electronics located within pressurized fuselage as close as 
practical to the associated equipment/actuators/sensors. 
Nine Bay Same general locations as six bay with reduced fault 
tolerance within each bay. 
Multi- Selected electronics are located outside pressurized 
location fuselage in order to be close to equipment being serviced. 
Embedded Electronics either embedded within equipment being serviced 
or in very close proximity. This is the fully dispersed 
arrangement. 
Although the assumptions on which the trade-offs were based do not 
exactly apply to the proposed architecture (principally in the structure of 
the bus network) the conclusions are sufficiently general to be applicable 
to a variety of architectures and are, therefore, worth summarizing here. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
One Bay 
• Excellent maintainability and environment 
• Intrabay communications short and protected 
• Excessive amount of dedicated wire required for remote 
equipment 
• Damage tolerance may be too low to support fully flight 
crucial functions 
Two Bay 
• Essentially the same maintainability, environment, and 
wiring as one bay 
• Some interbay communications required 
• Damage tolerance increased to allow full flight crucial 
functions 
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Three nay 
• 
• 
• 
Six Bay 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Essentially the same maintainability, environment, wiring, 
and damage tolerance as two bay 
Fault tolerance within each bay can be reduced 
Allows straightforward interface with triplex actuators 
Environment essentially the same as the one and two bay 
with maintenance only slightly less convenient 
Total wire required significantly reduced 
Damage tolerance increased 
Intrabay communications more complex 
Nine Bay 
• Expands six bay configuration to reduce the fault 
tolerance requirements of the three bay 
Multi-
location 
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• Wire lengths again significantly reduced 
• All locations no longer have to provide high levels of 
internal redundancy 
• Environment and maintainability for some locations con-
siderable degraded 
• Interlocation communications becomes more critical 
Embedded 
• Wire lenghts reduced to minimum 
• Supports high degree of fault and damage tolerance 
• Maintenance and environment extremely bad for some 
equipment 
• Reliability for electronics must be very high to avoid 
significantly reducing the reliability of the equipment 
in which it is embedded (not currently possible in some 
cases) 
The conclusions indicate that, from the standpoint of damage tolerance 
and reduced wire length, distributed deployment (i.e. multi-location and 
embedded) is preferred. The disadvantages of degraded environment and poor 
maintainability make distrihuted deployment risky, at the present time. 
The 3-bay and 6-bay arrangements appear to be reasonable compromises 
provided that they can be made sufficiently tolerant to damage. A 6-bay 
configuration employing a dual bus is shown in Figure 36. 
Relative to damage tolerance a deployment strategy for the advanced 
architecture will be strongly influenced by the following considerations: 
• The fatal damage rate must be less than lO(-lO)/hour. 
• The deployment should be transparent to the users, i.e. failure 
detection and isolation strategies should be independent of where 
the equipment is located. 
• The deployment should not impose constraints on the allocation 
of tasks within an application processor such as SIFT, or in the 
bus controller, e.g. the assignment of a set of processors to 
service a bus should be independent of the location of the 
processor. 
These requirements can certainly be satisfied if the system elements 
are deployed in such a way that a single damage event will not disable more 
that one element of a redundant set. Although this may be overkill, in 
most cases (depending upon the probability of damage), it is recommended 
as the deployment strategy for the advanced architecture. 
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6.0 PARALLEL PROCESSING 
6.] Introduction 
Most, if not all, digital flight control computations are processed 
sequentially. While sequential processinq offers the advantages of unified 
software under the control of a single Executive, it creates a number of 
problems: 
1. The CPU must be fast enough to execute the maximum set of 
computations, in sequence, in a prescribed period of time. 
Thus, the time required tends to increase linearly with the 
number of computations. 
2. Software programs can be interactive in unexpected ways due 
to software errors or hardware faults. 
3. The interaction of software, whether by design or error, imposes 
an additional burden on software validation. It is necessary to 
validate the potential interaction of each program as well as the 
program in isolation. 
In order to overcome these problems the alternative approach of 
parallel processing was investigated for this study. Parallel processing 
offers significant potential benefits: 
• By processing software tasks in parallel using multiple processors, 
the real time required is determined by the real time to execute a 
single task. 
• Software programs are physically isolated. While there may be some 
areas of interaction, e.g. shared data, the interaction is minimal 
and, hence, relatively easy to validate. Moreover, a large propor-
tion of faults and even software errors will affect only the errant 
processor and will require less validation, as a consequence. 
• The distribution of tasks among smaller processors affords an 
improvement in reliability due to a) increased reliability of the 
smaller processors and b) the potential for cross-strapping. 
• The distribution of tasks among smaller processors minimizes the 
effects of single faults on the total system. Thus, if control 
could be executed, in parallel, by axes, then loss of a single 
processor would only affect a single axis. 
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• The distribution of tasks among smaller processors results in 
smaller, more manageable, software programs. 
In summary, the potential benefits of parallel processing are: 
• improved real time 
• simplified software 
• simplified validation 
• improved reliability 
• qrowth capability 
• improved software maintenance 
It remains to be seen whether and to what extent these benefits can be 
realized in the flight controls application, and what the penalty is in 
additional hardware. 
6.2 Feasibility of Parallel Processing for Flight Controls 
Present and projected advances in microcircuit technology make 
the employment of large numbers of microprocessors in an aircraft 
technically and economically feasible. We anticipate, in the near future, 
inexpensive, single-chip microprocessors with self-contained memories and 
speeds comparable to todays' bit-sliced minicomputers. The availability of 
cheap and compact computing elements together with the potential benefits 
cited previously make parallel processing an attractive candidate for 
flight control applications. 
In this section the feasibility of parallel processing for flight 
controls will be demonstrated. We note, in this connection, that parallel 
orocessing is implicit in the distributed system which disperses sensor, 
application and actuator processing. The concurrent processing of I/O and 
control laws is a standard practice even in conventional systems that 
employ, for example, DMA as autonomous I/O controllers, and it requires no 
further justification here. Thus, it only remains to demonstrate the 
feasibility of parallel processing within an applications processor. 
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6.~.1 Parallel Applications Processing 
The objective of the parallel processor is to conserve real time by 
executing tasks concurrently. Relative to the flight control application 
our investigation of parallel processing was rlirected at the following 
issues: 
• Can an algorithm be classified by the degree to which it lends 
itself to parallel processing? 
• What is the connection between real time improvement and the 
number of processors used? 
• What are the characteristics of the "ideal" parallel processor? 
• What impact does parallel processing have on error detection, fault 
isolation and redundancy management? 
No attempt was made to quantify the impact of parallel processing 
(i.e. the distribution of large software tasks into smaller, independent 
tasks) on software and software validation. Although we believe that the 
distribution and concurrent execution of software tasks will greatly 
simplify the software effort, a quantitative assessment of these benefits 
would not be credible at the present time. To be convincing, an evaluation 
would require a comparison study of software design and validation 
techniques and costs for conventional and parallel systems. In any case, it 
would be exceedingly difficult to assess conventional software costs 
inasmuch as the benefits of many software design procedures are largely 
subjective. 
Classification of Algorithms 
In general, a large class of algorithms lend themselves, in various 
degrees, to parallel execution. To characterize these algorithms we made 
numerous attempts to formally define a parallel process and in such a way 
that the definition coincided with common usage and, at the same time, 
provided a meaningful distinction between parallel and other processes. The 
effort was unsuccessful. Instead, we give an informal definition that, 
at least, highlights the distinguishing features of parallel processes 
in the context of the present study. 
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Definition 
A "process" is a program executed on a CPU. 
Defi nit i on 
Two processes are "parallel processes" if, when executed on distinct 
CPU's, 
• both processes can be executed concurrently and 
• the computed outputs of either process are inaccessible to the 
other during their respective executions 
We note that the above definition does not preclude a processor 
inputting from a source different from the other processor while it is 
executing, e.q. it can input from a remote terminal. Nor does the 
definition preclude outputting at any time during execution provided that 
the outputs are not made available to the other processor. 
The definition can be extended to more than two processes in an 
obvious way, i.e all processes can be executed concurrently and the computed 
outputs of any process are not accessible to the other processes during 
their executions. According to this definition parallelism is not 
associative, i.e. if processes, PI and P2 are parallel and P2 and P3 are 
parallel it does not necessarily follow that PI and P3 are parallel. This 
is illustrated in Figure 37 where PI, P2 and P3 represent filters in a 
flight control computation. We note that this result conforms to common 
usagp.. 
An interesting feature of the definition of parallel processing is 
that it is not explicit regarding the correctnesss of the resultant outputs. 
According to the definition PI and P2 could be parallel processes even 
though PI followed sequentially by P2 yielded a different output than when 
PI and P2 were executed concurrently. This is illustrated by tandem 
filters in a flight control computation. The penalty paid for concurrent 
execution is a transport delay, which mayor may not be acceptable. 
From the standpoint of flight controls there are two potential 
penalties associated with parallel processing: 
• the introduction of transport delays and 
• real time and hardware overhead to support concurrent execution. 
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Transport Oelay 
Before assessing this penalty let us consider the transport delays of 
a sequential, digital process: 
1. If the computation is iterated every T seconds, then the output 
sample and hold circuit introduces an effective time delay of T/2 
seconds. This is the price one pays for digital processing. 
2. The time delay between imputting a sensor and outputting the surface 
command. This includes computational delays. Minimizing this 
delay is the reason that data refresh rates should be at least 
4 times greater than the iteration rate of the sensor subsystem. 
As illustrated by the previous example, parallel processing could 
introduce an additional transport delay which is, effectively, an extension 
of the time between inputting a sensor and outputting to an actuator. In 
our treatment of parallel processor configurations every effort was made to 
eliminate or at least minimize this time delay while no attempt was made to 
improve upon the inherent time delays of the sequential process. 
Distribution of Tasks 
For the purposes of this study a "parallel processor" is a collection 
of distinct processors that execute their programs concurrently. A 
simplified version of a parallel processor is shown in Figure 38. 
Referrinq to the figure, a flight control computation is partitioned into 
subtasks and these are distributed among the micr~processors for execution. 
Most, but not necessarily all, of the subtasks will be parallel processes 
and can be executed concurrently without introducing a transport delay. 
Before commencing a subtask, each microprocessor fetches the appropriate 
input data from a common memory using a dedicated interprocessor link for 
this purpose. After completion of the task the microprocessor stores the 
results in the common memory for later access by other processors. Access 
to the local network is provided by a remote terminal (not shown) that ex-
chanqes data between the bus network and the common memory. 
Two extreme examples of the distribution and execution of tasks in a 
parallel procssor are shown in Figure 39. Initially, three processes, PI, 
P? and P3 are executed, in that order, in a sequential processor during a 
frame of duration, T. Each process is then assigned to a distinct 
microprocessor. If the processes are independent (i.e. parallel) in the 
sense that P3 does not require an output from PI or P3 then the processes 
can be executed concurrently without introducing an additional time delay. 
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If, on the other hand, these processes are dependent then they must be 
executed sequentially (as in arrangement B of the figure) if an extraneous 
time delay is to be avoided. The arrows indicate the transfer of data from 
the output of one process to the input of another. 
The point to be made here is that any flight control computation can be 
partitioned into subtasks and executed on distinct microprocessors without 
introducing extraneous time delays. The fact that some tasks may be 
executed sequentially does not necessarily diminish the real time benefits 
afforded. In this connection we note that both distrihutions provide, at 
least in theory, the same reserve of real time for additional processing. 
The differences in the two approaches are: 
• each of the processes of arrangement B must be as fast as the 
sequential processor; 
• arrangement B requires data transfers within a frame, which 
increases the overhead penalty. 
Experience has shown that a substantial proportion of flight control 
computations can be partitioned and executed concurrently without 
introducing a significant, additional time delay. 
Example 1 
In conventional flight controls, pitch, roll and yaw axis computations 
are relatively independent. Thus, the distribution of these computations 
and their concurrent execution in distinct microprocessors would not 
introduce extra time delays. 
Example 2 
This example demonstates that some additional time delay may be 
unavoidable. An outer loop consists of two computations A, followed by B. 
A inputs the sensors and B outputs to the inner loop computation, C. We 
assume that the outer loop is iterated every T seconds and the inner loop, 
every T/2 seconds. The most efficient (from the standpoint of real time) 
concurrent execution of these tasks is shown in Figure 40. In this 
distribution CPU #1 executes the outer loop every T seconds and CPU #2 
executes the inner loop every T/2 seconds. 
From the figure it can be seen that the concurrent execution 
contributes an additional time delay of T/2 seconds, approximately. Of 
course, this time delay could be reduced by executing the complete 
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computations. Fortunately, the ratio of outer-loop to inner-loop iteration 
rates is greatly in excess of a factor of two, in practice. Since the 
extra time delay can never exceed T/2 seconds, the resultant effect on 
outer-loop dynamics would be insignificant. 
2) Overhead Penalty 
The real time benefits of parallel processing are measured by the 
reserve of real time available for additional computations (as indicated, 
for example, in Figure 39). Unfortunately, there is an associated real 
time overhead penalty that could seriously reduce the effectiveness of the 
parallel processor. 
To assess this penalty let us consider n tasks, PI, P2, ••• Pn, executed 
in a single CPU. We assume that the average time to execute a single task 
is T. We now assign each of these tasks to a distinct processor. For 
comparison purposes it is assumed that each of the n processors is 
identical to the original processor. 
If the n tasks are now executed we will observe that each processor 
takes slightly more real time to execute its assigned task than the 
original processor. This is due, of course, to the real time 
overhead. In general, this overhead is due to: 
• data transfers over the interprocessor link, 
• executive programming requirements. 
If 
aT = average wastage time of a parallel processor executing a single 
task 
then each processor requires, on the average, T + aT to execute its assigned 
task. Thus, the total time required by the parallel processor to execute 
all of the tasks is nT + noT, as compared with nT for the original 
processor. 
He define the inefficiency of the parallel processor by the ratio 
r = (nT + noT)/nT = I + aT/T. 
We interpret this to mean that it takes r processors, executing 
concurrently, to compute a task in the same time it takes a single, 
sequential processor. For example, if r = 2 then each parallel processor 
requires twice the computing power of a single sequential processor. 
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Estimating Efficiency of the Parallel Processor 
In this section the inefficiency, r, will be estimated for several 
data exchange protocols. 
Let 
T = average time to execute a single task in a sequential processor 
aT = average additional time to execute the task in a parallel 
processor 
n = number of tasks = number of microprocessors. 
In general, the wastage time, aT, will include 
• time to input and outout over the interprocessor link 
• additional time required by the parallel processor Executive. 
Worst Case Access Example 
In the worst case the microprocessors will demand access to the 
interorocessor link simultaneously. Since only one microprocessor can he 
serviced at a time and a processor cannot execute until it fetches input 
data, all processors in a waiting line are idle. This is depicted in 
F;qure 41. From the figure the total wastage is 
1 ) nOT = n (n + 1) T 
and, hence, the inefficiency ratio is 
2) r = 1 +a(n + 1). 
Observe that r is a function of the number of processors. 
Random Access Example 
In this case processor demand for access to the interprocessor link is 
random in time. As in the previous case it is assumed that processors in 
the waiting line are idle. The situation is depicted in Figure 42. 
140 
This is the classical queuing problem and is analysed in detail in 
(Ref. 13, PP 463-465). Using the terminology of (Ref 13), define 
1/\ = mean time between bus requests 
1/~ = mean time to service a bus request 
o = mean queue length including the processor being serviced. 
Then 
3) ~I\ = I/Ct 
4) (1 = q + ( 1 po) 
5) q = n - ( J + ~/\)I (1 po) 
n-1 n 
6) I-po [ I (~/\)k [ 1 . (~/\)k = k! k! 
k-o k-o 
7) rST/T = O/(n-O) 
8) r = I + O/(n-O) 
Fiqure 43 is a plot of the inefficiency ratio, r, versus number of 
processors for several values of a. It remains, now, to estimate a for a 
fliqht control application. 
Estimating Ct in a Flight Control Scenario 
In order to estimate a the flight control software for the 
DC-ln stretch airplane was analysed for distribution and execution in a 
parallel processor. The single thread software tasks were originally 
subdivided into five major modules, as shown in Figure 44. This figure 
also shows the memory and real time required for each module using the 
Bendix BDX-930 computer. The resultant distributions of tasks for parallel 
processinq are given in Figure 45. The memory and real time requirements 
are given for the BDX-930 and the TMS 9995 microprocessor. The number of 
1/0 and interprocessor data transfers are shown in Figure 46. 
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To be conservative we assume 
• serial interprocessor data link 
• 30 microseconds to transfer a single word 
• real time to transfer, in sequential processor, is negligibly small 
In accordance with out previous groundrules, we assume that each 
microprocessor has the same computing speed as the BDX-930. Because of 
the fixed transfer time and the high speed of the BDX-930 the resultant 
estimate of wastage will be extremely conservative. 
From Figure 45 it can be seen that the average real time to compute a 
module in the BDX-930 is 5.7 milliseconds. From Figure 46 there are 66 
data transfers or an average of 22 per module. Thus, 
T = 5.7 milliseconds 
aT = 22 x 30/1000 = 0.66 milliseconds 
and, hence, 
~ = 0.12, 
From Figure 43 it can be seen that the inefficiency ratio for a = 
n.12 and four processors is 
• 1.25 for worst case access 
• 1.15 for random access 
Thus, there is a 25% reduction in efficiency for the worst case access 
and 15~ for random access. 
In practice, of course, the modules will be executed in microprocessors 
having considerably less speed than the original, sequential processor. 
As an illustration of this differential we included the corresponding real 
time for execution in a TMS 9995 microprocessor in Figure 45. From this 
figure it can be seeen that the maximum time to complete a module is 34.78 
milliseocnds. Since the frame time is 100 milliseconds there is ample 
reserve time available for additional computation and to absorb wastage. 
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We note that, had we used the TMS 9995 to estimate wastage, the result 
woulrl have heen 
a = .66/28.9 = 0.02. 
6.3 PARALLEL PROCESSING CONFIGURATION 
The qenera1 characteristics of the parallel processing system proposed 
here are depicted in the block diagram of Figure 47. This configuration 
is described later in greater detail, however, it is presented here in 
order to provide an overview of the proposed parallel processinq 
confiquration. 
Parallel processing systems require (rapid) access to data throughout 
the system to a greater extent than most networks; hence, the need for a 
shared memory system. One method of memory sharing provides a single 
common memory system with either no private memory or only private (ROM) 
progra~ memory. In general, the degree of memory contention in such a 
system becomes a limiting factor. Consequently, the three alternative 
memory sharing techniques depicted in Figure 48 have been considered. In 
Figure 48a, arbitration logic is centrally located at the shared common 
memory. In this configuration two accesses are required to the 
interprocessor bus for each transaction, e.g. one access is required to 
transfer a copy of the data from the source processor to the common shared 
memory and a second access is required to transfer this data to the 
destination processor. This approach maintains the integrity of the source 
data since the destination processor cannot directly access it; the 
destination processor only has access to the common shared memory. In 
Figure 48b the shared memory is distributed throughout the system and a 
portion is associated with each processor in a decentralized manner. In 
this configuration only one interprocessor bus access is required since 
each processor has direct access to the shared memory local to every other 
processor. (Here, the integrity of the source data may be questionable in 
the presence of faults). In Figure 48c, the advantages of the 
distributed shared memory are maintained for shared variables while 
providing dedicated private memory for both the program memory (ROM) and 
private variables (RAM- scratchpad). Furthermore, hardware can be provided 
to limit and control access to specific segments for specific processors 
(the benefits of limited access control shall he evaluated in the next 
phase of this program). It is this last configuration, Figure 6-12c, which 
is proposed here. 
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Tn the selected shared memory configuration, a portion of the shared 
memory is physically associated with one processor but is accessible to all 
processors. Access to a processor's own private memory as well as its 
physically associated shared common memory is done locally while remote 
shared memory is accessed by means of transfers over the interprocessor bus. 
Since each processor in this system makes reference primarily to its local 
shared memory and only uses remote memory "sparingly", the system 
performances is not limited by the bandwidth of the interprocessor bus. 
If the total shared memory (logical address space) exceeds the 
physical address space of any processor, a memory address mapping function is 
required. The map function provided here is useful, even if the total 
logical address space is less than the physical address space, in that it 
simplifies the required memory address space assignment. 
Figures 49 and 50 provide details of the Application Processor and 
the Executive Processor. These two processors are identical except for 
MIL-STD-1553 Remote Terminal interface(s) provided in the Executive 
Processor, for external communications. 
The resulting memory hierarchy consists of local, private (on chip 
microprocessor memories are now being introduced by manufacturers and are 
in the development plans of others) memory having both ROM and RAM memory 
as well as having provisions for off-chip expansion of the private memory. 
This off-chip expansion feature allows local monitoring and debugging 
routines to be located where they are easily deletable; this feature also 
provides growth capability. The microprocessor has access to its local 
shared memory via the memory address mapped under memory allocation control 
without utilizing the interprocessor bus. Access to remote shared memory 
shall be via the memory address mapped under memory allocation control 
which functions in conjunction with the interprocessor bus controller 
(arbiter) to provide conflict-free access. 
The memory allocation control unit, in conjunction with the 
interprocessor bus controller, establishes the data path to the shared 
memory in each cycle by determining whether the local processor or a remote 
processor has access to the particular shared common memory segment. 
Requests for the interprocessor bus and use of shared memory initiate the 
action taken by these units. Hence, all processors are able to share 
portions of the physical memory. This allows a processor access to its own 
local memory (which is reserved primarily for its use) as well as allowing 
limited controlled sharing with other processors. The arbitration logic 
resolves any competition for the interprocessor bus and provides 
information to the memory allocation control unit so that the necessary 
address and data path is established between the source (destination) 
processor and the destination (source) memory. 
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The individual application processors are linked together by the 
single interprocessor bus which is here configured as a parallel bus 
consisting of the necessary address, data and control lines. Although 
the single bus structure places some constraints on the general purpose 
parallel processing system, this constraint is not significant in our 
applications. It only requires that a high majority of the processor's 
memory activity be to its local memory subsystem; this minimizes 
interprocessor bus requests and potential bus contention. In fact, the 
communications requirements of the system could be met by a serial link 
rather than a parallel interprocessor bus. An alternative serial link 
shall be considered during the next phase. 
The arbitration and allocation algorithm selection and implementation 
details, i.e. test and lock functions (to prevent simultaneous access), 
will be finalized during the early hardware design phase. Techniques being 
evaluated for the arbitration and allocation algorithm include the 
rotating bus mastership approach and the master/slave executive/application 
processor communications approach. In the rotating bus mastership approach, 
bus control passes from processor to processor, with the present master 
required to wait for all succeeding requests to be serviced before 
regaining its position as master. This prevents interprocessor bus 
"hogging" that otherwise can occur in a fixed priority scheme. In the 
master-slave arranqement the executive functions as the master in 
controlling interprocessor bus communications. 
6.4 Monitoring 
The advanced architecture allows considerable flexibility for 
monitoring the parallel processor. One such strategy is: 
• Output variables are monitored by the bus controller 
• When a fault is detected the bus controller directs the affected 
parallel processor to isolate the fault. 
• A failed microprocessor can be isolated by 
a) self-test 
b) comparison monitoring 
Comparison monitoring could be performed continually or only when 
requested using the local network or a private network for interchange of 
data between parallel processors. 
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7.0 TRADE-OFF STUDIES 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the objectives of the present study is to seek new and 
innovative strategies in advanced flight control systems which would have 
significant advantages over conventional approaches and architectures in 
the specific areas of: 
a. The ability to tolerate multiple faults without degraded 
operations. 
b. A reduction of maintenance requirements to periodic actions 
which would facilitate dispatch capability with failed 
elements. 
c. The ability to expand and/or modify functions without 
rearrangement of existing software or system interfaces. 
The advanced architecture will be heavily dependent upon a variety of 
new technologies, some of which are identified in Figure 51. These and 
related technologies are further identified in Table 7, along with a 
brief summary of their projected impact on the Advanced Flight Control 
System. 
Subsequently trade-offs in this section will emphasize, exclusively, 
the 
• fault-tolerant 
• periodic maintenance and 
• expansion/modification 
capabilities of the candidate architectures. Supporting technologies will 
be evaluated in this section only to the extent that they enhance 
these capabilities. As a consequence, some technologies will be ignored 
or only casually mentioned in this section even though their potential 
weight and cost payoffs may ultimately provide the major incentive for 
an advanced architecture. (Ref. 17) 
The potential economies conferred by an advanced architecture are 
reduced hardware, software and maintenance costs, technology independence, 
expansion and modification capability and dispatchability. 
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Hardware Costs 
These costs are measured in terms of the quantity and quality of 
subsystem components such as computers, communication networks and 
interfacing, electrical and hydraulic power requirements and weight. 
Indirect cost benefits are realized through lighter structures, fuel 
savings and refined operational procedures. One means of providing economy 
is sharing resources such as sensors and computers and by providing access 
to surviving elements. When evaluating economy the total system should be 
considered. For example, an architecture that is cost effective for flight 
control, which employs dedicated components and resources, may be a bad 
bargain in the long run since there is no sharing of resources with other 
sUbsystems. In fact, the non-accessibility of resources (even if 
available) has been the major stimulus for research in analytical 
redundancy. 
As an indication of the potential economy of an advanced architecture 
weight reduction benefits were evaluated in (Ref. 17) for digital, 
fly-by-wire controls with a multiplexed communications medium. The weight 
reduction benefit of these technologies, alone, was over 800 lbs. for a 
large commercial transport, with multiplexing accounting for half of the 
total. 
Software Costs 
Software cost is measured in terms of design, documentation, 
configuration control and validation costs. Experience has shown that 
software is easy to produce but difficult and costly to document, validate 
and modify. It is unlikely that a large and complex software program can 
be produced with an error rate of 10(-10)/hour unless a rigid and costly 
discipline is imposed. At present the major efforts to produce reliable 
software are: rigid structure, modularization, mathematical proof, 
automated testing procedures. use of a standardized processor and a higher. 
order language. 
One of the benefits of the proposed architecture is its potential for 
simplifying system software through the use of standardized communication 
and data formats, and distributing and parallel processing. Since the 
architecture imposes no constraints on the computing element, it can 
accommodate standardized processors, as these become available, with a 
minimum impact on the system. Distributed and parallel processing offer 
the benefits of smaller, more manageable and validatable software modules 
which are physically as well as functionally independent. Parallel 
processing confers the additional benefit of improved real time capability. 
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We envision, eventually, that flight control systems will be designed 
for implementation in distributed, parallel processors. Computations will 
be tailored to this kind of implementation and, thus, may avoid some of the 
problems connected with transforming a sequential program to a parallel 
processor. The distribution of tasks and the use of standardized I/O will 
broaden the community of qualified designers and allow greater 
participation in the design and development processes. 
Technology Independence 
One of the most serious limitations of the conventional flight control 
system is its inability to accommodate advanced hardware element retrofits. 
Thus, the conventional system quickly becomes obsolete. Because the 
original design was based on customized interfaces and signal formats and 
because the design was heavily dependent on special features of the 
computers, actuators and sensors, performance improvements require 
significant and costly modifications to the original design. 
The accommodation of new technology was a primary goal of the proposed 
architecture. In fact, it may be said that most of the technical risks 
associated with the advanced architecture were the results of this 
accommodation. 
Expansion Capability 
The architecture should have the capability to not only accommodate 
advanced hardware elements but to expand functions and add subsystems with 
a minimum impact on the system. Expansion capabilities must include 
software and hardware. Because of its rigid structure, the conventional 
flight control system, with its dedicated components and communication, can 
only expand within a limited envelope prescribed by its reserve of I/O, 
memory and real time. The proposed architecture, on the other hand, allows 
for an indefinite expansion which, in practice, is limited only by the 
number of terminals that can be connected to a local network and by bus 
bandwidth. The most significant impact of an added subsystem is on the bus 
controller software which must incorporate the new subsystem into the local 
network. 
Maintenance Costs and Dispatchability 
These costs are determined by component reliability, location and ease 
of access of components, frequency of maintenance actions, fault diagnosis 
procedures and the availability of spares. Trade-offs of these parameters 
will be given in detail in the next section. 
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It is appropriate to mention, at this time, the technical risks 
associated with the proposed architecture. During the study, technical 
risk did not disqualify an option unless the risk was judged to be totally 
unacceptable or the potential benefits did not seem to justify even a 
moderate risk. As a consequence, when it came to a choice between moderate 
risk and benefits the choice was always made for benefits. 
Technical Risks 
The technical risks have been identified throughout this report and, 
in all cases, methods for evaluating and surmounting them have been 
described. We include, here, a summary of these risks: 
1. A 1553B bus for critical flight controls may be unacceptably 
vulnerable to single point failures due to damage by a babbling 
terminal. 
2. The bus controller must be ultrareliable. Bus control 
processor, bus controller interfaces and bus control 
monitoring must support the lO(-lO)/hour survivability goals. 
3. Flight control system software can be efficiently distributed 
and executed in a parallel processor. 
4. Subsystem software can be made sufficiently reliable to support 
the 10(-10)/hour survivability goal. 
7.2 Trade-Off Parameters 
The principal trade-off criteria will emphasize fault-tolerance, 
periodic maintenance and expansion capabilities. 
1) Fault-Tolerance Capability 
The advance flight control system must meet the 10-(-10)/hour 
survivability goal. The susceptibility to system failure is the principal 
measure of the candidates' qualifications. The causes of system failure 
are: 
Exhaustion of Resources 
The candidate must provide a sufficient reserve of resources to 
replace failed elements. Failures must be correctly identified and isolated 
to avoid disengagement of non-failed components. The resources or 
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redundancy level of the conventional system are fixed and cannot be expanded 
if the necessity should arise. Moreover, since resources are dedicated, 
there is no access to resources outside of the flight control system. To 
overcome these deficiencies, the conventional system must resort to 
indirect data obtained by analytical redundancy techniques. 
In the conventional, centralized system, components tend to be large 
and complex with correspondingly large failure rates with little capability 
for cross-strapping. The distributed system, by using smaller and more 
reliable elements, has a greater reliability potential than its centralized 
counterpart. To illustrate, consider a quad set of processors such that 
loss of 3 or 4 processors in a single flight of one hour results in loss of 
system. The probability of this event is 
3 4 
S = 4A + A 
where A = failure rate/hour of a single processor. 
In a distributed system with m, quad sets of microprocessors, the 
corresponding probability is 
3 4 
S(d) = m (4Ad + Ad ) 
where Ad = failure rate/hour of a single microprocessors, 
assuming that each quad set is flight critical and there is no 
cross-strapping. 
Typically 
A = 300 x 10(-6) for a conventional flight control computer. 
If we conjecture (see section on "Parallel Processing" for a more realistic 
estimate) that 
Ad = 50 x 10(-6) for a microprocessor 
then 
Sd/S = 220m. 
Thus, the distributed system can employ 220 quad sets before it exceeds 
the unreliability of the centralized system, even without resorting to 
its inherent cross-strapping capability. Of course, the example is 
an oversimplification but it illustrates the point. 
166 
Software Errors 
A redundant system that employs identical software in its redundant 
processors is susceptible to loss of function due to a single software 
error. In as much as software errors are a strong function of discipline 
and procedures, which are independent of architecture, it is difficult to 
assess an architecture's potential for minimizing these errors. We can only 
conjecture that the proposed partition of software into smaller and 
physically independent modules will tend to simplify software and software 
validation and make the total system less vulnerable. 
Single-Point Faults 
Single-point faults are similar to software errors in that a single 
fault can result in loss of redundant elements. Generic hardware faults 
are in this category. The principal sources of single-point faults in the 
proposed architecture are the bus controller and 15538 remote terminals 
(i.e., the babbling terminal). Since a single-point fault can cause loss 
of a critical subsystem there is little to choose between a conventional 
and advanced architecture from the standpoint of these faults. 
Inability to Detect and Isolate Faults 
In order to keep redundancy at manageable levels, fault detection and 
isolation are essential in both the conventional and advanced systems. 
Faults tend to more visible and iso1atab1e in the advanced system. A novel 
feature of the proposed architecture is the expanded role of the bus 
controller, i.e., 
• monitoring redundant variables transmitted over the 
local network; 
• maintaining failure status; 
• reconfiguration management. 
The bus structure provides the bus controller with access to all 
sUbsystems. A a consequence, the bus controller is ideally situated to 
perform monitoring and reconfiguration. 
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Almost Simultaneous Faults 
These are faults which occur in close time proximity, the second 
occurring before the first has been detected and isolated. These faults 
can have a significant impact on systems with survivability goals of the 
order of 10(-10)/hour. As an illustration of this effect Table 8 gives 
the probability of a single component failure in 10, 50, and 100 
milliseconds as a function of the failure rate of the component. In a 
system of triplex processors, for example, with 
• frame time = 100 milliseconds 
• failure rate of a single processor = 300 x 10(-6)/hour 
the probability of a second failure occurring within a frame of the first 
failure is 
2 x 83.3 x 10(-10). 
As a consequence, a candidate system must be capable of tolerating 
almost simultaneous faults either through the use of more reliable 
components or higher levels of redundancey. By distributing tasks over 
smaller and more reliable processors and by accommodating greater 
redundancy, the advanced architecture meets these requirements. 
Latent Faults 
Latent faults are temporarily dormant but could become active in 
response to a single source of excitation. Recent studies, conducted by 
Bendix under contract to NASA Langley Research Center (Ref. 12), indicate 
that a significant proporation of faults are latent in a 
comparison-monitored system. In an emulation of a high performance 
inner-loop flight control system, consisting of 2200 assembly language 
instructions, approximately 40% of all gate-level faults remained 
undetected after 8 frames of computations. Unless special means are 
provided for their detection, latent faults will accumulate in redundant 
channels and could eventually be triggered by a single excitation. The 
result would be a rapid and unanticipated exhaustion of components. The 
effect on survivability has yet to be determined: this is one of the 
objectives of the CARE III reliability model. 
The advanced system, by distributing tasks among independent, smaller 
and more reliable elements 
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• mlnlmlzes the occurrence of latent faults in redundant, 
similar elements and 
• localizes their effects, if they should occur. 
Providing extra redundancy does not solve the latent fault problem. 
Eventually, latent faults must be detected and removed from the system. 
The solution is to apply an extensive system self-test, periodically, with 
the period and coverage determined by the predicted accumulation of latent 
faults and the degree by which they reduce survivability. 
Intermittent Faults 
These faults are the result of borderline design defects or external 
disturbances. The frequency of intermittent faults has not been determined 
but estimates have placed the rate at an order of magnitude greater than 
the failure rate of a typical flight control channel. Intermittent faults 
could result in premature exhaustion of components or confuse fault 
detection and isolation strategies. The solution is to insist that a fault 
persist for several frames before the affected unit is disengaged from the 
system. However, because of the possible occurrence of a second fault in 
the interim, the system must provide the necessary, additional redundancy 
to tolerate multiple faults. The flexibility to add redundancy and to 
reconfigure as the situation demands, is a key feature of the proposed 
architecture. 
2) Periodic Maintenance Capability 
One of the potential economies of the advanced architecture is an 
extended maintenance period. One of the benefits of the proposed 
architecture is that it can incorporate any number of spare subsystems by 
simply connecting them to a local network. The procedure for bringing a 
spare on-line and integrating its functions is dependent upon the subsystem 
configuration and will vary for different subsystems. In an case, the 
procedure is considered to be the responsibility of each subsystem; the bus 
controller will participate only to the extent of rearranging the data 
transmission. 
A detailed analysis of spares requirements is given in Appendix B. 
The results and conclusions are summarized here. 
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~aintenance Stratigies 
1. Scheduled, powered spares. 
2. Scheduled, unpowered spares. 
3. Unscheduled, powered spares. 
4. Unscheduled, unpowered spares. 
In scheduled maintenance, maintenance is performed at prescribed times 
whereas, in unscheduled maintenance, maintenance is only performed as 
required to maintain system integrity. 
Conclusions 
1. Maintenance requirements are extremely sensitive to the failure 
rate of the elemental units (LRU's) for both scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance. 
2. The number of spares required for a 1500 hour (biannual) scheduled 
maintenance period are given in Table 9 for several component 
fail~re rates. From the table it can be seen that 15 powered 
spares are required when the component failure rate is 300 x 10(-6)/ 
hour whereas only 4 are required when the failure rate is 
50 x 10(-6)/hour. 
3. The number of spares required to insure that the probability of 
unscheduled maintenance action in 1500 hours does not exceed 1/10 
is given in Table 10 for several component failure rates. The 
table also gives the mean time between maintenance actions. 
Comparing Tables 9 and 10 it can be seen that if a one in ten 
probability of a maintenance action is acceptable, unscheduled 
maintenance can achieve very respectable average maintenance periods 
with a modest complement of spares. 
4. The cost of spares in scheduled maintenance can be prohibitive 
especially for subsystems with component failure rates of the order 
of 300 x 10(-6)/hour (e.g., of a typical CPU, including I/O). 
5. From the standpoint of spares required it is preferable to employ 
unscheduled maintenance and distribute the system among many but 
more reliable components. The benefit of distribution is further 
enhanced, if a single spare can be used as a replacement for any 
one of several dissimilar components. 
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3) Expansion/Modification Capability 
The ability of the proposed architecture to expand its functions has 
been described, repeatedly, in previous sections. In summary, this 
capability is the result of the structure of the local bus network, the 
role of the bus controller as reconfiguration manager and the use of 
parallel application processing. It is difficult to envision how a 
conventional architecture could provide the equivalent capability. 
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TABLE 7 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
TECHNOLOGY SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY 
1. HOL 1. STANDARDIZED PROCESSOR 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS E.G. 1750A 
• VALIDATED COMPILER 
• DISCIPLINED PROGRAMMING 
• IMPROVED VISIBILITY 
• SIMPLIFIED VALIDATION 
2. RELIABILITY MODELING/VALIDATION 2A. CARE II, CARE III, 
• IMPROVED SAFETY MARKOV MODELS 
• AID TO SYSTEM DESIGN 2B. EMULATION 
• COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS 
• SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
3. PARALLEL PROCESSING 3. LSI TECHNOLOGY 
• IMPROVED REAL-TIME 
• SIMPLIFIED SOFTWARE 
• SIMPLIFIED VALIDATION 
• IMPROVED RELIABILITY 
• GROWTH CAPABILITY 
• IMPROVED SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE 
4. FAULT-TOLERANT MULTIPROCESSING 4a. HOL 
• HIGH RELIABILITY 4b. SOFTWARE VALIDATION 
• IMPROVED MAINTENANCE 4c. RELIABILITY MODELING 4d. ANALYTICAL REDUNDANCY MGMT 
4e. SKEWED/INTEGRATED SENSORS 
4f. BUS NETWORKS 
4g. SELF-TEST 
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TABLE 7 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES (CONT'D) 
TECHNOLOGY SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY 
5. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTED FAULT- Sa. FAULT-TOLERANT MULTIPROCESSING 
TOLERANCE Sb. SOFTWARE VALIDATION 
Sc. EMULATION 
• REDUCED HARDWARE, i.e. ECONOMY Sd. ANALYTICAL REDUNDANCY MGMT 
• FLEXIBILITY Se. SKEWED/INTEGRATED SENSORS 
• IMPROVED CONTROL Sf. BUS NETWORK 
• IMPROVED FAULT DETECTION, ISOLATION 
6. MULTIPLEXED DATA BUSSING 6a. STANDARD INTERFACE HARDWARE 
6b. STANDARD PROTOCOL 
• ECONOMY (e.g. Weight Reduction) 6c. FIBER OPTICS 
• IMPROVED CONTROL 6d. RELIABLE BUS CONTROL 
• RECONFIGURATION CAPABILITY 
• IMPROVED VISIBILITY 
• CENTRAL MONITORING 
7. SOFTWARE/SOFTWARE VALIDATION la. IMRPOVED DISCIPLINE 
7b. PARALLEL PROCESSING 
• ECONOMY lc. HOL 
• RELIABILITY ld. STANDARD PROCESSOR 
• VISIBILITY 
8. ANALYTICAL REDUNDANCY MGMT 8. BUS NETWORK, i.e. 
ACCESSIBILITY OF RESOURCES 
• ECONOMY 
• IMPROVED FAILURE DETECTION 
9. SKEWED/INTEGRATED SENSORS 
• ECONOMY 
• RELIABILITY 
10. ELECTRO-MECHANICAL ACTUATION 10. IMPROVEMENT IN 
STATE-OF-THE-ART 
• ECONOMY 
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TECHNOLOGY 
11. MULTIFUNCTION DISPLAY 
• ECONOMY 
• IMPROVED VISIBILITY 
TABLE 7 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES (CONT'D) 
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY 
11. STANDARDS 
12. FIBER OPTICAL COMMUNICATIONS 12a. BUS NETWORK 
• IMPROVED EMI 
• ECONOMY 
• GREATER BANDWIDTH 
12b. IMPROVEMENTS IN 
STATE-OF-THE-ART 
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TABLE 8 
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF A SECOND FAILURE GIVEN FIRST FAILURE 
Failure Rate Frame Time 
(per hour) (milliseconds) 
10 50 100 
50 x 10(-6} 1.39 x 10( -10} 6.94 x 10(-10} 13.88 x 10(-10} 
100 x 10(-6} 2.78 x 10(-10} 13.9 x 10(-10} 27.8 x 10(-10} 
200 x 10(-6) 5.56 x 10(-10) 27.8 x 10(-10) 55.6 x 10(-10) 
300 x 10(-6) 8.33 x 10(-10) 41.7 x 10(-10) 83.3 x 10(-10) 
500 x 10(-6) 13.9 x 10(-10) 69.4 x 10( -1O} 138.8 x 10(-1O} 
1000 x 10 ( -6) 27.8 x 10(-10} 138.9 x 10(-10) 277.8 x 10(-10} 
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TABLE 9 
NUMBER/SPARES REQUIRED FOR A SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE PERIOD = 1,500 HOURS 
F ai 1 ure Rate 
300 x 10(-6)/ 
100 x 10(-6)/ 
50 x 10(-6)/ 
Number of Spares Required 
Powered Spares Unpowered Spares 
15 
6 
4 
10 
6 
4 
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TABLE 10 
NUMBER OF SPARES REQUIRED FOR THE PROBABILITY OF A MAINTENANCE ACTION IN 
1,500 HOURS NOT TO EXCEED 1/10 
Failure Rate 
(per hour) 
300 x 10(-6)/hr 
100 x 10(-6)/hr 
50 x 10(-6)/hr 
Number of Spares Required 
Powered Spares Unpowered Spares 
6 (2,819) 
3 (5,095) 
2 (7,333) 
4 (3,333) 
3 (7,500) 
2 (10,000) 
( ) = Mean time between maintenance actions (Hours) 
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8.0 VALIDATION AND DEMONSTRATION METHODS 
A demonstration of 10 -10/hour survivabiity by observing the total 
system either in simulation or in the field is clearly impracticable. The 
number of statistical fault injection experiments required would be of the 
order of 10(10) for a credible assessment. As a consequence, survivability 
will be demonstrated, indirectly, by estimating reliability-related data 
associated with single failure events and combining the results, analyti-
cally, to obtain system survivability. By focussing attention on single 
failure events, with relatively large probabilities of occurrence, the 
number of samples required to estimate a statistic through laboratory or 
flight experience is reduced to the point where it becomes a practicable 
undertaking. 
8.1 Analytical Methods 
The proposed approach requires 
1. a reliability model which identifies and incorporates all of the 
essent i a 1 parameters affect i ng survi vabil ity and 
2. estimates of these parameter values 
The reliability model will be used to conduct studies to determine the 
sensitivity of selected parameters to survivability. Critical ranges of 
these parameters will be identified and laboratory and flight experiments 
will be used to estimate them. 
Reliability Model 
It may be said that a flight control system design is an implicit im-
plementation of the designer's reliability model. The levels of redun-
dancy, monitoring and reconfiguration strategies are determined by this 
model. An explicit reliability model is an essential ingredient of the 
design process because it forces the identification and quantification of 
key reliability parameters and provides the basis for design trade-offs. 
In conventional military systems, with reliability ~oals of the order 
of 10 -7/hour, experience has shown that a simple reliability model will 
suffice. This model generally assumes that there are no failures in the sys-
tem at the start of each flight; that latent faults either do not exist or 
their effects can be ignored. Effectively, the model is simple because it 
is relatively easy to identify failure events that are commensurate with 
the 10 -7/hour goal. 
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In advanced and critical flight systems however, the reliability model 
must include failure events that were ignored in the simple model. Without 
experience as a guide it is by no means clear what reliability parameters 
should be included. What is required is a reliability model sufficiently 
comprehensive to include a variety of such parameters and, at the same 
time, produce results accurately and in a reasonable amount of time. With 
such a model it would be possible initially to perform sensitivity studies 
on likely parameter candidates to ascertain their effect on overall systems 
survivability. As a result of this study key reliability parameters would 
be identified and the designers would be alerted to their importance in the 
system design. 
For a comprehensive survey of reliability models the reader is ref-
erred to (ref. 18). Care III appears to be the most powerful of all the 
models reviewed. It is currently undergoing test trials at Boeing, under 
contract to Nasa Langley Research Center. Information available indicates 
that the development is far enouqh along that the major technical problems 
have been overcome and the model may be available for restricted use in mid 
1982. 
Care III (Computer-Aided Reliability Estimation) is an outgrowth of an 
earlier model called Care II. A Markov chain is an inherent feature of 
both models. The system state at any given time is characterized by all 
those parmeters needed t determine both the likelihood that it will exper-
ience a fault and the probability that it will successfully 
detect, isolate and recover from the fault. These various system states 
are then interrelated through a set of transition functions representing 
the rate at which the system state changes from any given state to any 
other state. A single channel (or computer, or processor, etc) is divided 
into stages, e.g., processor, memory and bus. System states are obtained 
by combining all stages of all redundant elements in every possible com-
bination and for every possible fault mode. A fault mode is defined by all 
those parameters needed to determine the systems vulnerability to subse-
quent faults, e.q., detected, undetected, latent, intermittent, etc. 
The number os such states can be extremely large. One of the advantages of 
Care III is its ability to significantly reduce the number of possible 
states by, effectively, analyzing the fault-occurrence events separately 
from the fault-handling processes and later combining these in the over-
all model. -
In summary, Care III can be used to model 
• systems with large numbers of states 
• time-dependent transition probabilities 
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• time-from-entry-into-state transition probabilities 
• up to 40 stages 
• latent, intermittent, permanent and transient faults 
• failure detection coverage 
• reconfiguration time 
• effects of spares, Dowered and unpowered. 
8.2 Laboratory Testing 
Laboratory and flight methods will be used to: 
• establish reliability data associated with single failure events 
• confirm and validate assumptions and conclusions of the reliability 
model. 
Flight tests will be employed to validate laboratory results by dupli-
cating specific data points (e.g. flight condition, failures, etc) in ac-
tual flight environments. 
Laboratory testing will consist of: 
1. fault injection experiments using gates and pin-level emulations of 
major system components; 
2. closed-loop testing using actual and simulated hardware. 
Emulation 
One of the problems of using a refined reliability model such as Care 
III is the unavailability of fault modeling data. While themodel can be 
used to perform sensitivity studies, in the final analysis actual values 
are required. During the past several years Bendix Flight Systems Division, 
under contract NASI-15946 to Nasa Langley Research Center, has used a gate-
level emulation of the Bendix BDX-930 CPU as the basis for a series of 
fault injection experiments to determine: 
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• the applicability of qate-level emulation to fault analysis 
of digital systems; 
• the time required to detect faults in a comparison - monitored 
system; 
t fault detection coverage of a typical self-test program. 
The results (ref. 12) of the study demonstrated that emulstion was a 
practical and viable approach to FMEA analysis and could be used as a tool 
to obtain reliability data such as: 
• time to detect faults (e.g. fault latency) 
• proportion of latent faults 
• self-test and BIT coverage 
• ability to isolate faults 
• effects of single point faults 
• effects of almost-simultaneous faults 
• proportion of faults affecting control surfaces 
• effects of intermittent and transient faults 
• vulnerability of 1553 B to babblinq 
It is proposed to emulate, at the gate-level, the advanced archi-
tecture includinq: 
• 1553 B local network, a remote terminal, the bus controller ter-
minal and associated bus interface hardware: 
• an application processor subsystem such as SIFT. 
Exoeriments will consist of injecting faults and observing the re-
sultant system response. If it is assumed that the bus controller and appli-
cation processors are comprised of BDX-930 computers then the cost of the 
emulation experiments can be greatly reduced since the BDX-930 gate-level 
emulation already exists. 
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It is proposed to use the NASA Airlab Test Facility for performinq the 
emulation, provided that the facility can be made available to this pro-
gram. The facility can be used to demonstrate both normal performance and 
performance when subjected to failures. In addition, ongoing experiments 
would be conducted to update the system by the addition or substitution of 
new processors/technologies. As an example, the use of fiber optic busses 
could be demonstrated. 
In addition to obtaining generic reliability data the facility could 
be used to evaluate: 
• bus loading 
• bus error rate 
• throughput of parallel processors 
• time delays (transport lag in the parallel processor and the 1553 B 
bus system) 
• asynchronous performance feasibility 
• reconfiguration time 
• nuisance alarm susceptability 
• noise effects 
Appendix C describes a closed loop test facility that is available at 
Bendix Fliqht Systems Division. This facility can easily be modified to 
the requirements of this program. Among the modifications being considered 
at this time, for example, is tying this facility to a more powerful gener-
al purpose diqital computer (VAX 11/780), available at Bendix and, conse-
quently, to the entire Bendix VAX network. This will multiply the capacity 
of the facility. 
The facility would be used to verify and validate the software on a 
system basis, as well as to verify that aircraft performance is acceptable 
over the entire flight regime and for all system modes. In other words, it 
will check out the control laws as well as their software implementation. 
Fault injection experiments can be performed, down to the component level 
on the hardware to verify that the fault detection, isolation, and 
reconfiguration algorithms have been correctly programmed. 
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Figure 52 is a graphic representation of the interactions of the 
various laboratory software tests. It is assumed that all proqrams will 
be written in a higher order language, such as Fortran or Jovial (J-73). 
For example, a Jovial J-73 compiler is available already for the Z-SOOO 
microprocessor. It is expected that in the time span of this program, 
suitable compilers will be available for any microprocessor that one would 
wish to use. 
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9.0 TEST-BED AIRCRAFT 
9.1 Introduction 
Selection of the test-bed aircraft is a highly subjective task. Three 
major factors surface in the evaluation: (1) availability to NASA-Dryden, 
(2) the extent of the modifications required to the aircraft, and (3) the 
confiquration of the aircraft with respect to desirable test-bed 
characteristics. 
The major emphasis is given to availability to NASA since a vehicle is 
not a real candidate unless it is possible to obtain it. The other factors 
are: 
Modifications: 
Irreversible Control System 
Ease of Control System Modifications 
Airline Demonstration Suitability 
Desirable Characteristics: 
Safety 
Two-man Crew 
Equipment Installation Space 
Passenger Capability (Cabin) 
The primary question to be asked of a flight demonstrator vehicle is 
"does the system do the job," i.e. performance, demonstrability, and 
safety. 
It is considered basically impossible to demonstrate reliability to 
any reasonable extent in a single flight demonstrator vehicle. The basic 
limitation is time available. One year has a total of 8760 hours possible 
demonstration time available. Thus, even 10 years of continuous 
demonstration only gives 87,600 hours available at most. Practically, only 
a fraction of that time is available. Thus, it is not possible, in a 
practical sense, to verify reliability goals on the order of 10-9 or 10-10 hours 
MTBF on a single test article. 
A fleet demonstration with enough aircraft and enough hours could 
provide statistically valid reliability data. It is required, however, 
that any system which is a candidate for flight demonstration in a fleet 
environment, either commercial or military, be adequately tested before 
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introdllction into the fleet. Adequate testing of the technology before 
fleet introduction need not be on a similar vehicle. It is only necessary 
that the technology be compatible. 
An additional consideration is that advanced flight control 
configuration concepts are applicable to both low and high performance 
vehicles. In the area of maneuvering requirements, the actuator 
specifications are significantly more challenging in a high performance 
vehicle than in a low performance vehicle. Thus, while there may be areas 
of overlap between high and low performance configurations, there are 
enough significant differences to warrant consideration of two separate 
test-beds, one low performance and one high performance vehicle, in order 
to fully explore the realm of Advanced Flight Control Systems. 
Gulfstream STA Test-Bed Potential 
One possible test-bed aircraft for Advanced Flight Control System 
flight evaluation program is the NASA STA. The STA airframes are subjected 
to a severe fatigue environment and they are closely monitored and 
inspected for structural integrity. Thus, a possible source would be a 
fatigue damaged STA in the NASA inventory. An ~ircraft of this type could 
be repaired and put into service as an Advanced Flight Control System 
test-bed. 
Another possible source for a Gulfstream test-bed would be an airframe 
procured by NASA in anticipation of need of a STA requirement. This would 
be based on future STA requirements in the early 1990's. On this basis 
NASA would procure a Gulfstream II in 1985 in anticipation of need for 
conversion to a STA article and delivery in the early 1990's. Once in the 
NASA inventory it could be bailed to the Advanced Flight Control System 
study for interim use as a test-bed. 
There are several advantages to NASA with this approach. After 
procurement by NASA the aircraft would be under NASA control and its flight 
time and environment would be precisely known. The STA airframe 
modifications could be made at the time of the FBW changes, thus equipping 
the aircraft with the major STA elements of DLC, SFC and reverse thrust. 
The use of the aircraft for FBW tests would not put high time or stress on 
the airframe while it would keep the airframe in an airworthiness status. 
9.2 Advanced Flight Control System Test-Bed Summary Description 
The Gulfstream II STA aircraft offers several advantages as a 
candidate for the Advanced Flight Control System Test-Bed (Figure 53). 
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Primarily it is a mini-commercial type vehicle, having an airways 
capability. It has a two man crew and the 1400 cu. ft. of cabin space with 
5600 lb. payload potential provide it with very adequate capability for 
avionics equipment installation and an en~ineering test station. 
The cockpit instrument panel easily accommodates six CRT displays, two 
for each pilot as a vertical and horizontal display and two in the center 
panel for the advisory and warning tasks, Figure 54. These CRT's are in 
addition to the basic vertical enqine instruments in the center panel and 
leave adequate space for conventional three inch instruments on either side 
of each pilot's CRT displays. 
The basic STA is equipped with a LM type hand controller at the pilot 
station and a conventional Gulfstream II control wheel and column at the 
co-pilot station. This installation is maintained for the baseline FBW 
configuration since it offers the capability to evaluate both types of 
controllers in a test environment. Retaininq the control wheel and column 
requires the installation of a feel device for proper operation. 
Alternately, the cockpit could be configured with dual FBW hand 
controllers. 
The cabin space is very adequate for installation of each channel of 
the multi-channel avionics system in a separate pallet, Figure 55. Each 
channel is thus physically isolated from each other and, installed in the 
seat tracks, inflicts no scar or structural change to the aircraft. The 
pallet provides monitor and test panel capabilities in order to assess 
operation of the system to whatever level is necessary. In addition, the 
pallet concept allows each channel to be fully inter-wired and tested 
outside of the aircraft which significantly reduces the amount of aircraft 
time required for detailed sub-system checkouts. The electrical 
connections on the pallet are to the various airframe systems and 
interconnections to the other pallets. 
The STA is equipped with a Hewlett-Packard tape recorder which records 
273 words provided by the digital simulation system every 50 milliseconds 
(the basic computer cycle). In the STA many of these words pertain to the 
simulation model and simulation process. Thus interfacing this recorder 
with the FBW avionics system through the engineers' station provides a 
fairly comprehensive data recording system. 
The STA is equipped with fast acting Direct Lift Control (DLC) and 
Side Force Control (SFC) systems. The primary use of the control surfaces 
in STA simulation is to provide the simulation pilot with the rotational 
forces he feels while controllin~ a vehicle much larger than the Gulfstream 
II. This capability is implemented in the STA with two DLC and two SFC 
electro-hydraulic actuators. 
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One application of the OLC surfaces could be toward enhancement of 
approach and glideslope control. This capability exists on some current 
aircraft and is certainly a candidate for future aircraft. The FBW STA 
r,ulfstream would have this capability. While it is not within the scope of 
the Advanced FCS study, these SFC and OLC features would provide the 
aircraft with the capability to provide the simulation fidelity required to 
evaluate a FBW SST or other large airframe. If the FBW Gulfstream does not 
utilize these features, the OLC actuators can be replaced with a bar 
linkage and the SFC's can be locked in position or removed from the 
airframe. 
The FBW modifications to the control system involve removal of the 
aircraft cable and trim systems and the addition of electrically controlled 
actuators to provide inputs to the surface controls. Two dual 
electrohydraulic actuators in each primary control axis are baselined for 
this purpose. A third hydraulic system, electrically powered by the 
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), provides the power to one of the actuators. 
The basic flight and combined hydraulic systems provide dual power to the 
other actuator. This configuration gives a two fail-op capability and also 
provides flight control with both engines out. 
The electrical system is to be modified to provide uninterruptible 
power and to add a third system with in-flight APU operation. An increase 
in the battery size will provide 30 minute fail-safe operation in this 
mode. 
While the primary safety considerations in this aircraft are satisfied 
with redundancy, the ability for a rapid ~gress provides a certain level of 
security in the crew. The Gulfstream flight test programs have utilized a 
kick-out baggage door with an air deflector as the basic exit area. With 
the high tail and forward engines this exit provides a clear area for 
separation from the aircraft. It has been used with cargo drops. The 
means used to get to the door have been a powered cable tow or a hand rope. 
These techniques have been satisfactory to the crews. 
an additional level of safety could be provided, at least for the 
initial flights, by retaining the primary cable control systems. This 
would result in a configuration similar to, but slightly more complex than, 
the baseline FBW configuration. The primary interface between the cable 
system and FBW actuators would be with a shift mechanism at the sector. 
Detail design of this sector would allow summation of the cable and 
actuator inputs with the shift activated. The actuators would require a 
positive means for hydraulic disablement and by-pass should direct manual 
control by required. While this configuration is mentioned here as a 
possibility it is not recommended. It would only be considered further if 
the need for a back-up system arose. 
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A fully operational and configured iron bird was used for Gulfstream 
II and STA flight control system development. This iron bird is in storage 
at Grumman and available for the Advanced Flight Control program. Its use 
for design confirmation and test of the entire system is considered 
mandatory. 
The iron bird tests on the basic control system will address the 
capability of the control system in terms of performance, strength, 
stability, failure modes, etc. Confirmation of some of the test results on 
the aircraft would be required. The iron bird would also be electrically 
integrated with the avionics system for system development. It would be 
further integrated with a full aerodynamic airframe simulation for closed 
loop "simulated in-flight testing". While avionics integration can be 
accomplished on the aircraft during installation, this testing would be, by 
necessity, later in the program. 
Additional tests required on the aircraft include a build-up 
functional test of the hydraulic and electrical systems, the control 
systems and the avionics systems. These would be followed with very 
thorough GVS (Ground Vibration Survey) and EMC (Electro-Magnetic 
Compatibility) test programs. 
Following these tests, a flight readiness test (FRT) and flight 
readiness review (FRR) will clear the aircraft for flight. 
Flight tests at Grumman are airworthiness tests designed to verify the 
basic integrity and operation of the aircraft. Following airworthiness 
acceptance the formal test program will begin. While it is difficult to 
demonstrate reliability and maintainability with a single test article in a 
limited amount of time, it is most certainly appropriate to demonstrate the 
features which are designed into the system to provide these qualities. 
The key to the reliability feature is fault tolerance, the ability of 
the system to continue satisfactory operation after several faults. Thus, 
the test program must demonstrate the extensiv~ fault tolerant capability 
of the system. Integrated with this feature is fault detection and 
isolation. Proper fault management will retain the failure records for 
maintenance action, thus allowing this aspect of maintainability to be 
addressed. Detail hardware and installation dependent maintainability 
items could not be evaluated with a test configured article. 
Overall, the Gulfstream provides an excellent test-bed to perform 
Advanced Flight Control System evaluations for the baseline program and it 
has the inherent capability for advanced programs with in-flight 
simulation. 
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Appendix H describes the STA and provides details of the basic 
modifications to be performed on the aircraft, and basic data concerning 
the following systems. 
Crew Systems and Equipment 
Flight Control Systems 
Hydraulic Power System 
Electrical Power System 
Auxiliary Power Unit 
Air Data System 
Guidance, Navigation and Control Systems 
9.3 Airworthiness Flight Test Program 
Following the satisfactory completion of factory acceptance tests but 
prior to the first flight of the aircraft, a Flight Readiness Test (FRT) 
and Flight Readiness Review (FRR) will be conducted. The FRT is an indepth 
functional checkout of the integrated aircraft systems with results checked 
against pre-determined standards. The FRR provides an objective Grumman 
and customer review of the disposition of any and all failures and 
anomalies uncovered during the vehicle's acceptance tests and FRT to insure 
that the aircraft is in fact ready for first flight. 
In order to assure that the vehicle modifications and the new flight 
control system (FCS) are working as designed and can be safely operated 
within the operating flight, the contractor will perform an airworthiness 
test program. The objectives of this program are as follows: 
• Demonstrate a safe operating envelope for NASA 
• Demonstrate satisfactory handling qualities of the new FCS/airframe 
combination 
• Validate the functional operation of the FCS and the Engineers 
Station 
• Demonstrate satisfactory failure mode operation 
• Flight qualify the APU system for 3rd system hydraulic and electric 
power 
• Evaluate the functional operation of all subsystems 
• Demonstrate satisfactory operation of the cockpit displays 
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Specific maneuvers will be flown throughout the recommended flight, 
e.g. and weight envelope. Static and dynamic maneuvers will be performed 
to define the airframe and FCS characteristics. These maneuvers will 
measure, validate and assess the following items: 
• Static and dynamic airframe stability 
• SAS operation 
• Trimmability 
• Control harmony 
• FCS performance 
• FCS stability, lag and transient characteristics 
• FCS management 
• Landin9 and takeoff characteristics 
• Closed loop handling qualities 
• Stall prevention 
• Control force breakout and gradient characteristics 
• Cockpit displays 
• Autopilot performance 
Flight verification of all FCS functions will be conducted by the crew 
including failure mode operation. Concurrently, operation of all systems 
including subsystems will be functionally evaluated. 
An onboard tape recorder will record pertinent parameters for post 
flight analysis. Critical parameters will be telemetered to the GAC ATS 
for real time monitoring and analysis. All flight operations will be 
conducted from the contractor's Calverton facility. 
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R82-Q114-QS3W 
Figure 54 FBW Gulfstream Instrument Panel Arrangement 
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APPENDIX A 
BUS LOADING ESTIMATES 
Bus loading estimates were obtained from data acquired from three 
sources: 
1) F-16 Avionics 
Sundstrom, D.E., et al, "F-16 Multiplex: A Systems Perspective", 
Proceedings of the 2nd AFCS Multiplex Data Bus Conference, Dayton, 
Ohio, October, 1978. 
2) Avionics and Flight Control 
Hopkins, A.L., Brock, L.O., "Interim Report on Fault-Tolerant 
Aircraft Signal and Power Transmission Structures", C.S. Draper 
Laboratories, Cambridge, Mass., R-1298, August, 1979. 
3) Flight Control System, DC-I0 Stretch Airplane 
Bendix Proposal to Douglas Aircraft Company for DC-I0 Stretch 
Airplane, 1979. 
Groundrules For Bus Loading Calculations 
In deriving bus loading estimates we will be conservative and assume, 
in all cases, RT to RT communications. In particular, the broadcast mode 
will not be used for purposes of bus loading estimates. A 1 MHz bit rate 
is assumed, throughout. 
In a typical RT to RT request/reply transfer define 
RTA = transmitting RT 
RTB = receiving RT 
Be = bus controller. 
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Then the request/replay sequence and timing is 
1) BC issues "Receive Cmd" to RTB 
2) BC issues "Transmit Cmd" to RTA 
3) Response time 
4) RTA issues "Status" 
5) RT issues "Data" A 
6) Response Time 
7) RT B issues "Status" 
8) Gap between messages 
= 20 llsec 
= 20 llsec 
= 12 llsec 
= 20 llsec 
= 20 llsec 
= 12 llsec 
= 20 llsec 
= 2 llsec 
Let N = Number of data words per second transmitted 
MK = Number of messages per second of K words each. 
Then 
N 
N = L K MK 
K = 1 
N 
and L MK = Number of messages per second transmitted. 
K = 1 
The proportion of bus usage is the 
1) r = (l06 x LMK + 20N) x 10-6 
2) 
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or 
r = N (106 + 20) x 10-6 
W 
where 
w = __ N - = average number of words per message. L MK 
F-16 Avionics 
For this system (From Table III of Reference 1) 
N = 14,405 words/sec, excluding polling 
LMK = 1339.0625 messages/sec. 
This system comprised several types of data transmission, e.g., 
BC to RT, RT to BC and RT to RT. 
In the bus loading estimates we assumed that all transmissions were RT 
to RT since this resulted in the most conservative estimates. 
From Nand LMK we compute 
w = ~ = 10.76 words/message 
and, from (2), 
( 106 -6 r = 14,405 10.76 + 20) x 10 = 0.43. 
Then, avionics bus utilization is 43~. 
Avionics and Flight Control (Hopkins and Brock) 
From Table 4-9 in the referenced document we obtain 
N = 9662 words/sec. 
This data includes both the flight control and avionics systems and 
the levels of redundancy judged to be required by the authors. If we 
assume 
207 
• a redundant signal is only transmitted to a single RT (i.e., and 
not to multiple users) and 
• W = 12 words/message, on the average 
then 
r = 9662 (\0; + 20) x 10-6 = 0.279. 
Then, bus utilization is 27.9%. 
This estimate appears to be excessively optimistic. The authors 
postulate samplinq rates of the order of SO/second for flight controls. 
Since flight control algorithms (e.g., inner loop) are generally iterated 
at SO/sec the authors evidently assumed that data would be made available 
on request, thus eliminating any transport delay between inputting and 
using the data. If data transmission is not synchronized to user request 
then the rate of transmission should be at least 4 times greater than the 
iteration rate. 
Anoter factor that must be considered is the number of subsystems 
using a redundant variable. Our estimates assumed that a simple variable 
was transmitted to a single subsystem and that this counted for one 
transmission. This is justified only if the broadcast mode is acceptable. 
If not, then a redundant variable might have to be transmitted separately 
to each user of the data. 
DC-I0 Stretch Flight Controls 
The flight control system included autopilot/flight director, Cat IlIa 
autoland, autothrottle and stability augmentation. The system contained 
two, dual-dual computer systems, one for flight guidance and the other for 
flight augmentation. The data transmission requirements were: 
SUBSYSTEM 
FGC #1 (DUAL) 
FGC #2 (DUAL) 
FAC #1 (DUAL) 
FAC #2 (DUAL) 
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WORDS/FRAME 
124 
124 
124 
124 
ITERATION RATE 
la/sec 
la/sec 
20/sec 
20/sec 
WORD/SEC 
1240 
1240 
2480 
2480 
7440 TOTAL 
Assuming that it is necessary to transmit variables at a rate at least 4 
times ~reater than the iteration rate then the total words/sec required is 
29,760 words/sec. 
If we assume an average of 12 words/message than 
106 -6 
r = 29,760 (~+ 20) x 10 = 0.86. 
Thus, bus utilization is 86%. 
This estimate is realistic and conservative, e.g., it assumes 
• a single 15538 bus 
• 2 quadruplex I/O's 
• no broadcast transmissions 
• a transmission rate equal to 4 times the iteration rate. 
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APPENDIX B 
MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICATIONS PROCESSORS 
Because of the simplicity of the communication network and the ease of 
incorporating spares, the primary measure of maintainability is the number 
of soares that must be carried in order to obtain a desired maintenance 
period. 
The number of spares required will depend upon the maintenance 
strategy employed, i.e., 
• scheduled or unscheduled maintenance, 
• oowered or unpowered spares. 
Thus, we consider four maintenance strategies: 
Strategy #1: scheduled, powered spares 
Strategy #2: scheduled, un powered spares 
Strategy #3: unscheduled, powered spares 
Strategy #4: unscheduled, un powered spares. 
In scheduled maintenance, maintenance is performed at prescribed 
intervals of time. The system must maintain its integrity between 
maintenance periods. In unscheduled maintenance, maintenance is performed 
whenever system integrity is likely to be compromised by subsequent 
failures. 
Ground Rules 
Maintenance requirements are estimated for a single, redundant 
subsystem. 
• Biannual maintenance period = 1500 hours. 
• r = minimum number of redundant elements required to achieve 
10-10 /hour. 
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• m = number of spares 
• 3-fo1d voting. When a fault is detected the affected element is 
immediately isolated and disengaged without any degradation in 
performance. Thus, loss of subsystem function occurs when and 
only when all elements but one have failed. This assumption 
applies to most subsystems but not to all e.g., skewed sensors. 
To simplify the ca1cu1atins it is assumed that spares, powered or 
unpowered, are brought on-line at the instant an active element fails. In 
practice, unpowered spares would be brought on-line after each flight, as 
required. 
To further simplify the ca1cu1f8ions it is assumed that the minimum 
number of elements required for 10- /hour is four, i.e., r = 4. This is 
baserl on the observation that the failure rate of a typical avionics 
processor is of the order of 300 x 10-6/hour (MTBF = 3333 hours) and thus 
it requires four such processors to obtain 10-10/hour survivability. 
Maintenance requirements will be determined for a range of subsystems 
having individual element failure rates of 
Al = 300 x 10-6/hour 
A2 = 100 x 10-6/hour 
A3 = 50 x 10 -9hour 
Mathematical Preliminaries 
The maintenance estimates were obtained from a simple Markov chain 
representation of the failure events. The chain is shown in Figure 56 
where 
Eo = event of no failed elements 
Ek = event of K failed elements, K = 1, 2, ••• , ~ - 1 
E~ = event of ~ or more failed elements 
Pk(n) = occupancy probability for state Ek at time n. 
qk = transition probability from state Ek- 1 to Ek 
Each transition corresponds to a flight of one hour. 
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The chain is only an approximation to the actual failure process since 
it does not account for multiple failures in a single flight. However, a 
comparison between the correct result for strategy #1 and results obtained 
using the Markov chain indicates that the errors are negligible for the 
range of parameters involved. 
Bl) 
From Figure 56 we derive the following difference equations: 
Po(n) = (1 
P1 (n) = (1 
ql) Po(n 1) 
q2) P1(n 1) + ql Po(n - 1) 
P~-l (n) = (1 - q~) P~-l (n - 1) q~-1 P~-2 (n - 1) 
P ~ (n) = P ~ (n - 1) + q ~ P ~-1 (n - 1) 
subject to the initial conditions 
P
o
(o)=1 
P k (0) = 0, K = 1, 2, ••• , ~. 
It is easy to show that the mean time from entry into state Ek-l 
to entry into state Ek is l/qk' Thus, the mean time to entry 
into state EQ, is 
B2) Navg = 1. + 1. + ... + 1. ql qz q~ 
In the case when qk = q, K = 1, 2, ••• , ~, 
B3) N = ~ 
avg q 
Strategy #1 
The probability of loss of subsystem after n flights is Pm + r - 1 (n) 
where we have set ~ = m + r - 1. The average probability of loss of 
subsystem per hour is 
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P m + 4 - 1 (n)/n. For this strategy 
q1 = (m + ")\ 
~ = (m + r - 1)>. 
qm + r - 1 = n. 
Pm + r - l(n) = 10-10 was solved for nand m 
n 
and the results plotted in Figure 57 for AI' X2 and A3. 
Strategy #2 
Same as Strategy #1 except that 
ql = q2 = .. = qm = rX (r = 4) 
qm + 1 = rX 
qm + 2 = (r - 1)\ 
q:n + r - 1 = n. 
The results are plotted in Figure 57. 
Strategy #3 
In Strategies #3 and #4 a maintenance action will be performed, as 
performed, as required, i.e., after the loss of m spares. As a measure of 
maintenance action we want to compute the 
• n = mean time to loss of m spares and 
avg 
• Pm (1500) = probability of loss of m or more elements in 1500 hours 
or, equivalently, the probability of at least one maintenance 
action in 1500 hours. 
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Thus, the intention is to obtain a value of navg ~ 1500 while at the 
same time insuring relatively infrequent maintenance action in that time 
period. 
In Strategy #3 
ql = (m + r)A 
q2 = (m + r - I)A. 
qm = (r + l)A 
Figure 58 shows Pm (1500) versus m for AI' A2' and A3. 
Figure 59 shows navg versus m for AI. 
Strategy #4 
Same as Strategy #3 except that 
ql = q2 = .•• = qm = rA (r = 4) 
and 
_ m 
navg - rA 
Figure 60 shows Pm (1500) versus m for AI' A2' and A3• 
Figure 61 shows navg versus m for AI. The mean for A2 and A3 can be 
obtained by multiplying navg by the factors 3 and 6, respectively. 
Distributed Versus Central Processing 
It is interesting to compare the relative survivability of distributed 
versus centralized processing. Assume that we are given m, distinct, 
flight critical tasks. Assume further that each task must be 4-fold 
redundant for la-la/hour survivability. In a distributed system each task 
is assigned to a dedicated microprocessor for a total of 4 m such 
processors. In a centralized system, on the other hand, the m tasks would 
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be assigned to a single processor. Naturally such a processor would 
require more computing power and memory and would, as a consequence, have a 
larger failure rate than a microprocessor. If 
Ad = failure rate of a single microprocessor 
AC = failure rate of a single, centralized processor 
then the probability of loss of system in one hour is 
3 4 B4) Sd = m (4A d + Ad ) 
B5) 
for the distributed system and 
S = 4A 3 + A 4 
c c c 
for the centralized system. 
If Ad«AC then the survivability of the distributed system can be 
considerably less than that of the centralized system. As an example, let 
Then 
and 
m = 5 tasks 
Ad = 50 x 10-6/hour 
AC = 300 x 10-6/hour. 
-12 Sc = 1.08 x 10 /hour. 
Of course 20 microprocessors are required as compared with only 4, 
centralized processors. Further, the ratio of the respective failure rates 
(\d/AC) is critical in determining the relative survivability. 
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APPENDIX C 
CLOSED-LOOP TEST FACILITY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Bendix has developed a closed-loop test facility to provide an 
experimental medium which can be used through every phase of the program 
either as a design tool or to validate the design. 
Experience has shown that errors are relatively easy to detect and 
correct if they are identified early in the program and before the affected 
modules are integrated into larger modules. 
2. APPLICATION OF THE CLOSED-LOOP FACILITY 
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The closed-loop facility can be used in a variety of ways: 
• Preliminary Design tool 
The facility can be used to assist the designer in the initial 
selection of filter algorithms, word size, iteration rates; or in 
the assessment of synchronous versus asynchronous operation, 
quantization effect, intersample ripple, etc • 
• Validation and Performance 
Once the preliminary design is established the facility can be used 
to validate performance such as: 
• intersample response 
• quantization effects 
• finite word size effects 
• overflow 
• monitoring thresholds 
• open-loop/closed-loop phase, amplitude, frequency 
• effects of computational delays 
• effects of asynchronous computation (if applicable) 
• time responses 
• equalization, signal selection, failure detection 
• Integration Testing 
Because the facility can accommodate multiple computers, it is an 
ideal facility for integration testing. 
• Provides Normal Access to Computers 
In addition to providing a software development system the facility 
features a monitor program which allows an operator sitting at a 
CRT console to exercise control over the simulator. The facility 
also provides direct access to one or more processors either singly 
or simultaneously. For example, 1) the content of designated 
memory locations in one or more processors can be displayed con-
tinuously on the console or 2) designated memory locations in one or 
more programs can be changed either singly or simultaneously via the 
console. For maximum flexibility the monitor permits the user to 
construct virtually any display format desired. 
3. COMPONENTS OF THE CLOSED-LOOP TEST FACILITY 
Figure 62 shows the major hardware components. Although the figure 
shows a dual Flight Control Computer (FLCC), the present facility can 
accommodate up to eight computers. Specifically, the hardware and software 
components consist of: 
Hardware Components 
1) Data General Eclipse S/230 System 
• Eclipse S/230 CPU 
• 32K or 64K words of memory 
, 10 megabyte disc assembly 
• diskette drive 
• video display console 
• line printer 
This unit contains software for plant modelling, BDX-930 communi-
cations and operator control. 
2) BDX-930/Eclipse Software Development System Interface 
This unit provides the hardware necessary to access up to 8 flight 
control BDX-930 computers. It provides the conventional features 
of an access panel and in addition provides: 
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• single or simulataneous memory access, either storing or 
fetching, of up to 8 Flight Control Computers 
• single or simultaneous control of up to 8 Flight Control 
Computers 
3) I/O Simulator 
This unit provides the hardware necessry for communication between 
the Flight Control Computers and the Eclipse S/230. For example, 
it converts DC analog outputs from the Flight Control Computers to 
appropriate digital formats which are then transmitted, on command, 
to the Eclipse. Specifically, the unit contains (See Figure 63): 
BDX-930 with 16K of Memory 
2 - 1553B Bus Controllers and Bus Interfaces 
AD and DA Converters 
I/O Controller 
DC Inputs 
AC Inputs 
DC Outputs 
AC Outputs 
Synchro Inputs 
Synchro Outputs 
Discrete Inputs 
Discrete Outputs 
Intercomputer Serial Data Links 
The BDX-930 can be used in a variety of ways to enhance the simu-
lation capabilities, e.g. 
Formatting input and output variables 
Emulating fault conditions on sensors, actuator commands, etc. 
In addition, it can be used to emulate a single Flight Control 
System in lieu of the target system. This allows for an early 
evaluation of control modes and single system operation. 
4) Jack Panel, Power Supplies 
Software Components 
1) Plant Model (Resident in Eclipse) 
• 6 DOF Linear, Perturbation Airframe 
• Sensor/Actuator Dynamics 
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• Bending Modes 
• Prefilters, if Slow Clock Rate is used 
• 12 MS/lteration 
2) Monitor Program (Resident in Eclipse) 
• Interactive with Operator 
• Functions as Access Panel to Flight Control Computers 
• Memory Loads 8 BDX-930's Simultaneously 
• 50 MS/Word of Transfer, MAX 
• Accesses all System Variables in FLCC's or I/O Simulator 
• Displays Selectable Data Sets 
• Provides Complete Control over Simulation 
3) I/O Simulator (Resident in BDX-930 of I/O Simulator) 
• Services FLCC's I/O 
• Simulates Redundant Sensors/Actuators 
• Simulates Sensor Faults 
• Outputs to Recorder, Eclipse, CRT Console 
• Control Laws if Target FLCC Unavailable 
4) OFP Software (Resident in FLCC) 
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APPENDIX D 
INTEGRATED SENSOR TECHNOLOGY 
The design of advanced flight control systems (FCS), particularly 
digital fly-by-wire FCS, requires highly reliable communication paths to 
meet the overall FCS reliability. In addition to redundant on board 
computers and output devices, redundant sensory data are required. The use 
of conventional approaches to satisfy the sensory requirements leads to a 
proliferation of hardware with the attendant reliability, weight, power, 
maintenance, and cost penalties. 
An Integrated Sensory Subsystem (ISS) for advanced high-performance 
aircraft, consists of redundant inertial sensors, air data probes, and 
other transducer/sensory data in combination with a digitally implemented 
Redundancy Data Management System (ROMS) and computational algorithms to 
provide accurate, reliable vehicle sensory data to several using 
subsystems. For example, the information generated by the ISS (which 
includes rate, acceleration, attitude, heading, and air data parameters), 
is utilized by the control laws of the DFCS and by other aircraft 
subsystems such as the Engine Controls, Displays, and Navigation systems. 
The major objective of the ISS is a sensory subsystem that: 
• Satisfies the mission and flight safety reliability and redundancy 
requirements of fly-by-wire FCS by using redundant sensors and 
reconfigurable functional data paths embedded within the Data 
Handling System (DHS). 
• Decreases vulnerability to interior damage by dispersal of 
components. 
• Minimizes logistic support (1) by the use of equipment configured 
from more finely partioned interchangeable modules, with a common 
electrical interface; (2) by the elimination of dedicated equipment 
such as Attitude and Heading Reference systems and Air Data 
Computers; and (3) by the use of skewed inertial sensor technology 
to minimize hardware proliferation. 
• Eliminates intermediate-level maintenance through the use of a 
failure detection and isolation system within the ISS that fault-
isolates down to the module level. 
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The conceptual design of the ISS includes skewed/dispersed inertial 
sensors, dispersed air data probes and transducers, and the DHS which 
includes the algorithms to perform fault isolation, dispersed sensor 
compensation, and best-estimate output data computations. 
ISS DESIGN 
The ISS uses design techniques that: 
• Maximize the use of mature sensor technology, modularization and 
interchangeability. 
• Maximize the capability of self-contained fault detection and 
isolation. 
• Provide sensor configurations that reduce the time needed for 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. 
• Utilize dispersed sensor configurations that insure a survivable 
sensor system. 
The ISS system is composed of three main elements: 
• A sensor set consisting of hard mounted, skewed, and dispersed rate 
integrating gyros and accelerometers; low and high speed air data 
probes which are located in close proximity to modularized air data 
transducers: an Inertial Navigation System (INS), pilot command 
sensors, surface position sensors, radio navigation devices, 
terminal guidance sensors and landing aids. The ISS concept is 
shown in Figure 64. 
• A reliable and survivable input-output (I/O) bus that links the 
sensory data to three or more flight control computers. 
• A computation network within the flight Control System complex con-
sisting of subroutines that provide: 
Sensor signal selection through failure detection and isolation 
algorithms. 
- State estimation and sensor data normalization algorithms to 
account for the effects of deterministic errors associated with 
the dispersed sensors and random sensor noise. 
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Strapdown attitude and heading computations. 
- Air data computations for Mach number, true airspeed, etc. 
The ISS sensor set consists of: 
• Redundant skewed arrays of strapdown integrating rate gyros and 
accelerometers. 
• Redundant air data probes and transducers. 
• Magnetic heading reference sensors. 
• Nav/guidance equipment including an inertial navigation system and 
radio aids. 
• Command inputs/surface position transducers. 
Six gyros and six accelerometers are configured in conical arrays to 
provide a two-fail operational sensor configuration. The instruments are 
dispersed to assure a survivable system. The cone axis for the gyros lies 
along the aircraft longitudinal axis and the accelerometer cone axis lies 
along the aircraft yaw axis. The orientation of the cone axes and 
selection of cone angles is based upon the maximum rate or acceleration 
that is anticipated in each axis, and the axis about which the maximum 
level typically occurs. Details of this selection process are given in 
(ref. 23, 24) and Appendix E. 
The ISS design philosophy for inertial sensor packaging and dispersion 
for survivability permits installation of gyros and accelerometers in less 
than ideal locations with respect to bending nodes/anti nodes and the 
aircraft C.G. The appropriate compensation generated by the use of a state 
estimator can eliminate flight control system/bending mode coupling and/or 
nuisance trips of the ROM failure detection routines. The configuration of 
the gyro and accelerometer ROM routines and the state estimator is shown in 
Figure 65. 
In addition to providing feedback signals for flight control system 
stabilization, the inertial instruments provide the reference data for 
computing attitude and heading, thus eliminating the need for a dedicated 
AHRS. To minimize the overall hardware complement, inertial sensors and 
associated electronics are packaged in Inertial Component Assemblies which 
are dispersed onboard the aircraft as shown in Figure 66. 
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The air data portion of the ISS consists of a triple channel of air 
data probes and pressure transducers plus a fourth channel of air data 
parametres which are derived analytically. 
The air data hardware configuration for conventional flight is shown 
in Figure 67. The probes and pressure transducer sets are remotely located 
from one another to assure system integrity with exterior damage. The 
pneumatic air data probes are of the multipurpose variety which sense 
static pressure, total pressure, and differential pressure for 
angle-of-attack (a) computations. The nose probe also provides 
differential pressure for sideslip (8) computations. The air data probes 
are linked to pressure transducers via short pneumatic tubing runs to 
minimize (1) the transport lag and (2) vulnerability to damage. 
An independent probe and two dual total temperature probes complete 
the set of required air data probes. It should be noted that an additional 
source is available from the difference between left and right static 
pressure. 
State-of-the-art pressure transducers are mounted in a Universal 
Transducer Assembly which, in addition to pressure transducers, contains a 
microprocessor for data preprocessing and data output control, a power 
supply, and I/O electronics. 
In order to provide accurate long-term heading, flux valves are 
utilized. The flux valve data and gyro-derived heading data are combined 
via a complementary filter in the DHS to eliminate gyro-induced heading 
errors. 
The navigation equipment and guidance data within the ISS consists of 
an inertial navigation system and the radio aids necessary to solve 
landing/guidance solutions. 
The final set of ISS sensory data consists of the various FCS command 
and surface position transducers, including feedback signals to perform 
inidividual channel failure monitoring. 
DATA HANDLING SYSTEM 
The DHD depicted in Figure 68, is contained in the redundant computer 
complex and contains algorithms to perform the following functions: 
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• Normalization of the sensed parameters. 
• Redundancy data management. 
• iss output parameter computation. 
Normalization compensates the individual sensed parameters for local 
aircraft installation characteristics. The normalized data are 
theoretically equal and represent actual aircraft parameters. For example, 
air data parameters at each probe location are compensated for local 
pressure disturbances/variations which are functions of Mach, a and 8. 
Gyro and accelerometer data are also normalized by use of a state estimator 
which provides compensation for local body bening and lever arm effects. 
The sensor RDM, depicted in Figure 69, performs failure monitoring, 
failure isolation, and signal selection. In addition, analytic redundancy 
calculations are performed to minimize overall hardware requirements. for 
example, to achieve a two-fail operational set of air data parameters, a 
fourth channel of pressure ratio, a and 8 are derived from a set of filters 
using inertial navigation data and valid air data parameters. 
The failure monitoring performed consists of two types: (1) a 
reasonableness test and (2) comparison between channels. The 
reasonableness test compares the latest calculated parameter with the 
previously calculated parameter. The failure threshold is a function of 
aircraft dynamics and short-term noise characteristics of the calculated 
parameter. Thus, the threshold associated with static pressure data is a 
function of the aircraft's maximum change in altitude, plus the short-term 
noise characteristics of static pressure data that occur between successive 
computation cycles. If the parameter exceeds the failure threshold a 
transient failure is declared, and the associated data is not utilized in 
subsequent calculations until the rate of change of the parameter falls 
below the failure monitor threshold. 
Failure monitoring performs comparisons between channels based on the 
most current data. Should a parameter exceed the failure threshold for a 
specific length of time, a permanent failure is declared. 
The Redundancy Management program for six skewed sensors contains: a 
Transient Failure Removal Routine, a Voting Computational Routine, and a 
Failure Isolation Routine (Figure 70). 
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The Transient Failure Removal Routine applies iteration to iteration 
reasonableness criteria to the individual sensor readings, and removes any 
sensor that fails the criteria from the voting logic. If a sensor 
subsequently passes the reasonableness criteria it is reinstated as a 
candidate in the voting routine. 
The Voting Computational Routine selects the best of the sensors which 
have not been declared temporarily or permanently failed and computes the 
orthogonal output data. The selection process of this routine is based 
upon a least squares best estimate of the error for each sensor. 
The Failure Isolation Routine applies scale factor error/bias level 
criteria to each active sensor. If a sensor exceed the failure threshold 
level for a sufficient umber of iterations, that sensor is declared a 
permanent failure and is removed from further consideration by the RDM. 
The 'accelerometer RDM and the gyro RDM utilize similar logic for their 
respective Transient Failure, Voting and Failure Isolation routines. the 
major difference between the gyro RDM and the accelerometer RDM are in the 
input axes cone angle/orientation and in the failure monitoring thresholds. 
It is to be noted that failure monitoring thresholds and time delays 
for the RDM's are selected for the specific characteristics of the sensors, 
the aircraft, and the flight control system used for a particular 
application. The criteria and rationale for the threshold selection 
process is given in (ref. 23). 
The signal selection subroutines in the DHS controls the sensory data 
which determines the "best estimate" for each parameter. Should a 
transient or permanent failure occur, the associated sensory data is not 
utilized in "best estimate" computations. 
The final portion of the DHS is the output parameter computation which 
uses the best-estimate data to derive the output parameters listed in Table 
11. To obtain optimum performance, parameters such as attitude, heading, 
local level velocities, and position are determined from a set of 
complementary filters as shown in Figure 71. 
3. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT STATUS 
The varies ISS functions are being developed and evaluated 
individually and combined in building-block fashion into a total ISS. 
Following design/synthesis, the methodology utilized to perform the design 
verification for each function is similar in nature and includes analytic 
studies and laboratory test and evaluations. 
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The analytic studies consist of determing system performance 
capabilities and error sensitivities via computer simulation. In addition 
to determining the quality of the output parameters, a detailed evaluation 
of the ROM is also performed to assure that redundancy requirements can be 
met under such sensor failure conditions. 
A block diagram of the digital simulation is shown in Figure 72. The 
simulation provides aircraft trajectory data, taking into account all six 
degrees of freedom. Different trajectories are generated by inputting 
pilot step commands into the flight control laws which, in turn, generates 
the surface commands. The surface commands are fed into the F-14 
aerodynamic and structural models where skewed body rate and acceleration 
data containing body bending plus kinematic acceleration data are 
generated. Various sensor errors, such as bias and scale factor errors, 
are also introduced at this point in the simulation. The combined skewed 
sensory data is then fed into the ISS DHS where the ROM and best-estimate 
data computations are performed and orthogonal body rate and center of 
gravity body acceleration data are outputted. The open-loop switch shown 
in Figure 72 represents a software option. In the open-loop configuration, 
the control laws receive the required inertial data from the aerodynamic 
model; this allows evaluation of the ISS as a separate entity while 
exercising it in a realistic flying environment. In the closed-loop 
configuration, the ISS derived inertial data is utilized by the control 
laws to enable the designer to evaluae the ISS in a typical FCS design. 
Integration of the ISS into the F-14 6-DOF simulation was accomplished 
to perform ISS evaluation. This system development/evaluation testing to 
data included: 
• Failure threshold selection and testing. 
• DHS parameter sensitivity studies e.g., cone angle, alignment, 
and c.g. location uncertainty. 
• Performance with and without state estimator compensation. 
• Performance after one and two induced sensor failures. 
The significant results and conclusions obtained from the simulation 
tests are: 
1. Introduction of various and multiple failure modes in the gyros 
and accelerometers were detected and did not cause significant 
transients in control system performance. 
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2. Introduction of sensor bias and scale factor errors up to the 
levels appropriate for flight control sensors did not cause any 
significant degradation in flight control system performance. 
3. Closed loop tests without the state estimator resulted in unstable 
aircraft performance. The effectiveness of the state estimator in 
removing the rates caused by aircraft bending modes was 
demonstrated. 
4. System sensitivity studies indicate that the DHS is tolerant to 
large misalignment errors (up to 0.2 DEG.) and large uncertainties 
in sensor to C.G. lever arm (~ 15%). 
The ISS laboratory testing that followed the digital simulation effort 
was performed in Grumman's Fly-By-Wire Laboratory depicted in Figure 73. 
The aerodynamic and structural models of the aircraft are contained in an 
analog computer and used to drive the three-axis Flight Attitude Table (FAT). The ISS gyro and accelerometer arrays are mounted on the FAT 
(Figure 74) to provide inputs to the ISS DHS contained in the FBW 
Laboratory Digital Computer. An independent inertial reference assembly 
mounted on the FAT provides a three-axis orthogonal gyro and accelerometer 
data for comparison with ISS-derived data. The outputs from the ISS DHS 
are fed to control laws within the digital computer which, in turn, provide 
actuator commands to the aerodynamic model contained in the analog 
computer. 
The laboratory test plan included open and close loop testing similar 
to the evaluation testing performed on the all-digital simulation. The 
emphasis in the laboratory testing was on the following areas: 
• Verification of state estimator performance. 
• Verification of failure isolation capability. 
• Monitoring aircraft performance in the presence of induced sensor 
failures. 
The results of laboratory testing clearly showed that the RDM could 
successfully provide high-quality two-fail operational gyro and 
accelerometer data for FCS applications in the presence of local body 
bending. In addition, accelerometer lever arm effects due to the dispersed 
sensor locations were determined and compensated in order to provide the 
aircraft with center of gravity body accelerations. 
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The significant results obtained from the laboratory testing are: 
1. The state estimator design, modified for the laboratory test 
fixture, was effective in removing bending rates and kinematic 
accelerations. 
2. First and second faiures of gyros and accelerometers were isolated 
with no observable transients in aircraft parameters. 
Following the FCS skewed gyro/accelerometer development phase, a 
combined development effort for FCS and Attitude/Heading Reference system 
functions was initiated. The major differences between this system 
configuration versus the previous configuration are: 
• Utilization of medium grade inertial instruments to provide dual 
FCS and AHRS functions. 
• Redesign of the DHS to 
- Include a new state estimator to extract body bending/lever 
arm effects for the dual functions 
- Incorporate the algorithms for computing AHRS functions. 
The associated digital simulation and laboratory test setup are 
similar to that previously described with the above modifications. The 
digital simulation/evaluation effort has been successfully completed; the 
results showed that both FCS and AHRS functions can be achieved with a 
common set of dispersed inertial instruments subjected to dissimilar 
flexible body bending. The laboratory hardware is currently being set up. 
It is functionally similar to that shown in Figure 73 but will utilize 
medium-grade inertial components (i.e., rate gyros with an accuracy of 10 
degree/hour and accelerometer with an accuracy of 0.002g) and contains the 
DHS changes described above. Detailed performance testing is in process in 
the Grumman Fly-By-Wire laboratory. 
The air data system design effort for conventional takeoff and landing 
(CTOl) has been completed and the digital simulation effort is currently 
underway. A block diagram of the simulation is shown in Figure 75. In 
order to provide realistic parameters for the simulation, certain 
characteristics of the air data system fromthe F-14A flight test aircraft 
were utilized. For example, F-14A left/right and nose boom probe position 
error models are utilized within the DHS data normalization algorithms. 
Pneumatic lag models from the F-14A are also utilized. Actual F-14A flight 
test data, both steady state and maneuvering, are being utilized for 
generating the simulated pneumatic inputs. 
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In support of the system design effort, wind tunnel tests have been 
completed on both hemispherical-shaped (ref. 31) and aerodynamically 
compensated multi-purpose probes. 
In preparation for a future combined ISS test program, the laboratory 
test facilities are currently being modified to include a triple channel of 
air data test equipment consisting of computer-controlled pneumatic 
function generators and secondary pressure standards as shown in Figure 76. 
Future ISS development plans include development of a low airspeed 
omni-directional air data system to begin in Fall of 1982. In addition, a 
design effort utilizing advanced inertial sensors, such as strapdown 
two-degree-of-freedom rate integrating gyros, is in progress. Following 
these efforts, the navigation/landing guidance synthesis and laboratory 
test and evaluation of the air data system will be performed. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
to comply with the flight control sensory requirements for future 
aircraft, it is clear that a new, innovative approach was necessary. A 
systems designer/integrator, such as Grumman, must examine all aspects 
including performance, reliability/maintainability, operational readiness, 
and life-cycle cost to be assured that the total system requirements are 
satisfied. At this point, it appears that our Integrated Sensory System 
approach offers the greatest potential to satisfy these system requirements 
when compared to the dedicated hardware approach utilized in current 
aircraft. These system requirements are literally translated to design 
objectives with this approach and include: 
• Dual-fail operational characteristics where necessary. 
• Maximum use of mature hardware to assure that reliability/ 
maintainability goals are achievable. 
• Maximum use of standard modules to reduce life-cycle cost and 
assure procurement of competitive hardware. 
• Built-in-test to permit rapid fault isolation and minimize I Level 
maintenance. 
• Dispersed components to achieve a high degree of survivability. 
The conclusions reached from the digital simulation and laboratory 
evaluation of the synthesized data handling system are: 
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1. The skewed inertial sensor concepts, which utilize six rate gyros 
and six accelerometers, can provide dual fail-op rate and 
acceleration data to DFBW flight control systems, as well as 
to other aircraft sUb-systems. 
2. It is feasible and practical for flight control application, 
using current digital computer technology, single degree-of-
freedom gyros, and standard flight control system accelerometers, 
to perform skewed inertial sensor redundancy management with 
compensation for aircraft bending modes and kinematic 
acceleration effects. 
3. A state estimation scheme required to perform the compensation for 
bending modes and kinematic accelerations was developed. The use 
of this compensation permits complete flexibility of sensor loca-
tion for improved survivability and accessibility. 
Finally, it is clear that our efforts to date have resulted in 
techniques and approaches to solve these problems. It is also apparent 
that the techniques require further development and evaluation. The 
logical development cycle planned will prove the techniques to be feasible 
and practical in meeting the needs of future aircraft. In closing, a 
summary of the ISS accomplishments to date are shown in Table 12. 
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Table 11 ISS Output Parameters 
• THREE-AXIS BODY RATES 
• THREE-AXIS BODY ACCELERATIONS 
• ATTITUDE/HEADING 
-
• THREE-AXIS LOCAL LEVEL VELOCITIES 
• LANDING/GUIDANCE RELATIVE NAV 
• PRESSURE ALTITUDE 
• AIRSPEED & MACH 
• DYNAMIC PRESSURE 
• ANGLE-OF-ATTACK 
• ANGLE-OF-SIDESLIP 
• RELATIVE WIND R82-01l4-033(W) 
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Table 12 ISS Accomplishments 
• SKEWED/DISPERSED INERTIAL COMPONENTS FOR ADVANCED FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
- FLIGHT TEST DEMONSTRATION ON RIGID BULKHEAD 
- LABORATORY TEST DEMONSTRATION WITH FLEXIBLE BODY BENDING 
- SIMULATION UTILIZING UPGRADED INERTIAL COMPONENTS TO PROVIDE AHRS FUNCTIONS 
- LABORATORY TEST DEMONSTRATION TO PROVIDE FCS & AHRS FUNCTIONS· 
- SI.MULATION & LAB EVALUATION OF ADVANCED STATE·OF·THE·ART GYROS· 
• DISPERSED AIR DATA SENSORS CONFIGURED FOR ADVANCED FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
- WIND TUNNEL TESTS OF MULTI·PURPOSE PROBES 
- SIMULATION FOR EVALUATING SENSOR CONFIGURATION & DHS 
- LABORATORY TEST DEMONSTRATION OF REDUNDANT/DISPERSED AIR DATA COMPONENTS· 
R82·0114-030(W) ·IN PROCESS 
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APPENDIX E 
REnIJNnANT SENSOR CONFIGURATION DESIGN TRADEOFFS 
1. Tradeoffs 
Most discussions, analyses and desi~ns involving redundant sensors 
reference spatial configurations wherein the orientation of the sensor axes 
are defined by, 
A - A uniform distribution on the surface of a cone. 
B - A uniform distribution on the surface of a cone plus one sensor 
on the cone axis. 
C - Normals to the faces of the five regular polyhedra; Tetra-, 
Hexa-, Octa-, Dodeca-, and Icosa-hedron. 
Dependent upon the number of sensors involved and the specific cone 
an~le, these three cate~ories have some overlap. In addition, highly 
specialized configurations not strictly described by A thru C above, have 
been devised. We choose to iqnore specialized configurations because 
consideration of such systems at this point would add little to the 
determination of fundamental redundant sensor configuration tradeoff 
sensitivities. 
Without any loss of generality, four of the five regular polyhedra can 
be represented by half of their faces above or below a plane of symmetry. 
In this case, an equivalent cone model may be formed with the cone vertex 
as the spatial center of the polyhedron and the cone axis normal to the 
plane of symmetry. With the appropriate cone angle, cone configurations A 
and/or B can be made equivalent to the re~ular polyhedra. These 
equivalences and corresponding cone half-angles are summarized in Table 13. 
Per Table 13 the Semi-Icosahedron requires the compounding of cone 
configurations A and B, while the remaining four regular polyhedra are 
uniquely equivalent to A or B. For our purposes, any subsequent 
requirement to analyze a 10 sensor configuration can be adequately 
represented by cone models A or B, so we will neglect the compound cone 
configuration of the Semi-Icosahedron henceforth. 
In ~eneral, cone models A and B are sufficient to develop the 
significant tradeoff sensitivities involving any number of redundant 
sensors, includinq 4 of the 5 regular polyhedra where the appropriate cone 
anqle is specified. 
254 
In terms of evaluatinq the performance of rerlundant sensor 
confiquratoins, we ultimately need to consider how the individual sensor 
errors into the primary p, q, r A/e axes. The characteristics of this 
maoping must he evaluated for full sets of sensors and for the remaining 
partial sensor sets after failures have occurred. 
Figure 77 highlights the basic error relationships associated with 
cone configuration models A and B. With a full set of n sensors, a value 
of cone half-angle S, can be selected to minimize the p, q, r error 
ellipsoid. The optimum cone half-angles are summarized below e in Figure 
77. It is noted that the optimum cone half-angle in Figure 77 are 
identical to the cone half-angle designations in Table 13; the spatially 
uniform location of regular polyhedra faces is analogous to uniform sensor 
sensitivity in 3-dimensional space. 
In addition, note that the optimum cone half-angle cone model A is a 
constant 54.74 degrees while the optimum angle for cone model B is a function 
of the number of sensors. The constant optimum cone half-angle characteristic 
of cone model A is particularly convenient because it simplifies the 
analysis of tradeoff situations involving various combinations of multiple 
and/or identical sensor subsets. Since the cone angle is not a function of 
, linear superposition applies, and Ilanalytical cones" can be created 
by simple rotations of subsets as long as a colinear relationship between 
the cone axes is maintained. For example, a six-sensor cone can be created 
with 2 three-sensor cones (i.e., orthogonal triads) rotated 600 with 
respect to each otehr about their cone axes, or equivalently, about the 
triad diagonals. The possihle combinations are endless (e.g., a 12 from 
two 61 s or four 31 s, etc ••.• ), and they provide a fair amount of 
flexibility in the design of both software and hardware, including the 
possible utilization of proven sensor packages. The advantages cited for 
cone configuration A certainly do not preclude the viable implementation of 
a redundant sensor configuratoin per cone model B, but for the purposes of 
developing basic redundant sensor configuration tradeoff sensitivities, at 
least initially, the use of the cone A model is preferable. 
The Fail-Op capability of redundant sensor configuratoins is a main 
design driver in terms of the probability of mission success and 
maintenance cycle parameters. Sinqle sensor cones have a Fail-Op 
capability equal to N-4, where N equals the total number of sensors. (It 
requires a minimum of 5 sensors to detect and isolate a single failure.) 
One might consider cascading conventional orthogonal triads wherein the 
sensor axes are colinear. The Fail-Op capability of this configuration is 
~ _ 2 If cones are cascaded, the Fail-Op capability is given by N - 4nc, 
3 . 
where nc is the number of identical cones. The Fail-Op capability vs. the 
total number of sensors for single cones, cascaded cones, the cascaded 
orthogonal triads is plotted in A of Figure 78. 
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In qpnpr~l. cascaden orthoqonal triads havp the poorest Fail-Op 
capahility for ~ qivpn number of sensors while the single cones have the 
best and cascaded cones fall somewhere between. 
One miqht question the consideration of cascaded cones at all, since 
identical cascaded cones could be rotated to form "analytical or effective 
sinqle cones" as mentioned previously - with a much improved Fail-Op 
capability. Siqnificant justification exists however, for the 
consideration of cascaded cones in terms of related tradeoffs with respect 
to the corresponding computer and software configurations. For example, 
comparisons of the simultaneous failure detection and isolation of 18 
sensors on a single cone (analytical or real) vs. parallel processing of 9 
sensors in two cones or 6 sensors in 3 cones have to be analyzed in terms 
of failure modes, reliability, system interface and I/O characteristics, 
development costs, maintenance costs, .•••• , etc. 
In addition, one could suggest that tradeoffs conducted to optimize 
the overall redundant sensor system design with respect to a given Fail-Op 
desiqn goal might yield different results from the case where the Fail-Op 
capability was to be optimized given a limit on the maximum number of 
sensors. In short, this is a significant tradeoff area requiring a fair 
amount of detailed effort. 
The allowable mean system error a, is another major design driver. As 
sensors fail, the mean system error will increase to some end-of-life value 
at the Fail-Op limit. This end-of-life error is a function of the initial 
number of sensors, the sensor quality, and the inherent failure degradation 
characteristic of the candidate redundant sensor configuration. 
The initial value of the mean system error (i.e., with no failures) is 
not a function of the sensor configurations referenced in Figure 78 it is a 
function of the total number of sensors only. If the mean system error is 
normalized with respect to a common individual sensor error as, we can 
refer to the relative mean system error, a/as. the initial value of a/as 
as a function of total number of sensors is shown in B of Figure 78. 
The degradation of a/as for two different redundant sensor 
configurations, each with a total of 24 sensors, is given in C of Figure 
78. The performance of the 4 cascaded six-sensor cone configuratoin is 
based on a software simplification design policy of dropping each 
six-sensor cone off-line when it has reached its Fail-Op limit of 2 
failures. The failure performance of this configuratoin is analyzed in the 
following section. On the other hand, the failure performance of the 8 
cascaded triads was based on complete processing of all the remaining 
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sensors. No meaningful comparison between these two particular redundant 
sensor systems is intended or implied at this point. They were presented 
as examples to highlight another significant tradeoff area; the 
relationship between end-of-life performance and redundant sensor 
configuration. 
In summary, it should be noted that this introduction to redundant 
sensor configuration tradeoffs is by no means comprehensive or complete. 
For example, practical considerations involving the use of non-optimum cone 
angles and the effect of different failure modes in certain classes of 
sensors (e.g., SOOF vs. TOOF gyros), are additional topics that may require 
further development - and there are no doubt, serveral more. 
2. Relative Mean Error Relationships for Single and Cascaded Six Sensor 
Cones 
In this section, the relative mean system error for cascaded 
six-sensor cones is developed as a function of the number of failed sensors 
and the individual sensor error variance. 
We start by evaluating a single six-sensor cone as illustrated in 
Figure 79. The .individual sensor axes sl' thru s6, are located on a cone 
of half-angle = 8, with the cone axis cOlncident with one of the major AIC 
axes. The projections of the sensor axes in the plane of AIC axes q and r 
are symmetrically separated by an angle of 600 • 
It is noted that any computational processing of the six sensor 
outputs would have to account for the specific orientation of the cone with 
respect to the major AIC axes p, q, and r and the specific value of the 
cone angle as well. If the Figure 79 orientation represented a real 
implementation, then the transformation matrix H, in Figure 79 would of 
course have to be used in the actual processing. For the purposes of this 
appendix however, we use the specific H transformation in Figure 79 only as 
a convenient means of developinq general results that are independent of 
any specific orientation. 
by, 
-+ The least mean squares solution for the AIC axes vector A, is given 
where: 
A = 
A ~ 
[HTH] -lHTS 
[p q r ] T 
11) 
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-+ -+ -+-+ 
If the vector errors in A and S are denoted oA and oS respectively, 
then from (1), 
(2) 
It follows that the covariance matrices of the error vectors are 
related by, 
( 7T) (+ +T\ T oft. • CA 3x3 = [G]3x6 oS· oS ix6 [G ]6x3 (3) 
where: 
G ~ [HTH] -1 HT (4) 
(.) ~ the statistical expectation operator 
Now, if the individual sensors are similar, with a common zero mean 
Gaussian error variance of cr 2 S ' 
(5) 
.... and (3) may be expressed as, 
( -+ +T) T oA • oA = [G.G ]cr2 
s (6 ) 
Usine (4), 
(7) 
258 . 
r-
hence the Ale axes error covariance matrix per (6) may be 
finalized as, 
<oA~ . oA T) [PH P12 P13] [HTHr1 ~ P21 P22 23 = 
P31 
[) P33 r 32 
where: P1l 
2 
axis variance = 0' = P error p 
P22 
2 
axis variance (8 ) = 0' = q error q 
P33 
2 
axis variance = 0' r = r error 
P .. = P .. = corresponding covariance lJ Jl terms for i -; j and i, j 
= 1, 2, and 3 
0'2S 
It is convenient to normalize our results with respect to the 
individual sensor error variance and deal with the elements of [HTH]-1 only. 
e. g. , O'~ [T J-1 ~ = H H 11 ' etc ... 
as 
Using the H matrix of Figure E-3 the normalized error covariance 
matrix with all six sensors operating is given by (10). 
= 
1 : 
6 cos""S 0: 0 
I I 
--------------~-----------~----------
: 1 : o I 'I a 
I 3 sin z6 I 
I I 
--------------~-----------~----------I I 
o : 0 : 1 
I I 3 sinzS 
I I 
I 
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(9) 
(10) 
Hence, 
0 2 1 + = 6 cos 2a 5 
0 2 "2 
9 o r 1 , = (T = 3 sin 2 (3 o-
s 5 
If we wish to optimize the error covariance with six sensors 
operating, a value of a may be chosen that minimizes the trace in (10). 
TRACE = = 
then, usinq (11) and (12) in (13), the trace is qiven by, 
= 
1 
6" 
Using (14), the solution to 
1 + 3 cos !3 [ 2] ------s~i-n~2a~c~o~s~3~S~--
d~) 
d p = a 
defines the optimum cone half-angle. The result is, 
.... and 
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( 11) 
(12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
, r--
The 54.74 deqrees cone half-angle per (15) is also the optimum angle for 
any number of 5ensors uniformly distributed around a cone. It is of interest 
to note that in the case of the six-sensor cone, the configuration with the 
optimum ~ is identical to two orthogonal triads rotated 60° with respect to 
each other. For example, sensor subsets (SI' S3' S5) and (S2' s~, S6) in 
Figure 79 are orthogonal triads with their diagonals along the cone axis. 
Hence, any number of 6, 9, 12, etc •••• , sensor cones can be formed with 
appropriately oriented orthogonal triads. 
If we use the optimum cone angle solution per (16) in (11) and (12), 
the result is equal relative variances, 
i . e. , = = ~ 
° s 
= 
1 
"2 
Since the normalized trace is not a function of the specific H matrix 
involved, we can state that 
(17) 
(Ig) 
0;- 2 2 0 2 1 + 3 cos 2 6 0p + 0g + 1 for gen-r 6" si n 26 cos 26 eral 6 
----crz- = 0 2 = S s 
3 for optimum 
-2-
6 = 54.740 
.•.• for any orientation of the cone with respect to the p, q, and r 
Ale axes and with six sensors operating. 
At this point, we would like to express the relative error in some 
mean sense that is convenient; arithmetic, geometric, or harmonic mean. 
Since the sum of the individual variances is the invariant combination, the 
arithmetic mean is both convenient and the most conservative. Let the 
normalized arithmetic mean variance be represented as 62/02 S ' where, 
:2 
v 
--
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(19) 
(20) 
Then, for (18) and (19) in (20), we may summarize the basic results thus 
far as, 
Relative Mean } 
Error For 
Six-Sensor Cone 
(j2 
t. 
- a 2 
s 1 
"2" 
for general 8 
for optimum 
8 = 54.740 
Since a six-sensor cone has a Fail-0p = 2 capability, we must develop 
the relative mean error for the additional cases of one and two sensor 
failures. We will continue the development in terms of a qeneral cone 
half-angle B, since it is not necessarily true that the optimum cone angle 
for 6 out of 6 sensors operatinq, is the same as the optimum cone angle for 
5 out of 6 and/or 4 out of 6 sensors operating. Non-optimum cone angles in 
redundant sensor confiqurations can be utilized for the purpose of 
maximizinq end-of-lifeperformance by trading off initial mean error with 
all sensors operatinq vs. end-of-life mean error at the Fail-Op limit. 
To represent a sinqle sensor failure, we can delete any row of the 
matrix of Figure Al and proceed to compute [HTH]-l as before. The result 
is, 
..... where the subscript "5/6" is used to denote "5 out of 6 sensors 
operating". 
Note that the B dependent term in (23) is identical to the B dependent 
term in (14). Hence, the optimum cone half-angles for 6 out of 6 sensors 
and 5 out of 6 sensors are identical; B = 54.74 degrees. 
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(21) 
(22) 
(22) 
Then, using the definition of the arithmetic mean variance per (20) 
along with (23), yields, 
3 [1 + 3 cos 2 8 ] for general 8 ~::) 5/6 27 sin 2 8 . cos 2 8 = 2 for ootimum 
"3 8 = 54.740 
Next, we consider a second sensor failure. For any two failures in 
the six-sensor cone, the normalized trace of [HTH]-1 is still invariant as 
long as the separation angle between the failed sensors is constant. 
Therefor~, we must consider three distinct second failure modes; separation 
anqles between the two failed sensors of 600 , 1200 , and 1800 • Deleting two 
rows of the H matrix per Figure 79 with the three possible separation 
angles (e.g., Sl' and S3 for a separation angle of 1200 ), and computing 
[HTH]-1 as before, yields the following results. 
(:::) 600 = 15 + 37 cos 2 8 4/6 30 sin 28 . cos 2 8 
G::) 1200 = 5 [1 + 3 C05 2 8 ] 4/6 18 sin 2 8 . cos 2 8 
G::) 1800 = 3 + 13 cos 2 8 4/6 12 sin 2 8 . cos 28 
263 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
•••. where the superscript angle notation represents the separation angle 
between the two failed sensors. 
After the first sensor failure, it is clear from the geometry in 
Fiqure 79 that the probability of a separation anqle of 180 degrees with the 
second sensor failure is one chance in five; 1/5. Similarly, the 
probability of a separation anqle between two failed sensors of 60 degrees 
and 120 deqrees is the same; 2/5. Therefore, the appropriate combination of 
the results in (25) thru (27) can be formed with a weighted arithmetic mean 
format, where the weighting is equivalent to the probabilities of occurrence 
as discussed above and shown in (28) and (29) below. 
(::,) 4/6 = 
1200 G::) 4/6 
After combininq terms, the final result is, 
(28) 
325 + 939 cos 26 (29) 
If we compute the optimum cone half-anqle as the solution to, 
4/6 = 0 (30) 
dB 
the result is 8 = 54.55 degrees for the 4 out of 6 sensor case. The value for 
6 out of 6 and 5 out of 6 was previously computed as 8 = 54.74 degrees •. The 
small difference of 0.190 in the 8 values is negligible and affects the (02/0S2) 4/6 
value in the 4th decimal place. Therefore, for a six-sensor cone, the optimum 
cone half-angle in terms of minimizing the relative mean error for 0, 1, and 2 
sensor failures is 8 = 54.74 degrees - for all practical purposes. The basic 
error relationships developed to this point are summarized in Table 14. 
264 
Before proceeding with the development of the relative mean system 
error for cascaded six-sensor cones, we must precisely define "cascaded". 
In the context herein, "cascaded" means replication of the basic six-sensor 
cone without any change in orientation. 
One could define a configuratio~ of six-sensor cones in which the cone 
axes are parallel, but where each successive cone is rotated to obtain 
uniform distribution of the sensors. For example, if 3 six-sensor cones 
are rotated about their axes exactly 200 with respect to each other, the 
result would be analytically equivalent to a single l8-sensor cone; this is 
not what we are considering herein. 
In addition, the specific implementation or utilization of the 
cascaded cone outputs must be defined in order to develop the approprite 
relative mean system error. First, it is assumed that the sensor Failure 
Detection and Isolation (FDI) software is replicated on a cone-by-cone 
basis; each six-sensor cone has a Fail-Dp = 2 capability and the entire 
cone is dropped from the system after two failures are detected. Secondly, 
it is assumed that the p, q, and r axes outputs from each cone sUb-system 
are approximately weighted to develop the final or system p, q, r values. 
Summarizing the ground rules/definitions above, the following 
development of the relative mean system error for the cascaded six-sensor 
cone confiquration is in accordance with (i) thru (iii) below. 
(i) Simple replication of the basic six-sensor cone - total system 
Fail-Dp capability = twice the number of cones. 
(ii) Simple replication of FDI software - detection of two failures 
drops entire cone off-line. 
(iii) System output is based on weighted combinations of individual 
cone sub-systems; cones with single sensor failures would be 
weighted less heavily than cones with no sensor failures. 
With respect to (iii) above, the specific weighted combination used is 
the inverse of reciprocal sums. For six-sensor cones denoted 1, 2, 3, 
etc •.. in cascade, the relative mean system error is computed as, 
(-2~ ~ t:. O'S2 SYSTEM:: 
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(31) 
As an example, if the "system" was defined as 4 six-sensor cones in 
cascade, and one of the cones has a single failure, the relative mean 
system error would be computed in accordance with (31) as, 
(!:~ V(~:~ 5/6 !(O'~ le'~ le'v r = + 0S2 6/6 + °S2 6/6 + °S2 6/6 SYSTEM 
Then using, (02/0S2)5/6 = 2/3 
and (-2 2) o /Os 6/6 = 1/2 from Table 14, the numerical 
value in (32) is, 
~02 ) _ 2 -2 - 15 Os SYSTEM 
Next, we must consider the effect of sensor failure location and 
sequence. The variation of the relative mean system error vs. the number of 
failed sensors is not unique, except at the initial and end-of-life points. 
e'~ i . e. , 2 as SYSTEM ( INITIAL) 
(::~ = SYSTEM 
(F.~JD-OF-!..I FE) 
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1 
= (NUMBER ) 2 x OF CONES 
(~:~ 4/6 = 1.0312 
for no failures 
at the Fail-Op limit with 
two failures in the last 
on-line cone 
(32) 
If the faiures were to sequence throughout the system in a uniform manner 
(i.e., no second failure in one cone until all cones had at least one 
failure), the variation in relative mean system error would be optimum in 
the sense of maintaining the smallest error vs. the total number of failed 
sensors. On the other hand if the first two failures occurred in a single 
ocne and the next two failures occurred in another cone, and so on, the 
variation in relative mean system error would represent a worst case 
condition. It is this latter or worst case failure mode sequence we choose 
to present herein. 
In addition to being conservative, tabulation of the worst case 
failure mode is convenient in terms of representing all results for 
different numbers of cascaded cones below some specified maximum with a 
single calculation set. For example, if it is concluded that 5 six-sensor 
cones in cascade is the maximum size system being considered, once the 
relative mean system errors are computed for each sensor failure upt to the 
Fail-Op limit, the results for 4, 3, 2, and 1 six-sensor cone systems are 
already included as subsets of the original 5 six-sensor cone system 
calculations. 
This "one-shot" calculation set for 1 to 5 six-sensor cones in cascade 
is tabulated in Table 15 and plotted in Figure 80. The results in Table 
15 are based on the optimum cone half-angle; 54.74 degrees, the single 
six-sensor cone relationships in Table 14 and the weighted combination of 
cone errors per equation (31). 
It is noted that the relative mean system error is double-valued at 
sensor failure totals of 2, 4, 6 and 8 for the purpose of "constructing" 
Table 15 and clearly identifying the points where each cone goes off-line. 
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Figure 77 Redundant Skewed Sensor Error Geometry 
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WHERE: P11 = U p2= p-axis ERROR VARIANCE 
P22 = U Q.2= q-axis ERROR VARIANCE 
P33 = U r2= r-axis ERROR VARIANCE 
U 82 = INDIVIDUAL SENSOR ERROR VARIANCE 
Figure 79 Six-Sensor Cone Geometry 
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Figure 80 Relative Mean system Error for Cascaded Six-Sensor Cones 
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Table 13 Regular Polyhedra & Conical Equivalences in Redundant Sensor Systems 
0 ® 
1 SENSOR ON 
CONE AXIS 
'(~: '\:'~/ TOTAL \~\c 1; NUMBER \~ ~ EQUIVALENT OF REGULAR 
INDIVIDUAL !~l !" POLYHEDRA SENSORS (n) n SENSORS n-1 SENSORS 
UNIFORMLY UNIFORMLY 
DISTRIBUTED DISTRIBUTED 
SEMI-HEXAHEDRON (CUBE) 
3 13 = 54.74° OR 
ORTHOGONAL TRIAD 
4 13 = 54.74° SEMI-OCTAHEDRON' 
4 13 = 70.53° TETRAHEDRON 
6 13 = 63.44° SEMI-DODECAHEDRON 
ct=;:3 COMPOUND CONES 
10 Q~"'" 6 SEMI-ICOSAHEDRON" 
V 133 = 37.3° 136 = 79.1° 
'OFTEN REFERENCED WITH RESPECT TO TDOF GYRO IMPLEMENTATIONS 
"SUITED FOR RING LASER GYROS & ACCELEROMETERS BECAUSE OF ICOSAHEDRON'S 
TRIANGULAR FACES 
R82·0114·001W 
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Table 14 Relative Mean Error Relationships for a Single Six-Sensor Cone 
RELATIVE MEAN ERROR RELATIONSHIPS 
NO. 
OF iJ2 7i 
FAILED - -
0 5
2 a SENSORS 5 
GENERALj3 OPTIMUM CONE HALF·ANGLE; i3" 54. 74· 
0 1 [1 + 3 cos
2 j3 ] (:~) = t ( ~) 6/6 = 18 sin 2i3 cos2i3 0.7071 6/6 
2 [1 + 3 cos2p J ( iJ2 ) 2 
( ~s) 5/6 1 27 sin2~ cos2(3 052 = - = 0.8165 3 5/6 
325 + 939 cos2i3 
(0
2 
) 319 
( :s) 4/6 
2 
2700 sin2i3 cos2i3 052 = - = 
1.0312 300 
4/6 
ij2 = MEAN SYSTEM (CONE) ERROR VARIANCE 
R82·0114·005(W) 05
2 = INDIVIDUAL SENSOR ERROR VARIANCE 
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Table 15 Tabulated Values of Relative Moan Errors for Systems 
with 1 to 5 Six· Sensor Cones in Cascade 
NO.OF NO. OF 
FAILED SENSORS OPERATING SENSOR.S -RELATIVE MEAN 
IN SYSTEM IN EACH CONE SYSTEM ERROR 
1 CONE 2 CONE 3CONE 4 CONE 5CONE CONE CONE CONE CONE CONE (12 .L. 
SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 1 2 3 4 5 as2 as 
0 6 6 6 6 6 
1 0.3162 10 
1 5 6 6 6 6 
2 0.3244 -19 
2 4 6 6 6 6 
319 0.3344 2852 
CONE 1 
0 2 OFF· 6 6 6 6 8 0.3536 LINE 
1 3 5 6 6 6 2 0.3651 -15 
2 4 4 6 6 6 
319 0.3796 --2214 
CONE 
...L 0 2 4 OFF· 6 6 6 0.4083 
LINE 6 
1 3 5 5 6 6 2 0.4264 11 
2 4 6 4 6 6 319 0.4499 1576 
CONE 1 0 2 4 6 OFF· 6 6 0.5000 
LINE 4 
1 3 5 7 5 6 2 0.5345 -7 
2 4 6 8 4 6 319 0.5832 938 
CONE 1 0 2 4 6 8 OFF· 6 0.7071 
LINE 2 
1 3 5 7 9 5 2 0.8165 3 
2 4 6 8 10 4 319 1.0312 300 
-BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS: 
1 ) OPTIMUM CONE HALF·ANGLE; (J = 54.74° 
2) WORST CASE DEGRADATION OF RELATIVE MEAN 
SYSTEM ERROR; FOR SEQUENTIAL CONE FAILURES 
R82·0114·006(W) 
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APPENDIX F 
MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SKEWED SENSORS 
1. Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is to determine an optimum sensor 
configuration which will comply with a safety risk goal of 10-10 losses per 
flight hour with a maintenance plan which permits scheduled restoration of 
redundancy bi-annually (1500 flt hrs.) and no unscheduled maintenance. 
The study was accomplished through the evaluation of the following 
seconrlary investigation: 
• Evaluation of the relative reliability characteristics of Skewed 
and Orthogonal sensor configurations. 
• Determination of the sensitivity of orthogonal and skewed system 
failure orobabilities to variations in configuration complexity, 
element failure rate and mission time. 
• Evaluation of the impact of the bi-annual scheduled maintenance 
concept. 
• Evaluation of the impact of imperfect redundancy management; e.g. 
less than 100% coverage and a greater than zero false alarm rate. 
2. Conclusions 
• A skewed sensor set appears to offer the only practical means of 
achieving the 10-10 safety risk probability per flight hour when 
unscheduled maintenance is eliminated. 
• An alternate maintenance concept which permits unscheduled main-
tenance whenever only 4 skewed sensors remain operational can 
result in the attainment of the safety risk objective with 20% 
fewer sensors and a very low probability (.0008)* of performing 
unscheduled maintenance between scheduled maintenance events. 
The life cycle cost trade study between the alternate and required 
maintenance concepts should be performed and used to determine 
which is the preferred approach. 
* for a sensor failure rate of 20 FPM and 7 skewed sensors 
(see Paragraph 6.0). 
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• an analytic approach to false alarms and coverage which was based 
on a previous study has been extended to the general case of a 
system of n like items which can be characterized by the binomial 
expansion. The results of this analysis showed that additional 
sensor redundancy provides no improvement when the sensor failure 
rate is 20 failures per million hours. For realistic probabilities 
of no false glarms (.999) and correct failure isolation (.99), a 
limit of 10- failures per hour appears to have been reached. 
Additional work in applying the concepts of false alarms and 
coverage to a Markov transition state analysis is recommended. 
In addition, an approach which takes into account the dependence 
of the probability of false alarms on mission duration, and allows 
restoration between missions of sensors which have been removed . 
via false alarms would be more realistic and will be pursued in 
future studies. 
3. Orthogonal vs. Skewed Sensors 
A set of n orthogonal sensors would have n/3 sensors aligned along 
each of the three principal axes of the aircraft. When comparison 
monitoring is user to detect and isolate failures, a minimum of two sensors 
per axis is required for safe operation. With two sensors remaining, the 
next sensor failure would be detected but not isolated, causing operation 
on incorrect data, which in a Fly-by-wire application, can be considered to 
result in loss by the aircraft. The reliability of an orthogonal system 
with n sensors is given by the expression. 
(1) R = 3 (Raxis ) os N N N I N 
R_3 + N R 3 -
1 (1 - R ) + N!· R 3 -
2 
where Raxis = (1 -~ j s s . (3 - 2) !2! s 
N I 
+ ... 
3· 
(~ - m)!m! 
Note that m = total of failures, Rs 
is an integral multiple of 3 
N 
= sensor reliability, ~ - m = 2 and n 
276 
Rs)2 + 
-
A set of n skewed sensors would have the sensors aligned in 
predetermined directions none of which necessarily coincide with any of the 
orincipal axes or each other. In order to completely define three 
dimensional space, three independent sensor m~asurements are required. 
Whenever 4 sensors remain, safe operation is possible. The next sensor 
failure would be detected but not isolated by comparison monitoring. 
Therefore, a skewed set of n sensors can tolerate n-4 failures. The 
expression for the reliability of a system of n skewed sensors is 
(2) Rc;s = R N + N R N - 1 (1 _ R ) + N! R N - 2 (1 _ R )2 + 
_ s s s (N - 2)!2! s s'" 
T N! R N - m (1 _ R )m (N - m) !m! s s 
Note that n-m=4 
The above equations for Ros and Rss apply whenever conditional 
orobabilities do not aoply to the scenario under consideration. They are 
applicable to a sensor system which is maintained in a conventional manner 
(e.g. unscheduled maintenance as required between misisons), whose false 
alarm rate is zero, and whose coverage (detection and isolation 
probability) is 100%. 
Using the fact that R sensor =e-\t, where \ is the sensor failure 
rate and t is the mission time, equations (1) and (2) can be used to 
exolore the relative characteristics of skewed and orthogonal sensor 
configu~ations. . 
For a sensor faiure rate of 80 failures per million hours (FPM) and a 
one hour misison, equations (1) and (2) yield the following equivalence 
relationships: 
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6 Skewed . > 12 Orthogonal 
7 Skewed .~ 15 Orthogonal 
8 Skewed => 18 Orthogonal 
This is depicted graphically in Figure 81. 
When the number of sensors is fixed at 6 skewed and 12 orthogonal, and 
the sensor failure rate is held at 80 FPM, equations (1) and (2) are used 
to show the effect of mission times of 1, 3, 5, and 8 hours. This is 
depicted in Fi~ure 82. It is noted that mission times of greater than -10 
three hours would require additional redundancy in order to attain a 10 
failure oer mission goal. 
When the number of sensors is fixed at 6 skewed and 12 orthogonal, and 
the mission time is fixed at 1 hour, equations (1) and (2) are used to show 
the effect of sensor failure rates of 10, 20, 45, 60, and 80 FPM. This is 
depicted in Fiqure 83. It is noted that sensor failure rates as high as 80 
FPM would allow attainment of a goal of 10 failures per hour. 
4. Sensor Faiure Rates for the 1990's Time Frame 
Before attemptinq to postulate sensor failure rates based on the 
technoloqy expected to be available in the 1990's we must first evaluate 
the actual performance of current technology hardware and assess how well 
we were able to predict this performance. 
The sensor package on the F-14 aircraft is an orthogonal system 
containing 2 roll rate gyros, 2 pitch rate gyros, and 3 yaw rate gyros. 
During a recent year of operation, the packages which included these seven 
rate qyros accrued 52,377 flight hours and experienced 34 in-flight 
failures. This data yields a failure rate of 649 FPM for the sensor 
packages and 92.7 FPM for each of the seven sensor elements. This value is 
reasonably close to the initial prediction of 80 FPM. Also note that the 
military environment is a more rigorous environment to the gyros than 
commercial service would be. 
The sensor envisioned for a 1990's application would consist of a ring 
laser gyro, a power switching regulator, and a bus interface unit. 
This hardware would provide individual sensor data to a dual 1553 data 
~us, where remote processors would handle redundancy management and perform 
flight control, inertial, and other required computations. 
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The rinq 1.1Sf'r qyro, which has no movinq parts, is currently being 
incorporated into an IMU for the AV8B. The pREDICTED failure rate for this 
current techno 1 og,v vers i on of the ri ng 1 aser gyro is reported to he 20 FPM 
by the IMU manufacturer. The powre switching regulator which receives 
aircraft/battery power and transforms it to required gyro power and bias 
power for electronics, is predicted by MIL HDBK 217 C to have a fialure 
rate of 10 FPM. The BlU, a current technology version of which is beinq 
manufactured at the Grumman Electronics System Center on a single chip, has 
a current technology prediction of 20 FPM. This would yield a prediction 
for current technology version of a ring laser gyro and associated 
electronics of 50 FPM. It is not unreasonable to postulate that based upon 
the rate of technology improvement, this failure rate will improve to 20 
FPM by the 1990's. 
5. Scheduled Maintenance 
The study requirement for scheduled maintenance bi-annually, with no 
unscheduled maintenance between missions can be evaluated using equations 
(1) and (2) when the misison time is set to the flight hours expected to be 
accrued between the bi-annual maintenanc~ periods (1500 hrs,approx.). In 
order to determine a risk probability on a per flight hour basis, equations 
(1) and (2) must be divided by the mission time*. 
Figure 84 depicts the number of sensors required for orthogonal and 
skewed configurations as a function of sensor failure rate. Note thatin 
this analysis all sensors are powered and operating continuously. 
Consideration of unpowered "spare" sensors was not undertaken since the 
finite, non-negliaible warm-up time for the laser gyro presents analytical 
and hardware complications which would tend to offset any advantages. 
If the predicted 1990's failure rate of 20 FPM for the sensor element 
is attained, then 9 skewed and 27 orthogonal sensors are required to attain 
the safety risk probability goal of 10-10 losses per flight hours. If the 
sensor failure rate were to remain at a current level of 80 FPM then 13 
skewed and 42 orthogonal sensors would be required. For all practical 
purposes, the criteria for no unscheduled maintenance has virtually 
eliminated an orthogonal configuration from further consideration. 
6. Alternate Unscheduled Maintenance Concept 
The restriction of no unscheduled maintenance requires the addition of 
at least 7 skewed sensors (A = 80 FPM) compared to a scenario that allows 
unscheduled maintenance between 1 hr. missions. A reasonable alternate to 
this restrictive scenario would be to permit unscheduled maintenance 
whenever the system has arrived in a state in which the next failure would 
result in loss of the aircraft. For skewed sensors, this represents the 
state in which all but four sensors have failed. 
* See Paragraph 8.0 for a discusion of this criterion. 
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This conditional maintenance criterion introduces a conditional 
probability of restoration of redundancy into the reliability analysis. 
This scenario lends itself to treatment via Markov transition state 
analysis. Using Grumman's existing MARCAP analysis computer program, which 
facilitates the mechanics of multiplying an initial state vector by 
transition matrices and restoration matrices to obtain final and 
intermediate state vectors, the results depicted in Figure 85 were 
obtained. Note that for a sensor failure rate of 20 FPM 7 skewed sensors 
are required to attain a safety risk probability of 10-10 losses per flight 
hour. This represents a savings of 2 sensors over the scenario which 
allows no unscheduled maintenance. 
7. The Impact of False Alarms and Imperfect Coverage on Sensor 
Reliability 
The need to incorporate a criterion for the persistence of failures 
before permanently disengaging a system element has already been discussed 
in connection with transient errors in data transmission. This section 
quantifies the hazards of premature disengagement. 
False alarms (removal of n functional units from the system) and 
imperfect coverage (removinq one or more functional units prior to removing 
the failed unit from the system) reduce system reliability. Consider a 
three channel, active, parallel redundant system in which two functional 
units are required for successful operation. With no false alarms and 
oerfect coverage, the reliability would be 
R = Po + PI 
where Po (probability of successful operation with no failures) 
= e -3H 
PI (orobabilitv of successful operation with one failure) 
= 3 (e -2At _ e -3At) 
If false alarms are considered, 
P -+ P , = Po [P FA + (1 PFA ) (P FA)] 0 0 
PI -+ P I = PI [PIT] 1 
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If 
where PFA = probability of no false alarms (taken to be independent of the number of units remaining 
in the system; time-weighted mean value used 
for this analysis). 
imperfect coverage is also considered 
P I -+ P II = P 0 0 0 
PI I -+ P II = PI I [PIJ 0 
I"here PI = probability that a failure will be correctly 
isolated to the failed unit. 
Thus, with hoth false alrams and imperfect coveraqe considered, the 
reliability would be 
R = P II 
o 
= P II 
1 
= e -3At [P FA + (1 - PFA) PFAJ 
For the general case, with no false alarms and perfect coverage, the 
reliability may be represented as a binomial expansion. 
n 
R = .L ( ~) (e - \ t ) K (1 _ e.. -At ) n - K 
K = r 
n 
= [ B (K, n, A, t) 
K = r 
I.here r = number of un; ts requi red 
n - number of units installed 
The impact of false alarms and imperfect coverage may be considered in 
the general case by introducing appropriate coefficients for each term in 
the binomial expansion. The reliability would be 
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n 
R = L en _ k B (K, n, A, t) 
K = r 
(3) where en _ k = PFA {Kfr (J - pFi\)i1 K = n 
1 = 0 r 
= PFA PI {! + Kfr [(!'- PFA)i + (J - p/ll; r < k < n 
i = 1 J 
K = r 
In most analog systems, redundancy management is done by comparison 
monitoring. A monitor threshold is set which controls both parameters, ?fA and PI. Broadening the threshold reduces the probability of false 
alarms while increasing the probability of improper fault isolation. 
Narrowing the threshold has the opposite effect. 
The selection of failure monitor thresholds is investigated in great 
depth in (ref. 34). This report notes that; 
• The distribution of bias error for typical rate sensors subjected 
to normal quality screening can be characterized by a normal 
distribution which is essentially truncated at the 3 sigma limits. 
• For systems whose accuracy and performance requirements would 
allow setting the monitor threshold slightly above the ~ 3 sigma 
limits of the sensor population, false alarm probabilities of .999 
are not unreasonable. 
• When the monitor threshold is set slightly above the + 3 sigma 
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1 imits, .99 probabil i ty of fail ure detect i on/ i so 1 at ion (coverage) 
is not unreasonable. In addition, the lack of coverage occurs 
when the fialure magnitude is in the +3 sigma to +7.5 sigma and 
-3 sigma to -7.5 sigma ranges. Failures in these ranges were 
determined to result in a good sensor being flagged as bad 
followed by successful detection during subsequent interations 
of the Failure Detection Routine. 
Since time constraints precluded the development of false alarm and 
coverage transition matrix modifiers, no attempt was made to utilize the 
Markov process in this investigation. Instead, the binomial technique 
whcih applies to the situation where no unscheduled maintenance is 
permitted was modified to account for false alarms and coverage, and the 
results in terms of additional sensor requirements will be extrapolated to 
those scenarios described by the Markov process. 
To apply equation 3 to the case where 9 skewed sensors are installed 
and at least 4 are required for safe operation (n = 9, r = 4) we must 
evaluate C9, C8, C7, C6, C5, and C4. C9 ooerates on the zero failure term 
of the binomial, C8 operates on the one failure term; etc. (e.g. K = 9, 8, 
7, 6, 5, & 4). 
Setting~ = .999 and PI = .99 in equations 3, we obtain 
C9 = 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 
C8 = (.999)(.99) [1 + (.001) + (.01) + (.001)2 + (.01)2 
C8 = 
C7 = 
C6 = 
C5 = 
C4 = 
.999 99 
.999 99 
.999 989 
.999 889 1 
.989 01 
+ (.001)3 + (.01)3 + (.001)4 + (.01)4 
+ (.001)5 + (.01)5 + (.001)6 + (.01)6] 
Aoolving these coefficients to the respective term of the binomial 
expansion we obtain the results shown in Figure 86. It is noted that the 9 
skewed sensor system which apparently complied with the 10-10 failures peB 
hour goal (when the sensor failure rate is 20 FPM) can only achieve a 10-
failures per hour goal when realistic alarm coverage probabilities are 
introduced. 
Figure 87 shows 11 & 13 skewed sensor systems, with PFA and PI = 
.999 and .99 respectively. It is noted that these systems with 2 and 4 
additional sensors cannot achieve the 10-10 failure per hour goal when 
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the s{'nsor failure y'ate is (>0 FPM. Evidently the false alarms and non-
isol~tahle faililres are the prime drivers from a reliahility standpoint 
whenever this failure rate is low. At higher failure rates (\ = 80 or IOn 
FPM) the added redundancy produces siqnificant improvements as expected. 
Figure 88 shows the 9, 11 and 13 skewed sensor systems, with PFA 
and PI = .999 and .995 respectively. This improvement in isolation 
probability was introducted to evaluate its effect upon system failure 
probability. It is noted that at low sensor faiu1re rates the added 
redundancy again does not provide any benefits. However, the improved 
isolation probability has brought the 9 sensor configuration closer to the 
goal of lx10-10 failures per hours (8.3x10-10). The apparent message is 
that improvements in PFA and PI which would make their effects neg1ib1e are 
required, isnce whenever they do have a non-negligible effect, added 
redundancy does not help. 
The above analysis must be considered preliminary in nature. More 
work in developing the methodology for handling the problems of false 
alarms and failure to correctly isolate a failed sensor is required. A 
technique which takes into account the dependence of the probability of 
false alarms on mission duration, and which permits restoration of a sensor 
removed via false alarm between missions would be more realistic. This 
will be our objective for future studies. 
8. Failure Per Flight Hour With No Unscheduled Maintenance 
The requirements of a 10-10 probability of loss per flight 
hour in a bi-annual scheduled maintenance only scenario (no unscheduled 
maintenance between missions) has been interpreted in several ways. One 
interpretation was to design a system with a loss probability of 10-10 
for the entire 6 mos scheduled maintenance interval. This resulted in a 
system of 12 skewed sensors (with zero unscheduled maintenance) and 10 
skewed sensors with unscheduled maintenance whenever a minimum set of 
sensors (4) remained. The probability of performing unscheduled 
maintenance was .124x10-6 
The interpretation presented in the earlier sections are systems which 
provide an average risk per flight hour of 10-10. This required 9 skewed 
sensors for zero unscheduled maintenance and 7 skewed sensors with 
unscheduled maintenance whenever 4 sensors remain. For this case the 
probability of performing unscheduled maintenance has increased to 8x10-4. 
(The chances of 3 of 7 failing is higher than the chances of 6 of 10 
failing during a given interval.) While this system provides an average 
hourly risk of 10-10 losses per flight hour, the risk in the flights which 
immediately precede scheduled maintenance is substantially higher than 10-10 
and the risk in the flights which immediately follow scheduled maintenance 
is substantially better than 10-10 losses per flight hour. 
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In a conventional unscheduled maintenance scenario, which allows 
restoration of redundancy as required between missions, the risk is the 
same for every mission and a requirement for risk per flight hour is 
meaningful. The elimination of unscheduled maintenance (or the alternate 
concept of restoring redundancy only when a minimum safe complement of 
hardware remains) left us with the dilemma of variable risk. In the 
context of a system in a commercial application, the higher risks incurred 
prior to scheduled maintenance impose moral, if not legal, implications. 
As .a compromise between the two interpretations noted above, it w8s 
decided to investigate a system which maintains a minimum risk of 10-1 
losses per flight hour. This can be achieved by restoring redundancy when 
the number of sensors remaining is equal to that required to yield a 
minimum risk per hour of 10-10 • For the case of a one hour mission and a 
sensor failure rate of 20 FPM this represents a set of 6 skewed sensors. 
A system of 7 skewed sensors with restoration of redundancy when six 
remain yields an average hourly risk of 10-11, a minimum hourly risk of 10- 10 
and a probability of performinq unscheduled maintenance of .195. Except 
for the considerahle chance of performing unscheduled maintenance the 
system meets all of our objectives. Adding additional sensors will reduce 
the average hourly risk while reducing the prohahility of performing 
unscheduled maintenance. Figure 89 shows the probability of performing 
unscheduled maintenance as a function of the number of sensors installed. 
Note that in order to reduce the probability of unscheduled maintenance to 
a chance of one in ten thousand, ten sensors must be installed. For a ten 
sensor configuration with redundancy restored when six remain our minimum 
hourly risk is 10-10 while the average hourly risk is 10-20 • This system 
at the expense of 3 additional sensors over the configuration described 
earlier, has desirable safety characteristics, with a correspondingly low 
chance of unscheduled maintenance. 
Figure 90 is a representation of the relative hourly risk 
characteristics for the various interpretations of the system reliability 
goals. 
From the above it is apparent that the maintenance scenario is a major 
driver of system configuration. The ultimate interpretation of the 
requirements with respect to maintenance and hourly risk probability should 
be decided and mutually agreed to. 
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APPENDIX G 
SYSTEM INTEGRITY BETWEEN MAINTENANCE ACTIONS 
1. Introduction 
In paragraph 6.1.3.3 of the S.O.W., it was required to allow for 
periodic maintenance with a "high degree of integrity" between maintenance 
actions. As it transpired, "high degree of integrity" was subject to 
several interpretations, each of which lead to a different set of 
maintenance requirements. For this reason, and because the meaning of 
total system survivability was also affected by these interpretations, it 
was decided to dedicate a separate appendix to the subject. 
2. The Meaning of lO-lO/hour Survivability 
Throughout the study, the threshold survivability requirement of each 
candidate subsystem was assumed to be 10-lO/hour. When these subsystems 
were combined, it was expected that the survivability of the flight control 
system would be of the order of 10-9/hour. These loss rates are subject to 
two possible interpretations. 
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Interpretation #1 
In this interpretation "lO-lO/hour" is viewed as an average rate 
of loss of function of the subsystem. It is obtained by dividing 
the total member of failed subsystems by the total number of 
operating hours. Accordingly, it is not required that the prob-
ability of subsystem failure during each and every flight hour be 
less than 10-10. It is only the average that counts. This was 
the interpretation adopted for the study. 
Interpretation #2 
In this interpretation 110-1O/hour" is viewed as the maximum 
failure rate allowed during each and every flight hour. 
Examole: 
The life of a subsystem is arhitrarily subdivided into operational 
periods of T hours, each. It is known that the probability of 
subsystem failure during each period is P. The following para-
meters are easily computed: 
-~ 
1. Averaqe number of periods to loss of subsystem = l/P 
and 
2. Average time to loss of subsystem = T/P (hours). 
Thus, 
3. Avera~e number of losses per hour = PIT. 
When computing the spares required: 
T = maintenance period and 
P = function of the number of spares required. 
According to Interpretation #1, the number of spares was determined to 
satisfy the inequality. 
4. PIT ~ la-la/hour. 
Because of the successive losses of spares, it is clear that 
survivability, by any interpretation, is a decreasing function of time 
during any maintenance period. As a consequence, when spares are 
determined by (41, the probability of loss of subsystem during the first 
hour of flight is several orders of magnitude less than 10-10, whereas 
during the last hour of flight, it is several orders of magnitude greater 
than 10-10 . The averaqe, however, over the entire maintenance period is 
always la-la/hour or less. 
According to Interpretation #2, on the other hand, an additional 
number of spares would have to be carried to insure that the probability of 
loss of subsystem never exceeded 10-10 for any flight. 
A very conservative criterion of insuring this requirement is to 
compute the number of spares using the inequality. 
5. P ~ 10.-t o 
This could lead to a prohibitively large number of spares. Moreover, 
when 
T = 1500 hours 
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the resultant average loss rate is 
10-10 -13 1500 = 0.66 x 10 /hour 
which clearly far better than what is required as an average. 
3. Conclusions 
(1) Throughout the study and, in particular, when computing spares, 
the survivability goal of la-la/hour was interpreted as an average rate of 
loss and, accordingly, does not require that the probability of loss of 
subsystem during each and every flight hour never exceed 10-10 • This 
interpretation appears to be consistent with the method which established 
the survivability goal in the first place, i.e., by dividing the number of 
aircraft losses by the total number of operating hours of all aircraft in 
service. 
(2) The use of inequality (5) resulted in an average survivability of 
O.66xlO- 13/hour. This appears to be exceedingly small. In addition, this 
interoretation results in a larger number of spares. 
(1) Interpretation #2 could have been employed as described in 
Appendix F, Section 8 at a cost of a few additional spares. The resultant 
average loss rate would undoubtedly be significantly less than la-la/hour 
and the orobability of oerforming unscheduled maintenance could become 
significant. 
(4) The crux of the problem of interpretation is that for 
conventional unscheduled maintenance between missions the average and 
maximum risk are equal. For a scenario of scheduled maintenance only, the 
average risk and maximum risk can differ by orders of magnitude. It is 
this disparity which can raise moral or even legal implications for a 
commerical transport application. 
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APPENDIX H 
DESCRIPTION OF GULFSTREAM II STA MODIFICATION 
1. STA Description 
The Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA) is a modified Grumman Gulfstream 
II which is confiqured for training Orbiter pilots from 35,000 feet to the 
actual Orbiter cockpit height above the runway at Orbiter touchdown. The 
Orbiter descent trajectory as well as responses to Orbiter pilot control 
commands are accurately duplicated by the STA. High-fidelty Orbiter 
cockpit-motion matching is accomplished by the model following system 
implemented in the Simulation System computer. 
The STA provides Orbiter pilots with a realistic reproduction of 
Orbiter cockpit motions, visual cues and handling qualities while 
simultaneously matching the Orbiter's atmospheric descent trajectory from 
35,000 ft altitude to touchdown. This is accomplished with independent 
control of six degrees-of-freedom, effected with the standard autopilot 
control on pitch, roll and yaw and with the use of auxiliary direct lift 
and side force control surfaces (DLC and SFC) and in-flight reverse thrust. 
These controls are illustrated in the aircraft three-view presented in 
Fi9ure 91. The motion of the auxiliary surfaces as well as the 
conventional aircraft controls are commanded by the DAS (Digital Avionics 
System) 
The STA can perform nine training cycles in a 3 1/2-hour flight from 
altitudes in excess of 35,000 ft while maintaining an 8,000 ft cabin 
altitude. Its operatinq envelope everywhere equals or exceeds Orbiter 
training requirements. The 1400 cu ft cabin and 5600 lb payload potential 
provides a large capacity for future utility growth. 
The STA has sufficient structural strength to accommodate all critical 
STA nesign load conditions. All modifications have been designed for 
minimum structural scarring and maximum use of existing components, support 
brackets, etc. All STA actuators are either existing Gulfstream II 
equipment or off-the-shelf hardware in present use on other Grumman 
aircraft. Primary control system actuators are of dual tandem type driven 
by two completely independent hydraulic systems, either of which can supply 
the required power. 
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The OLC (direct lift control) is designed to match the Orbiter 
visibility angle and normal acceleration changes with anqle-of-attack 
throughout the entire STA operating envelope. The OLC provides this 
capability for all Orbiter and STA gross weights both in and out of ground 
effect. A safe margin above the training mode stall speeds is always 
maintained. The OLC is flutter-free and the Gulfstream II wing box and 
flap support fittings are retained. 
The OLC surfaces are 22.5% chord plain fast-acting flaps. These flaps 
occupy the same wing span as the basic Gulfstream II Fowler flaps and 
utilize the same flap hard points. The outboard half of the OLC also 
provides roll control in conjunction with the existing ailerons and 
replaces the lateral control function provided by spoilers on the 
production Gulfstream II. The OLC can also be operated as a conventional 
landing flap and ground spoiler. 
The outboard segment of the OLe (flaperon) replaces the Gulfstream II 
spoilers while providing the same roll control power. The spoilers were 
discarded from the STA as they would produce unsatisfactory flying 
qualities at certain flight conditions. 
The SFC's (Side Force Control) produces O.lg of side acceleration at 
Orbiter landing speeds and at maximum aircraft gross weight. They simulate 
Orbiter sideslip angles and associated changes in side acceleration to 
side-slip angles beyond ~10o at the final approach condition. The SFC 
design minimizes significant reductions in side force effectiveness with 
increasing wing angle of attack and landing gear deployment. The SFC's 
do not measurably alter the lateral/directional stability characteristics 
of the Gulfstream II. Their deflection does, however, produce a small 
wing-induced rolling moment which is easily cancelled through the model 
following computer. 
The SFC's are a pair of rectangular surfaces mounted in parallel 
underneath the wing-fuselage near the aircraft center of gravity. The 
SFC's are fitted with geared lead tabs and individual end plates to 
maximize their effectiveness. They are hydraulically-driven, fully-powered 
surfaces. The SFC's rotate about a torque tube which is itself rigidly 
fixed (non-rotating) to the wing. 
The SFC's are self-contained assemblies with integral actuators, 
hydraulic, and electrical systems. They are designed for ease of 
maintenance and removal, ready access, and have a permanently-sealed 
attachment to the wet aircraft wing. 
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The Simulation System drives the STA control systems in accordance 
with the model-following technique to simulate Orbiter cockpit motion and 
visual cues. The brain of the Simulation System is the Sperry Digital 
Avionics System (DAS). The DAS is integrated with prototype Orbiter and 
standard off-the-shelf navigation, control, and cockpit equipment. The 
capability of the onboard avionics to simultaneously match STA and Orbiter 
short period motions and trajectory has been demonstrated in all critical 
areas. The DAS computer software includes all the functions necessary for 
a complete STA mission. 
With the exception of the SFC's and removal of the main landing gear 
doors for the simulation mission, the outboard appearance of the STA is 
otherwise unchanged from the production Gulfstream II. Except for the 
spoilers, the control systems, linkages, and actuators have not been 
modified for the STA mission. Structural and control system modificatoins 
are kept to an absolute minimum. 
The training pilot occupies the left side of the STA cockpit which 
incorporates all salient Orbiter instruments and controls, including a 
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) and the Multifunction Cathode-Ray Display 
system (MCDC). An instructor pilot occupies the right-hand seat which is 
arranged as a standard Gulfstream II. This pilot can assume command of the 
aircraft at any time and can disengage the STA simulation computer at the 
push of a button. 
The interior of the STA cabin is fitted with the furnishings 
commensurate with its training mission. Seats are supplied for the 
instructor pilot, Orbiter pilot, simulation engineer, and one passenger. 
The Mach/Airspeed limitations for simulation, simulation fidelity and 
basic STA are shown in Figure 92. 
The STA simulation mode load factor envelope is shown in Figure 93. 
The simulation mode design structural envelope is from O.Og to 2.0g with a 
cut-out to n.5q above 280 KEAS. The STA requirement for simulation 
fidelity within the structural envelope, is from 0.8g to 1.5g. 
The load factor envelope for the STA out-of-SIM (flaps, symmetrical 
flaoerons and SFC's zeroes and gear up above 250 knots) is the same as the 
Gulfstream II, -1.0g to 2.5g. 
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2. Crew System & Equipment 
The GlIlfstream STA flight compartment and cabin are ideally suited for 
the Advanced Flight Control System mission. The aircraft is fully 
conditioned with pressurized air to provide a 7,000 ft. cabin altitude at 
the maximum FAA certified aircraft altitude of 43,000 ft., with a maximum 
cabin ~P of 9.45 PSI. The controlled crew environment has been further 
enhanced by employing the most modern state-of-the-art thermal and acoustic 
treatments to the aircraft interi~r. 
The large cabin volume of 1,400 cu. ft. and its payload of 5,600 lbs. 
provide for an efficient equipment layout with sufficient space for future 
add-on experiments and installations. The entire STA electronics package, 
alonq with the other major avionics equipment, is located within the cabin 
area, providing easy crew access during flight. 
3. Flight Compartment Instruments and System Controls 
The flight compartment, located forward of bulkhead FS133, provides 
side-by-side accommodations for both pilots. The current STA cockpit is 
confiqured to functionally represent the flight station of the orbiter. 
The LH flight station duplicates the orbiter's instrumentation, controls 
and external visibility angles, while the RH flight station is configured 
as a standard Gulfstream GIl cockpit. Instruments and controls are 
arranged to permit full operation of the aircraft from the RH seat. 
Instruments and systems controls are located in five main qroups as 
shown in Fiqures 94 and 95. These are: 
• Flight/engine instrument panels 
• Overhead/eyebrow panels 
• Center control pedestal/quadrant 
• Center radio control console 
• Side consoles 
In the STA, the LH side arm control column and control wheel have been 
replaced with a NASA furnished orbiter side-arm controller. The Gulfstream 
rudder/foot pedal controls were replaced with an F-14 type mechanism. The 
increased height of the instrument panel (to accommodate the CRT units) 
necessitated the removal of the structure at the lower part of the 
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instrument panel. In addition, the nose wheel steering control was 
relocated from the LH side console to the RH side console. The instrument 
panel glare shield was completely revamped to accommodate all the orbiter 
functions/controls. The current STA cockpit arrangement is shown in Figure 
95. 
4. Flight Station Rework for Advanced Fliqht Control System 
The general arrangement for the modified Gulfstream is shown in Figure 
96. The STA cockpit can be reworked to a Gulfstream type flight station 
with the advanced instrumentation and controls. The STA instrumentation 
and controls and a portion of the RH flight station can be deleted and 
replaced with the defined instrumentation. The instrument panels are to be 
removed and discarded. Items noted in Tables 16 and 17 are to be removed 
from the LH console, center console and control pedestal/quadrant. 
In order to accommodate the double row of CRT displays at the RH 
station, the same type of work is required as was performed on the LH side 
to accommodate the orb~ter flight controls. That is, the Gu1fstream 
rudder/brake controls and supporting structure have to be removed and 
replaced with an F-14 type of mechanism. Both stations will now have the 
new rudder/brake mechanisms. The same support structure for the lower part 
of the RH station instrument panel needs to be installed as is on the LH 
station. Wiring, cables etc. behind the instrument panel have to be 
relocated to a distance of 15" to provide clearance for the CRT's being 
installed. Additional secondary support structure will have to be added to 
support the total of six (6) new CRT's at both flight stations. 
New instrument panels and glare shields with instrumentation as shown 
on Figure 97 can be installed. The left and right consoles and center 
radio console can be revised to accommodate controls as shown. The forward 
throw of the control column has to be reduced approximately 50 - 100 to 
eliminate contact with the new instrument panel location. 
Figure 98 shows the arrangement of the flight/engine instrument panel 
at both stations. Each flight station has two CRT's to show all parameters 
for flight control. In each case the CRT's have backup flight 
instrumentation grouped around them. The center panel contains two 
side-by-side CRT's to show warning annunciators and diagnostics. The 
co-pilot's panel contains the standard engine tape indications, landing 
gear control and windshield wiper controls. Additional panel area is 
available on the left and right and center panels for add-on 
instrumentation, if required. All radio/communication and FBW controls are 
located on the center pedestal within easy reach of both pilots. The L/R 
consoles contain control elements similiar to those on the Gu1fstream II. 
The one exception is the nose wheel steering control wheel on the RH 
console. The control pedestal is common to the Gulfstream quadrant. 
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5. Visibility 
Visibility is identical to that of the standard Gulfstream II. The 
maximum practical vision is provided for both pilots, thru six windows. A 
two-panel windshield is installed forward of the pilot's station, 
permitting unobstructed vision of 180 down and 160 UD, and unobstructed 
aximuth angles of 250 right and 150 left. The windshield is free to expand 
and contract without distorting structure. Electrical anti-icinq is 
provided. Two electrically heated direct vision windows are installed 
adjacent to the main windshield panels. These panels can be opened and 
permit unobstructed vertical vision of more than 20 up and down. 
Two non-opening windows are installed aft of the direct vision 
windows. These are electrically defogged and permit unobstructed vision 
angles of 120 up and 250 down. Maximum aft vision is better than 1150 
along the horizon. 
6. Crew Seats 
The pilot and co-pilot's seats, mounted on tracks, are capable of 
forward, aft and vertical adjustment. The vertical adjustment range 
achieves a reference eye position for pilots with seat to eye heights 
ranging from 28 to 33 inches. 
7. Electronics and Vestibule Area 
The area between FS133 and FS206 contains the main entrance doorway 
and stairs, vestibule, storage compartment, jump seat, and electronic 
equipment compartment. Currently, the standard electronic boxes and STA 
related components are located in the RH equipment compartment. Removal of 
noted STA items (Figure 99) provides sufficient room to install an 
additional radio altimeter receiver transmitter. The remaining electronic 
items; navigation, communication, inertial navigation, distance measuring 
equipment, automatic direction finder, fliqht director and magnetic tape 
recorder remain in their present locations. A slide out, adjustable, jump 
seat is provided in the forward part of the electronic compartment. A 
control station is provided to the right of the jump seat station for use 
by the observer seated at this station. Controls include a weather radar 
scope, RMI, rcs, o~ygen control, remote compass compensator (2), compass 
controller, fliqht recorder and encoder, and master caution panel. Figure 
]00 shows the FBW electronic rack installation. 
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The header installation between FS133 to FS181 provides an oxygen mask, 
lighting control panel, circuit breaker panel, and seat restraint system 
for the observer in the jump seat. A life raft, forward inverter box, 
flash tube power supply and growth volume is provided on the left side of 
the compartment between FS181 and FS207. 
8. Jump Seat 
One adjustable and stowable jump seat is installed on the right hand 
side, just behind the cockpit bulkhead STA 133 in the lower portion of the 
radio rack. The jump seat is flush with the inboard edge of the radio rack 
when in the stowed position and is covered with a hinged door. 
9. Flight Compartment Finishing 
The materials used for finishing the flight compartment are the same 
type and quality as used elsewhere in the aircraft. The reduction of pilot 
fatigue, the minimization of compartment reflections and maintaining a high 
level of safety, has always been a continuing effort at Grumman. 
10. Lighting 
• Flight Compartment Lighting 
All lights and related equipment are accessible for ease of 
maintenance. All instruments are integrally lit with white natural 
lights, edge light panels use white lighting. Instrument panel 
flood liQhting is white. A white map light is provided at each 
pilot station and jump seat, each being mounted on a flexible shaft 
properly located for optimum utilization. A spare lamp container 
is provided on the LH console • 
• Interior Cabin Lighting 
- Overhead Lighting 
Six (6) overhead dome lights are installed throughout the cabin 
providing the main cabin lighting. 
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11. Main Cabin 
The area between FS206 and the pressure dome contains the passenger 
compartment (FS 206-497), lavatory compartment (FS 497-539), and baggage 
compartment (FS 539 - pressure dome). The STA cabin interior contains an 
aft facing seat and flight test equipment pallet on the LH side and an 
avionic IIJII box and STA digital avionic system pallet. The first three 
articles will remain while the STA pallet is removed. In its place, five 
(5) pallets and one (1) work station are added. This arrangement is shown 
on Figure 96. 
12. FBW Pallets (See Figures 101, 102, 103) 
Five (5) pallet modules are provided for installation in the cabin 
area. All five pallet structures are the same in size and configuration. 
Each pallet attaches to the seat tracks with four (4) quick disconnect 
fittings. Each pallet is configured to contain four (4) electronic units, 
namely; sensor interface unit, actuator interface unit, bus controller, and 
an application processor. The top portion of the pallet contains a test 
panel and a status panel. Three (3) sensor component assembly units are 
mounted to the vertical surface of the pallet. The units are located 120 
with respect to each other. Three (3) pallet assemblies are located on the 
RH side of the cabin and two (2) on the LH side. The pallet design is 
readily modified to hold up to nine electronic units of 1/2 ATR size. 
13. FBW Monitor/Work Station Pallet (See Figure 104) 
A FBW monitor/work station can be located aft of the rear facing seat 
on the LH side of the fuselage. This work station is configured to be 
operated by a seated occupant. Four (4) fittings on the pallet secure the 
unit to the seat tracks. The work station contains a writing surface, 
fault panel, monitor panel with three CRT's and data recording controls. 
The operator will have sufficient controls and displays on this console to 
monitor the FBW system and operate the data system. 
14. FBW Pallet Installation 
Figure 105 and 106 depict a cross section of the cab in showing the 
relative location of the pallets to each other. A 23 inch angle is 
provided between the units. 
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15. Furnishings 
• Cabin Seating 
One single rear facing seat is provided for the engineer. It 
includes bas~ tracking for proper adjustment up to the console, 
recline and swivel for easy egress. Provisions for life vest 
stowage is located under the seat. The seat is attached to the 
floor tracks with quick disconnect type fittings. A side console 
is located outboard of this seat providing an ICS volume control, 
head set jack and small item stowage. 
• Survival Equipment 
An FAA approved life vest is provided for each crew member. 
Stowage area is placarded and convenient to the user. An FAA 
approved life raft with full survival kit and emergency locator 
transmitter is provided. Stowage area is placarded (left hand 
forward electronic compartment), installation is such permitting 
quick and easy access. 
16. Lavatory 
A lavatory compartment is provided between FS 497 and FS 539. It 
contains a chemical toilet, hand rail, storage cabinet, paper dispenser and 
a trash container. A stowage compartment/shelf, with adequate tie-down 
provisions is provided on the LH side of this compartment. Sliding full 
length drapes across the bulkhead opening provides privacy in this 
compartment. A speaker is located in the aft bulkhead. 
17. Fire Extinguishers 
a portable chemical fire extinguisher is mounted on the Fwd side of FS 
133, RH side, behind the co-pilots seat. An H20 fire extinguisher is 
mounted to the Fwd, LH side, of the lavatory compartment bulkhead. 
18. Oxygen Masks/Bottles 
The flight crew has the Gulfstream type fixed oxygen installation. 
The test engineer, in the cabin is provided with a portable oxygen bottle 
with mask. This unit is located outboard of his seat. Another portable 
oxygen bottle, with mask, is located in the lavatory. 
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19. Baggage Compartment 
The baggage compartment is located between FS 539 and the pressure 
dome. A netting with tie down provisions is used to contain the baggage in 
this compartment. 
20. Interior Finish 
The main cabin is fully insulated and lined with 1/2" thick scott 
felt. Aluminum straps are employed to retain the scott felt in place. 
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TABLE 16 
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS· 
INSTRUCTOR PILOT DISPLAYS 
-------------------------
-------------------------
*1.1 Flight Director Indicator 
(FDI) (HZ-6F) 
*1.2 Horizontal Situation Indica-
tor (HSI) (RD-350M) 
1.3 Altimeter (Servo Driven) 
1.4 Vertical Speed Indicator 
(D6HL) 
1.5 Standby Attitude Indicator 
(AI-804J/G) 
*1.6 Altimeter (Pneumatic) 
1.7 Mach/airspeed Indicator 
1.8 Radar Altimeter 
1.9 Gyrosyn Compass (RMI) (C-63) 
1.10 Vertical Scale Engine Instr's 
1.10.1 Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) 
1.10.2 Turbine Gas Temp. (TGT) 
1.10.3 % RPM HP 
1.10.4 % RPM LP 
1.10.5 Fuel Flow 
1.10.6 Fuel Quantity 
1.10.7 Oil Temp 
1.10.8 Oil Press 
1.11 Clock 
1.12 Static Pressure Valve 
1.13 Landing Gear control 
1.14 Angle of Attack Group 
1.14.1 Angle of Attack Ind. 
1.14.2 Indicator Light 
1.14.3 AOA Selector 
1.14.4 AOA Test/Reset Sw 
*1.15 IP Instr Switches 
1.15.1 VG1, VG2, 
1.15.2 NAV 1, NAV 2 
1.15.3 Compass 1, Compass 2 
* STA items removed 
TYPE-P/N 
--------
Sperry 2590281-906 
Sperry 4011046-901 
Sperry 2594620-905 
Teledyne SLZ9157-1 
Jet 501-1105-04 
IDC 570-23932-001 
IDC 575-25850-909 
Honeywell ID-1880/APN194(V) 
Sperry 1784460-655 
Hartman 
622-0-000-7 
623-0-000-8 
624-0-000-8 
621-0-000-8 
684-0-000-7 
639-0-000-7 
625-0-000-7 
626-0-000-7 
Waltham Al3A 
Republic Mfg. Co. 11-254-8 
Avionic Prod. 1159F20775 
United Control 966-0031-001 
Mstr Specialties 2224-1 
MS 24523-23 
MS 24523-27 
Jayel Mk8 Series 
Jayel Mk8 Series 
Jayel Mk8 Series 
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TABLE 16 
COCKpIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS (CONT'D) 
INSTRUCTOR PILOT DISPLAYS 
-------------------------
-------------------------
1.16 Fuel Qty Test Switch 
1.17 Windshield Wiper Switch 
1.18 Windshield Wiper Control 
1.19 Emerg. Battery SW/Lts 
*1.20 Flight Director Mode Lts 
1.20.1 Loc/Rev Lt 
1.20.2 G/S - Ext Lt. 
*1.21 F/D Sensitivity Sw 
*1.22 Fliqht Director Info 
*1.23 Horizontal Situation Info 
IP AUXILIARY INSTRUMENT PANELS 
------------------------------
------------------------------
2.1 
*2.1.1 
*2.1. 2 
*2.1.3 
2.1.4 
2.2 
?'.2.1 
*2.2.2 
*2.2.3 
*2.2.4 
*2.2.5 
2.2.6 
2.2.7 
LH Skirt Panel 
Mode Selector Sw (FDS) 
Instrument Remote Controller 
Flt. Display Mode sw 
Engine Sync Sw/Lts 
RW Skirt Panel 
Surface Position Indicator 
Auto Pilot Trim Ind. 
Ind. Light Assy (A/P 
Supervisory) 
Mach Trim Sw. 
Yaw Damp Sw. 
Rudder Limit It. 
Single Rudder Limit Lt. 
* STA items removed 
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TYPE-P/N 
--------
W101PAB3W 
ITLl-2 
GAC 1159F20750 
Mast. Specialties 90E 
Mast. Specialties 5000 
Mast. Specialties 5000 
Bendix 2806448 
Bendix 2806448 
TYPE-P/N 
--------
Sperry 2589582-903 
Sperry 4001939-901 
Mast Specialties 90E 
·Weston 521605 
Weston 253694 
34-1020-1 
512TS1-50 
512T1-S 
MS25041 
MS25041 
TABLE 16 
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS (CONTID) 
IP AUXILIARY INSTRUMENT PANELS 
============================== 
2.3 
2.3.1 
2.3.2 
2.3.3 
2.3.4 
2.3.5 
2.3.6 
2.3.7 
2.3.8 
2.3.9 
2.3.10 
RH Console Assy 
Aux Hyd Pressure Ind 
Utility Hyd Pressure Ind 
Comp Hyd Pressure Ind 
Flt. Hyd Pressure Ind 
Wheel Brake Pressure Ind 
Fuel Tank Temp 
Fuel Temp 
Free Air Temp 
Aux Hyd Pump Sw 
Utility Hyd Pump Sw 
IP CONTROL PANELS 
================= 
3.1 
3.1.1 
3.1.2 
3.1.3 
3.1.4 
3.1. 5 
3.1. 6 
3.1. 7 
3.1.8 
.1.1. 9 
3.1.10 
3.1.11 
3.1.12 
3.2 
3.2.1 
3.2.2 
3.2.3 
RH Console 
Emergency Landing Gear Ltl 
Aux DLC Panel 
Nose Wheel Steering Control 
Oxygen Regulator Control 
Compass Control (C-11B) 
Circuit Breaker Panel 
ADC Air Supply Control 
Aux Stabilizer Control 
Foot Air Outlet Control 
ICS Jacks 
Ldg Gear Emer Dump Valve 
RH Fairing 
Master Warning Lts 
Cockpit Ltg Control 
ICS Speakers 
* STA items removed 
. TYPE-PIN 
======== 
Glassco 1159SCH241-7 
Glassco 1159SCH241-5 
Glassco 1159SCH241-1 
Glassco 1159SCH241-3 
AW2057AC01 
Weston 253685 
Weston 260638 
Weston 253686 
TYPE-PIN 
--------
Gac 159F10825 
Gac C21A0355 
Gac C21Gll01 
Bendix MS22062 
Sperry 1775132-22 
Gac C21A0260 
Gac 1159F20633 
Gac -
Gac 1159AC20002 
Gac 1159F20278 
Aero Avionics 704842 
Gac C21A0299 
Utah Elect. C35EC 
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TABLE 16 
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS (CONTID) 
CENTER PEDESTAL 
--------------
--------------
4.1 
*4.1.1 
*4.1. 2 
4.1.3 
4.1.4 
4.1.5 
4.1.6 
4.1. 7 
4.1.8 
*4.1. 9 
4.1.10 
4.1.11 
4.1.12 
*4.1.13 
4.1.14 
4.1.15 
*4.1.16 
*4.1.17 
4.2 
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
*4.2.3 
4.2.4 
4.2.5 
4.2.6 
4.~.7 
*4.2.8 
4.2.9 
4.2.10 
4.2.11 
4.2.12 
4.2.13 
*4.2.14 
4.2.15 
Console 
Mode Select Panel 
CRT Keyboard 
VHF Nav 1 & 2 Panel 
TCN Control Panel 
VHF Control Panel 
INS CDU (LTN 51) 
ATC/MKR Panel 
VHF Comm 1 & 2 Panel 
Data Entry Panel 
L/H Audio'Sel Panel 
R/H Audio Sel Panel 
Any Select Switch 
Stall Barrier Switch 
Rudder Trim Control 
Aileron Trim Control 
Status Test Sw/Lts 
SP Instr Switches 
FWD Control Pedestal 
Voice Recorder Panel 
Mode Selector Unit (Ins) 
CRT Switches 
Park/Emerge Brake 
Gust Lock Lever 
Ground Spoiler Hyd Press. Sw. 
Antiskid Switch 
Infliqht Thrust Reverse Sw. 
Main Gear Speed Brake Lt 
Main Gear Speed Brake Sw. 
Eng. Temp Control Sw. 
Longitudinal Trim Wheel 
OLC (Flap) Lever 
Stab Trim Sw. 
* STA item removed 
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TYPE-P/N 
--------
Sperry 4008171 
IBM MC65-0007-002 
Gables C-4661 
Hoffman C-9599A/ARN-117 
Collins 622-0356-002 
Litton 66350-04 
Gables G-4668 
Gables G-4660 
Sperry 4019817 
Gac C21A0353-1 
Gac C21A0353-3 
MS24523-22 
MS24524-23 
Gac 1159AV22221-1 
Gac 1159AV22222-1 
Jayel 10620 
Jayel 10620 
Colli ns 914F-1 
Litton 663570-03 
Micro 13A6402-72 
Gac 1159F20800 
Gac 1159F20351 
MS24659-230 
MS24659-23D 
Micro SET17-2-F 
Gac C21A073-5 
Micro 5ET17-2-F 
GS8363CJ3-1 
Hansen Lynn 1159F20351 
Gac C21F1120 
: ...... ' .. < ::'~" .. : . ' .... '.' ." 
. . '.; .. ; .":. :' .. :: 
TABLE 16 
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS (CONTID) 
I 
CENTER PEDESTAL TYPE-PIN 
---------------
---------------
--------
4.3 
4.3.1 
4.3.2 
4.3.3 
4.3.4 
4.3.5 
Power Control Head Hansen Lynn 1159SCF100 
Thrust Levers 
Reverse Thrust Levers 
High Pressure Fuel Cock Levers 
Friction Control Lever 
Thrust Reverser Disable Sw. 
SP INSTRUMENT PANEL 
-------------------
-------------------
*5.1 
*5.2 
*5.3 
*5.4 
*5.5 
5.6 
*5.7 
5.8 
*5.9 
*5.10 
*5.11 
5.12 
*5.13 
*5.14 
*5.15 
*5.16 
*5.17 
*5.18 
*5.19 
Attitude Director Ind (LM) 
Horizontal Situation Ind 
(HSI) (RD-350M) 
Alpha, Mach, lAS, Vert 
Scale Ind 
MachlIAS I nd 
VIS, Alt, Rad Alt, VSI 
Altimeter (Servo Driven) 
CRT Display Unit 
Accelerometer 
Surface Position Ind 
(Orbiter) 
Angle of Attack (Orbiter) 
Angle of Sideslip (Orbiter) 
Clocl 
Data Select Sw. 
Display Power Sw. 
LOG Gear Position Ind 
(ORBITER) 
LDG Gear Arm & Own Sw/Lts 
ADI Scale Sws 
HSI Select Sws. 
Air Data Select Sw. 
* STA items removed 
TYPE-PIN 
--------
--------
NASA MOD C21F125 
Sperry 4011046-901 
Malwin 1660-1 
Sperry 2594621-903 
Malwin 1661-1 
Sperry 2594620-905 
IBM MC615-0006-0002 
NASA Mod type MA-1 
Weston 521606 
Rosemount 30R-1 
Rosemount 30R-2 
Waltham Al3A 
Grayhill 44-D-30-01-2-AJN 
Micro weAT402/T2 
Gac C21A0351-3 
Micro 13AT402-T2 
Micro 13AT402-T2 
Micro 13AT402-T2 
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TABLE 16 
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS (CONT/D) 
SP INSTRUMENT PANEL 
-------------------
#5.20 
#5.21 
#5.22 
#5.23 
#5.24 
#5.25 
#5.26 
#5.27 
Flight Director Info 
Horizontal Situation Info 
Mach/Airspeed Indicator 
Gyrosyn Compass (RMI) (C-6E) 
Vertical Speed Indicator 
(D6HL) 
Radar Altimeter 
Caution Advisory 
Caution Advisory 
SP CONTROL PANELS 
-----------------
-----------------
6.1 
6.1.1 
6.1. 2 
*6.1.3 
*6.1.4 
6.1. 5 
*6.1.6 
*6.1. 7 
6.1.8 
6.1. 9 
6.1.10 
6.1.11 
6.1.12 
6.1.13 
6.2 
*6.2.1 
6.2.2 
6.2.3 
6.2.4 
6.3 
LH Console 
Cockpit Ltg Panel 
Oxygen Regulator Control 
Speed Brake Control (Orbiter) 
Instrument Remote Controller 
Spare Camp Stowage 
Body Flap Sw 
Trim Yaw Sw 
Oxygen Shut Off Control 
Aux Hyd Pump Sw. 
Foot Air Outlet Control 
ICS Jacks 
LH Fairing 
Controller Power Sw 
Oxygen Pressure Ind. 
Circuit Breaker Panel 
ICS Speaker 
Rotational Hand Controller (LM) 
* STA items removed 
# FBW items added 
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TYPE-P/N 
--------
--------
Bendix 2806448 
Bendix 2806448 
IDC 575-25850-909 
Sperry 1784460-655 
Teledyne SLZ 9157-1 
Honeywell ID-1880/APN194(V) 
Bendix 2806448 
Bendix 2806448 
TYPE-P/N 
--------
Gac C21A0298 
Bendix MS22062 
Gac C21A0293 
Sperry 4001939-901 
Gac C21E1002 
Gac 1159AC20002 
ANG011-1B 
GAC C21A0261 
Utah Elect. C35EC 
NASA Mod C21F1109 
TABLE 16 
COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS & DISPLAYS (CONT'D) 
GLARESHILED PANEL 
-----------------
-----------------
*7.1 
7.2 
*7.3 
*7.4 
*7.5 
*7.6 
Flt Control Sw/Lts (Orbiter) 
Master Warning Lts 
7.7 
*7.8 
7.9 
Event Sequence (Orbiter) 
Touch Down Lt 
Emergency Control Panel 
Status Display 
STA Warning L ts 
Marker Beacon Lts 
MISCELLANEOUS 
-------------
-------------
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
8.6 
Standby Compass 
Lower Overhead Panel 
Center Overhead Panel 
Upper Overhead Panel 
IP Control Wheel 
Flt Hyd Shutoff Valve 
* STA items removed 
...... : ..... 
TYPE-PIN 
--------
--------
Jayel 10620 
Mstr Specialties 90E 
GAC C21A0267 
Mstr Specialties 90K 
GAC C21A0268 
Sperry C21Fl08 
Mstr Specialties 90K 
MS 25041 
TYPE-PIN 
--------
--------
Airpath CB-2100-T6-D 
GAC C21A0276 
GAC C21A0274 
GAC 1159F20777 
GAC C21A0280 
GAC 1159F20840 
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TABLE 17 
ELECTRONIC RACK INSTALLATION 
NOMENCLATURE 
------------
------------
1. Vestibule Light Control 
2. Auxiliary Circuit Breaker Panel 
3. Static Pressure Select Valve 
4. MapLight 
5. Weather Radar Scope 
6. Inertial Navigation Unit 
7. Engine Oil Temp. Unit 
8. Engine Oil Press Unit 
9. Inertial Navigation Battery 
10. Marker Beacon Receiver 
11. Gyro Horizon Power Supply 
*12. Flight Director Roll Axis Compo 
*13. Flight Director Pitch Axis Compo 
*14. Rate of Turn Rack 
*15. Pitch, Yaw/Roll Rate Gyro 
16. Master Caution Panel 
17. Gyrosyn Compass (RMI) 
18. 
19. 
20. MSBLS Power Control Panel 
21. Compass Controller 
22. ICS Panel 
23. Flight Recorder Encoder 
24. Bl ank 
25. Blank 
26. Oxygen Control Panel 
27. Remote Compass XMTTR 
28. Inverter (800 HZ) 
29. Angle of Attack Cmptr. (2) 
30. VHF Comm. Trans. 
31. VHF Comm. Trans. 
32. Compass Amplifier 
33. Compass Amplifier 
34. Air Data Computer 
35. VHF Nav. Receiver 
36. VHF Nav. Receiver 
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SELLER/PART NO. 
---------------
C21F1203 
RCA MI-585011-2 
LITTON 663450-8 
HARTMAN 625-0-0007 
HARTMAN 626-0-0007 
LITTON 500012-02 
COLLINS 522-2996-011 
JET 501-1075-02 
SPERRY 2588145-907 
SPERRY 2588146-907 
SPERRY 2588424-906 
SPERRY -4019811, -4019812 
SPERRY 1784460-659 
SPERRY 2586257-1 
ABBOTT 22843 
UNITED CONTROL 965-0041-005 
COLLINS 522-4089-201 
COLLINS 522-4089-201 
SPERRY 614937-10 
SPERRY 614937-10 
SPERRY 2593200-910 
COLLINS 522-4280-101 
COLLINS 522-4280-101 
TABLE 17 
ELECTRONIC RACK INSTALLATION (CONTID) 
NOMENCLATURE 
------------
------------
37. DME 
38. Weather Radar Receiver/Transmitter 
39. Audio Amplifier 
*40 •. Status Panel Electron Unit 
41. Tacan Conv. Siqnal Data 
42. Tacan Rcvr./Xmttr. 
43. RF Assy (MSBLS) 
44. Decoder Rcvr. (MSBLS) 
45. A.T.C. Transponder 
46. Jump Seat 
47. Anti-Skid Control Box 
48. Cabin Pressure XDCR 
49. Air Data Computer 
50. Radar Altimeter Rcvr./Xmttr. 
#50. Radar altimeter Rcvr./Xmttr. 
*51. Stability Augmentation Compt. 
*52 •. Display Electric Unit (DEC) 
53. Transformer/Rectifier 
54. Magnetic Tape Recorder 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
50. 
60. 
* Delete from STA for FBW 
# Add for FBW 
SELLER/PART NO. 
=============== 
COLLINS 522-4209-012 
RCA MI-585009 
COLLINS 522-4538-002 
SPERRY 4021785 
HOFFMAN CV 31881-117 
HOFFMAN RT-1127/ARN-84(V) 
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APPENDIX I 
MODIFIED STA FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM 
1. General Description of STA Flight Control Systems 
The primary flight control systems of the STA are the Longitudinal 
(elevators, pitch control), Lateral (ailerons and flaperons, roll control), 
and Directional (rudder, yaw control) systems. They are hydraulically 
powered and boosted systems wherein the pilot, through mechanical linkages, 
pushrods, and cables, actuates dual tandem hydraulic boost actuators to 
move the control surfaces. The dual tandem hydraulic actuators receive 
hydraulic power from two independent pressure sources, the Flight and the 
Combined Hydraulic Systems. The Combined Hydraulic System maintains a 
pressure of 3000 PSI during landings and take-offs, but switches to 1500 
PSI during normal flight conditions upon retracton of landing gear and 
flaps. Loss of system pressure of one hydraulic system has no effect on 
operation of the flight controls. If either system fails, the other 
automatically shifts to 3000 PSI to maintain actuator load capacity. In 
the event of total pressure loss to both hydraulic system, the controls 
revert to manual operation. The ailerons, flapersons, elevators, and rudder 
flight control surfaces are mass balanced to prevent flutter in the manual 
mode of operation. 
Lift augmentation for take-off and landing during the non-simulation 
mode of flight is provided by flaps and flaperons on each wing. During the 
simulation mode of flight, these control surfaces are used to simulate 
orbiter flight characteristics. The flaperons also provide roll control 
and operate in conjunction with the Lateral Control System functioning 
simultaneously with both systems. The flap and flaperon control surfaces 
extend along the trailing edge of the wing from the fuselage to the 
ailerons. Control is accomplished in the non-simulation mode by the 
OLC/Flap Handle. Both sets of control surfaces operate through a series of 
pushrods, cables, and cranks to the flap and flaperon hydraulic power 
actuators. Both flap and flaperon actuators are a tandem arrangement of 
two double acting balanced cylinders supplied by two separate hydraulic 
systems. The flaps, left flaperon, or right flaperon, may be isolated 
manually by the pilot from the aircraft hydraulic system in the event of a 
malfunction; when this occurs, the control surface assumes trail position. 
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A movahle stabilizer compensates (trims for nose tuck-in) when the 
flaps are lowered to their takeoff or landing position of -200 during the 
nonsimulation mode of flight. The stabilizer has the capability of moving 
form 00 to 20 leading edge down. Its only control mode is for flap trim 
compensation • 
The STA Trim Control Systems provide for trim about all three axes. 
Manual trim control is accomplished by moving control wheels mounted· on 
the Control Pedestal, or Center Console, in a position corresponding to the 
respective trim axis. Cable operated mechanical screwjack actuators are 
used to provide trim surface displacements in both the lateral and 
directional control systems. The lateral trim actuator drives a trim tab 
on the left aileron. The directional trim actuator varies the neutral 
position of the directional system by displacing the rudder actuator, 
driving the rudder to the desired trim position. The longitudinal trim 
system can be trimmed manually, or by means of elevator trim switches, 
located in the Instructor Pilot's control wheel. Longitudinal trim is 
accomplished manually by rotating the trim wheel and driving a cable drum 
or electrically by driving a servo motor. The servo motor responds to trim 
switch inputs and drives the cable drum, which is common to both manual and 
electrical operation. Operation from either source transmits motion by a 
cable control to drive both left and right elevator trim tabs 
s imu ltaneous ly. 
2. General Description of Modifications 
Basically, the FBW Modifications involve removal of the aircraft cable 
and trim systems and the addition of electrically controlled actuators to 
provide inputs to the surface controls. The co-pilot control wheel and 
pedals are modified to provide appropriate artifical feel devices and 
transducer pick-offs for the computer signals. 
The baseline STA cockpit retains the interesting potential for 
evaluation of a control wheel vs. hand controller for piloting a transport 
type aircraft. Alternatively, the cockpit could be configured with dual 
FBW hand controllers, if so desired. 
3. STA Longitudinal Control System 
Longitudinal control is provided by means of conventional elevators. 
Control in the STA is accomplished in the non-simulation mode by fore and 
aft motion of the Instructor Pilot's control column, and in the manual 
simulation mode through the Simulation Pilot's Rational Hand Controller 
(Figure 107). Motion of the control column is transmitted through 
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mechanical linkages to the hydraulic power boost mechanism in the tail 
section. The rotational hand controller is electrically connected to the 
control system, through the DAS. The elevator actuator is a tandem double 
acting balanced cylinder, moving body type, identical to the left aileron 
actuator. Trim is accomplished by means of elevator trim tabs either 
manually, or electrically. The horizontal stabilizer is also movable for 
trim purposes. 
4. FBW Lon9itudinal Control System 
The longitudinal control system can be revised to a FBW configuration, 
from the existing GII-STA mechanical input, hydraulically boosted system, 
as shown in Figure 108. This will be accomplished by the following: 
1) Remove the connecting elements between the pilots control column 
and the boost actuator valve input as shown in Figure 108. 
2) Revise the reaction point for the existing elevator boost actua-
tor, converting it to a fully powered configuration. 
3) Modify the existing actuator boost valve from the "overlap" design 
to a "line to line" configuration, increasing the resolution and 
frequency response of this system. 
4) Install two dual tandem electra-hydraulic command actuators to 
replace the manual inputs to the power actuator control valve. 
The outputs of each dual tandem actuator will be force summed, 
i.e.; both pushing on the same fail-safe crank to displace the 
elevator actuator valve in the commanded direction. 
5) Modify the co-pilot control column for FBW with a multi-element 
transducer (or transducers) to provide command inputs to the 
computers, and connect the control column to a 'q' sensitive 
artifical feel system that will provide the pilot with a 
simulated force as required by the flight condition. A column 
damper will be incorporated to cater to the system hardware 
dynamics, and the column will be mass balanced. 
6) Remove the trim tab control system components with the trim 
tabs grounded at the elevator. Series trim is incorporated 
through a trim wheelan the control wheel. 
5. STA Lateral Control System 
Lateral control of the aircraft is provided by both ailerons and 
flaperons on each wing. The flaperons also operate in conjunction with the 
Flap/Direct Lift Control System and function collectively with both 
systems. Control in the STA is accomplished in the nonsimulation mode by 
rotating the Instructor Pilot's control wheel, and in the manual simulation 
mode through the Simulation Pilot's Rotational Hand Controller, Figure 109. 
Motion of the control wheel is transmitted through mechanical linkages to 
the hydraulic power boost mechanism of the ailerons and flaperon power 
actuators. The rotational hand controller is electrically connected to the 
control system, through the DAS. Both aileron and flaperon actuators are 
dual tandem double acting balanced cylinders supplied by two separate 
hydraulic systems. The aileron actuator is a moving body type, while the 
flaperon actuator is a stationary body type. Trim is accomplished by means 
of a tab on the left aileron. 
6. FBW Lateral Control System 
The lateral control system can be revised to a FBW configuration, from 
the existing GIl mechanical input, hydraulically boosted system, as shown 
in Figure 110. This is accomplished by the following: 
1) Remove the connecting elements between the pilot control wheel 
output and the wing cable system. 
2) Revise the reaction points for each aileron actuator converting it 
to a fully powered configuration. The existing actuator valves 
will be modified from 'overlap' to 'line to line', increasing 
the resolution and frequency response of the ailerons. 
1) Install two dual tandem force summed command actuators, one on 
each side of aircraft center line, to replace the manual inputs 
to the wing cable. 
4) Modify the co-pilot's control column with a multi element 
transducer (or transducers) to provide inputs to the computer 
and connect an artificial feel system and damper. The trim tab 
inputs will be removed and the trim tab will be deactivated by 
grounding it to the aileron. Series trim is incorporated through 
the GIl lateral trim wheel driving an input transducer. 
5) Add a hand controller at the pilot's station. 
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7. STA Flap/Direct Lift Control System 
The Flap/Direct Lift Control (DLC) System includes both flap and 
f1aperon control surfaces and is utilized during all modes of flight. The 
flap system provides lift augmentation for take-off and landing during the 
non-simulation mode of flight. The DLC system controls aircraft attitude 
and motion to simulate Orbiter visibility and acceleration changes 
associated with ang1e-of-attack changes, wind gusts, maneuvers, and ground 
effects realized during final stages of approach, in the simulation mode of 
flight. 
The f1aperons also operate in conjunction with the Lateral Control 
System and function simultaneously with both systems through a mixing 
linkage. 
In the non-simulation mode, the flaps and f1aperons are operated by 
the flap system and are controlled manually by the DLC/FLAP handle, located 
on the control pedestal. The handle is mechanically connected to an input 
bungee containing the flap up and down switches, which control the DLC trim 
actuator. The actuator, through mechanical linkages, operates the control 
valves on the flap and f1aperon servo actuators which position their 
respective control surfaces. As the OLC trim actuator moves, the input 
bun gee will be repositioned until the control surface position corresponds 
to DLe/FLAP handle input. At this time the bungee will be in its neutral 
position with both control switches grounded. 
8. FBW Flap/Direct Lift system 
The high lift system will be modified for FBW operation. A flap 
position electrical trim actuator (identical to the LH side) will be added 
to the RH flap linkage. This will replace the existing cable run which 
originates in the LH flap linkage, goes to the cockpit pedestal, and then, 
to the RH wing flap input linkage. 
The OLe servo actuators will be maintained to provide 'quick acting' 
OLe, if required. 
9. STA Directional Control System 
Directional control of the aircraft is provided by means of a single 
rudder. Control is initiated by moving either pair of dual rudder pedals, 
Figure 111. Motion of the Instructor Pilot's pedals is transmitted through 
mechanical linkage to the power actuator located in the tail section. The 
Simulation Pilot's pedals are electrically connected, through the DAS, to 
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the power actuator. Each set of pedals also incorporate a bungee for 
artificial feel. Maximum rudder travel is 220 left and 220 right. The 
dual tandem hydraulic power actuator consists of two double acting balanced 
cylinders supplied by two separate hydraulic systems. The actuator also 
includes a series mode yaw damper, autopilot control, DAS control, and an 
automatic feature that limits rudder hinge moment. In the event this force 
is reached, a RUDDER LIMIT light (green) on the Instructor Pilot's right 
Skirt Panel will illuminate. The rudder does not utilize a trim tab but is 
displaced to a new neutral position for trim corrections. 
10. FBW Directional Control system 
The directional control system will be revised to a FBW configuration, 
as shown in Figure 112. This is accomplished by the following: 
1) Remove the mechanical elements between the pilots rudder pedals 
and the rudder actuator valve input. 
2) Incorporate two force summed dual tandem command actuators to 
reolace the manual input actuator valve. 
3) Modify the pilot's rudder pedals so that rudder pedal motions 
signal 2 multi-element transducers to provide inputs to the 
computer and connect an artificial feel system and damper to 
the pedals. The parallel trim system will be removed. Series 
trim is incorporated thru the GIl directional trim wheel driving 
an input transducer. 
11. Servo Actuators 
The force summed dual tandem servo actuator configuration ;s identical 
for all three primary control systems. Each actuator of the pair is 
identical to the other and uses a direct drive electrohydraulic valve. 
One dual tandem servo actuator is powered by the existing Flight and 
Combined systems each in a different chamber. The other dual tandem servo 
actuator is powerd by a new, (third) servo hydraulic system described 
below. For normal operation only one half of this actuator is powered (one 
chamber). If either or both primary hydraulic systems are lost (Flight 
and/or Combined), the other chamber is powered thru the servo hydraulic 
system. Further study may indicate that a fourth hydraulic system 
(Standby) may be needed. This system could then power the standby half of 
the servo actuator as required in lieu of the servo hydraulic system. 
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In the event both hydraulic systems are lost on the GIl, the pilot can 
control the aircraft manually with no switching on his part. Since manual 
reversion is a Iqet home l control, the control forces are high. For the 
FBW configuration, when the flight and combined hydraulic system are lost, 
the FBW servo actuator can control the surfaces. Electromechanical 
actuators can be substituted for the hydraulic units when they become 
available. 
12. Electromechanical Actuation Systems 
It is recommended that electromechanical actuation systems (EMAS) be 
considered and to be potentially phased into the program on an axis by axis 
basis. It is expected that EMAS could be incorporated into all flight 
control actuator applications by 1988 to 1989. Prior efforts described in 
the actuation survey section of this report defines the specific 
configurations and designs for each control surface application. We expect 
that most of the EMAS for the Gulfstream would be rotary hinge line 
designs. The rudder and elevator units would undoubtedly be force summed, 
each having two motors with each motor being dual magnetic torque summed 
motors. Each actuator could then be considered quadruple redundant, at 
least to the qear box section where it would be dual. Clutches would 
isolate failed or jammed motors and perhaps part of the mechanical gearing. 
Figure 113 shows a typical installation of an EMAS in the elevator axis of 
the longitudinal control system of the FBW Gulfstream. 
13. Control Surface Indication 
The control Surface Position Indication System (SPI) provides the 
Instructor Pilot with visual indications of the positions of the following 
fliqht control surfaces: left and right flaperons, left and right flaps, 
horizontal stabilizer, left and right side-force generators, elevator, and 
rudder. The system also provides control surface position inputs to the 
Digital Avionics System (DAS) for use during the simulation (Orbiter) mode 
of flight. 
In addition to the SPI, the Control Surface Indication System includes 
seven synchro transmitters and two linear voltage differential 
transmitters, for sensing control surface positions, and seven Synchro/DC 
Converters for converting the synchro transmitter outputs to DC drive 
siqnals for the SPI. 
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14. Angle of Attack System 
A redundant Angle of Attack system is installed in the aircraft 
consisting of: 
A. An Indicator to show the angle of the aircraft in relation to 
stall. 
B. Two Shaker Motors, used to vibrate the Instructor Pilot's Control 
Column, and an aural warning, which alerts the crew of an 
impending stall. 
C. A dual control Stall Barrier system (Stick Pusher), used to 
prevent a stall by forcing the Instructor Pilot's Control Column 
forward when the crew fails to respond to the indicator, shaker 
motor vibration, or aural warning. 
If the aircraft nears stall, and Stall Barrier operation is called 
for, hydraulic valves are energized open, porting hydraulic fluid to a 
cylinder that pushes the Elevator down and the Instructor Pilot's Control 
Column forward. The Instructor Pilot can overcome this force by exerting 
an approximate 55 pound pull on the column if the 1500 PSI hydraulic system 
is engaged, and 72 pound pull with 3000 PSI system engaged. 
Either system can deliver information to the Angle of Attack Indicator 
located on Instructor Pilot's Flight Instrument Panel. This is dependent 
upon the position of the Angle of Attack Selector Switch located adjacent 
to the indicator and selected by the crew. 
15. Hydraulic Power System 
The Gulfstream II STA (see Figure 114) has a dual-compensated 
(1500/3000 psi) normal hydraulic power system which includes the Combined 
(sys. No.1) and the Flight hydraulic power system (system No.2). The 
hydraulic power system is sub-divided into five systems as follows: 
A. Combined -
B. Fli~ht 
c. Utility 
1500/300 ± 50 @ zero flow 
2900 ± 50 @ full flow 
1500/3000 + 50 @ zero flow 
2900 ± 50 @ full flow 
2900 + 50 psi @ max. flow 
3000 ± 50 @ zero flow 
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D. Auxiliary-
E. Emergency-
2950 + 50 psi @ max. flow 
3050 + 50 @ zero flow 
3000 psi (Nitrogen @ 700 F) 
The hydraulic system is designed for use with Hyjet IV hydraulic fluid 
approved alternate fluids, and for operation temperatures from -540 to 
+1070 C. (-650 to 2250F). 
The Combined hydraulic system supplies 3000 psi, during takeoffs and 
landings to operate the flight controls and the landing gear stall barrier, 
wing flaps, wheel brakes, nose wheel steering, ground spoilers, thrust 
reversers and windshield wipers. During flight, the Combined hydraulic 
system supplies 1500 psi to operate the elevators, stall barrier, ailerons, 
rudder and speed brake/flight spoilers. The pressure compensation of 1500 
or 3000 psi is accomplished by a series of electronically controlled 
switches which energize the engine pump solenoid. 
For ground test and check-out procedures with the use of an external 
hydraulic rig, the Combined system is normally operated at 3000 psi. 
The Flight system supplies 1500 psi to operate the flight controls of 
the aircraft. The only time the Flight system is compensated to 3000 psi 
is during Combined system failure (or when the right engine is started 
first). During a Combined system failure, Flight system pressure, at 3000 
psi, is also available to power the hydraulic motor pump of the Utility 
system. 
For ground test and check-out procedures with the use of an external 
hydraulic rig, the Flight system is also operated at 3000 psi. 
In the event of a Combined system failure, other than hydraulic fluid 
loss, the Utility system supplies 3000 psi to operate the following 
sub-systems of the aircraft: stall barrier, landing gear, wing flaps, 
wheel brakes, nose wheel steering, ground spoilers, thrust reversers, and 
wind shield wipers. The Utility system includes a hydraulic motor-driven 
pumo, the motor using flight system pressure to operate the pump, which in 
turn pressurizes combined system fluid to operate the sub-systems. During 
flight, with the Combined system failed, the Utility system is activated 
only when the landing gear handle, and/or the flap handle is moved to the 
down position. 
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The Auxiliary system supplies 3000 psi to operate the following 
sub-systems of the aircraft: auxiliary wing flaps, auxiliary brakes, park 
and emergency brakes, (using an accumulator), ground spoilers, and landing 
gear doors (for ground service). The Auxiliary system, with its pressure 
reduced to 1500 psi, also operates the main entrance door. 
For ground test only, the Auxiliary system can also operate the 
landing gear. 
The Emergency pneumatic system supplies 3000 psi for emergency 
extension of the landing gear only. 
The Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA) and the Gulfstream II Aircraft 
Hydraulic Power Systems are identical, except for the following 
modifications to the STA (Figure 115): 
A. The Combined Hydraulic System supplies 3000 PSI, during takeoffs 
and landings, to operate the flight controls, the landing gear, 
stall barrier, wheel brakes, nose wheel steering, thrust 
reversers, and windshield wipers. During ferry flight, the 
Combined Hydraulic System supplies 1500 PSI to operate elevator, 
ailerons, flaperons, flaps, and rudder. In the Simulation and 
Non-simulation Modes, the Combined Hydraulic System supplies 
3000 PSI to operate the flight controls and landing gear, thrust 
reversers, side force generators, and stabilizer trim control. 
B. The Flight System supplies 1500 PSI to operate the flight 
controls of the aircraft; namely, elevator, rudder, ailerons, 
flaperons, and flaps. 
16. FBW Hydraulic System 
The FBW configured GIl will require a third hydraulic system to ensure 
flight control system safety. This additional system will allow this 
aircraft to meet FAR 25 requirements. 
This third hydraulic system, identified as the Servo Hydraulic System, 
Figure 114, is dedicated to the FBW servo actuators only. 
This Servo Hydraulic system will be completely independent of the 
existing systems (Flight and Combined). An electrically driven hydraulic 
pump will be installed to power this added system. The Servo system will 
power both halves of one of the added servo actuators, for each control 
axis, as per the flight control system hydraulic power requirements. 
If ongoing studies indicate that a fourth system (Standby) is 
necessary, it would power the standby chamber of the actuator as required. 
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APPENDIX J 
STA ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM MODIFIED FOR DFBW 
1. System Description 
The Electrical Power System has a number of changes necessarY,to 
upgrarle to Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) capability. Most important of these 
is the requirement to make DFBW power uninterruptible; i.e., "glitch"-free. 
Since current power quality specifications (essentially MIL-STD-704) permit 
both DC and AC voltages to go to zero for up to 7 seconds during either bus 
switching or fault clearing operations, and DFBW equipment cannot have 
input voltage dip below 18 VDC (for 28 VDC) nominal input under any 
circumstances, additional power equipment and changes in power interface 
design are needed. Another important consideration is that DFBW is a 
flight-safety critical system; thus, reliable power must be maintained 
throughout the flight from takeoff through landing. In particular, the 
emergency sources (main batteries) must have their reliability upgraded 
from the present design. In brief, the changes proposed are: 
• Increase battery size from 34/36Ah each to 50/60Ah each to 
allow for a 30-minute fail-safe period (last failure to safe 
landing). Replace battery monitor/bus float charge design 
with battery charges, and impose stricter maintenance 
requirements. 
• Utilize remotely operable circuit breakers for DFBW in-line 
functions, and main source control to provide the following: 
- Automatic switchover to back-up sources/busses 
- Multi-mode fault protection (overload, over-under-
voltage, underfrequency, etc.) 
- Power/load management to assure sufficient power/ 
energy for DFBW and other flight-safety-critical 
systems. 
• Couple each source to each DFBW channel power interface indivi-
dually via circuit breaker and diode. 
• Configure each DFBW channel power interface to include transient 
suppression and filters. 
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• Flight rate two (2) 20KVA or more (1) 40KVA APU to 29000ft. (new 
maximum operating altitude). 
• Eliminate 800 Hz DAS inverter. 
The balance of the equipment complement, and most of the power system 
monitoring will remain the same as the present configuration. 
2. Change Comments 
With a full-rated APU running all the time, DFBW power will be dual 
fail-op, b~t the rest of the aircraft may not be. If both DC generators 
have failed, an attempt to maintain cruise causes the total AC load to be 
~ 27KVA, meaning that at least two alternators must be on line. If the DC 
generator failures are both due to a power take-off problem, this causes 
loss of both wild frequency alternators as well, leaving only one 
alternator on line (APU). As a baseline, then, it will be assumed that 
only DFBW power will be dual fail-op, so that loss of both DC generators 
does abort the STA mission, but still leaves DFBW fully capable. (It 
should be noted that loss of both DC generators is a worse case than loss 
of one DC and one wild frequency alternator.) 
Table 18 is a first estimate of critical load totals for three 
conditions: 
• Cruise during training mission 
• Landing during training mission 
• Emergency, mission aborted. 
The cruise and landing conditions were chosen to give a feel for 
relatively normal training flight. The figures were modified from a 
baseline STA by eliminating DAS and substituting DFBW. The only 
significant effect was addition of about 33 Amps DC. The extra current 
represents enough additional battery capacity for emergency conditions that 
an increse in size from 34/36 Ah to 50/60 Ah became necessary to continue 
to allow a full 30-minutes to safe landing. 
Because the main batteries must be available for flight-safety-
critical equipment (DFBW), the reliability penalties associated with 
bus-float charging can no longer be tolerated. Better chargers are 
therefore introduced. These add about 1.7SKVA to the alternator load--an 
insignificant amount. The batteries will also be subject to stricter 
requirements for maintenance in terms of frequency, cell balance, 
reconditioning and electrolyte/water tests. Cell balance requirements for 
new battery purchase will be more stringent as well. 
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-The primary purpose of using circuit breakers in the source-DFBW 
interface coupling is protection of the sources from feeder and/or channel 
failure. The coupling diodes act as a power OR gate, so that only the 
highest voltage source delivers power, and all other diodes are 
back-biased. It can be seen from this that, with all sources available, 
all circuit breakers are normally closed.to permit the smoothest transition 
from one to another. If a source fails, the circuit breaker associated 
with its feeders to each interface will be tripped by command following 
transition to a back-up. 
The "glitch" suppression batteries are tentatively sized as 3 Ah ("0" 
cell) sealed nickel-cadmium in a 20-cell configuration. Each string will 
be diode coupled to a DFBW channel power interface; so will be 
open-circuited when not needed. Actual steady-state minimum voltage at the 
power interface will by 20 x 1.0-0.8=19.2V, comfortably above the required 
18V level. However, during each transition, the battery has a rise time of 
~ 1-5 microseconds. To maintain interface voltage in this period, a small 
capacitor will be used. Overvoltage spikes and EMI will be suppressed by a 
combination of absorption and filtering devices. The "glitch" suppression 
batteries will not be charged on-board. At 3 Ah nominal rating, each can 
handle up to 15 7-second periods of zero source voltage, or retain up to 4 
such events for 10 days without maintenance. It is desirable, then, to 
remove the strings after either 10 days or 10 events (whichever is first) 
for reconditioning and test. The same restrictions on cell balance obtain 
for these as for the main batteries. In order to assure that a string is 
healthy while on the aircraft, each will be monitored by a tapped sensor 
which can detect a I-cell failure or degradation by determining the 
difference in voltage between the two halves of the string. The sensor is 
designed to draw current at least two orders of magnitude below 
self-discharge equivalent (~ 5.25 rnA maximum for this size cell). 
Additional weight due to new components and upgraded ones are 
estimated to be as follows: 
• Battery chargers ~ 30 1 b. 
• "Glitch" suppression equipment ~ 50 lb. 
• Main battery increase ~ 100 1 b. 
• Diodes, breakers, feeders, etc. ~ 25 lb. 
These figures do not account for reductions due to removal of DAS 
equipment, nor additions ude to structure. It seems certain the battery 
compartment will require major modification, and that the power 
distribution system and cockpit control panels will too. 
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Figure 116 shows in block form, the basic DC system of the present 
STA. It was taken from the STA Maintenance Manual. Sketched on the figure 
is the Area of Change to modify the system for DFBW. Figure 117 is that 
Area of Change so modified. Figure 117 shows an n-channel DFBW, but the 
load and weight estimates above are for a 4-channel system. 
3. Auxiliary Power Unit 
The Gulfstream II STA auxiliary power unit (APU) provides hot 
compressed air for ground air conditioning and engine starting. A 20K VA 
alternator mounted on the APU accessory case provides electrical power for 
use when neither of the engine-driven generators is operating. Controls 
and indicators for the APU are located on the center overhead panel. The 
APU is installed in the tail compartment aft of the pressure dome, and is 
equipped with its own fire detection and extinguishing systems. 
The APU is self-regulating, essentially requiring only start and stop 
commands from the cockpit. Self-contained control devices continue the 
start sequence after it is initiated at the center overhead panel, maintain 
constant speed under varying load conditions, and automatically perform a 
shutdown sequence if certain temperature, pressure, or overs peed parameters 
are exceeded. 
The APU is currently limited to ground operation. Power connections 
through the nutcracker system prevent starter operation if the aircraft is 
airborne, and APU shutdown is automatic if the aircraft becomes airborne 
with the APU operating. The APU installation in the Gulfstream I is flight 
rated. 
The APU is flight rated for the envelope shown in Figure 118. A brief 
outline of the steps for flight rating the APU as installed in the FBW 
Gulfstream follows: 
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1. Change mount structure to steel 
2. Modify or change flex ducts to improve fire proof capability 
3. Add heat shield to aircraft skin 
4. Modify controls for in flight starting 
No nutcracker interlock 
Add bleed surge dump 
5. Modify bleed surge dump ducting 
n. Add interlocks to prevent unit bleed when main engine air is used 
7. Modify fuel control to fine speed control if frequency is critical 
8. Flight test compartment cooling scheme 
9. *Flight test starting and operating capability 
TO. Modify fire detection system to permit inflight checking 
11. Fireproof inlet duct to skin 
12. Add second fire extinguishing system. 
*Should be capable of 20,000 ft. starts and 30,000 ft. operation. 
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Table 18 Critical Loads Estimate· STA vs. FBW Gulfstream 
STA FBW GULFSTREAM 
LOADS LOADS 
OVER· 
LOAD 
CRUISE LANDING EMERG* OVER· 
LOAD 
CRUISE LANDING EMERG* 
SOURCE RATING RATING VALUE % VALUE % VALUE % RATING RATING VALUE % VALUE % VALUE % 
DC GENERATORS 300A 450A 241.3A 8004 399.8A 133.3 123.6A 41.2 300A 450A 274.4A 91.5 432.9A 144.3 156.7A 52.2 
,.* 
ALTERNATORS 20.0 N/A 14.9 74.5 14.9 74.5 14.5 72.5 20.0 N/A 16.7 83.5 16.7 83.5 14.5 72.5 
KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA KVA 
2 PAR *** 2 PAR *** 
BATTERIES-MAIN 34/36 N/A - - - - 61.8 88.3 50/60 N/A - - - - 78.4 71.3 
AH EA. AH AH EA. AH 
* ASSUMES ONE OR BOTH DC GENERATORS & BOTH MAIN ALTERNATORS ARE OUT. 30 MIN ALLOWED FOR 
SAFE LANDING 
** SECOND FULL·SIZE APU REQUIRED FOR HYDRAULICS (OR SINGLE 40 KVAI. APU FLIGHT RATED TO STA 
CEILING OF 30K FT, & IS OPERATED THROUGHOUT FLIGHT . 
*** BATTERIES MAY SUPPORT THIS CONDITION IF COMBINATION OF DC GENERATORS & T-Rs IS INSUFFICIENT R82·0114·010(W) 
APPENDIX K 
SHUTTLE TRAINING AIRCRAFT 
GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The guidance, navigation and control system provides the STA Digital 
Avionics System (DAS) with attitude, velocity, acceleration, and position 
data for computation of flight parameters and control commands. The 
equipment comprising the guidance, navigation, and control systems is 
listed in Table 19. 
Functional Description (See Figure 119) 
The following paragraphs describe the relationship between the 
navigation and guidance system inputs and the Digital Avionics System 
(DAS). 
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A. Rotational Hand Controller 
The rotational hand controller is used by the Simulation Pilot to 
apply pitch and roll rate commands to the DAS in response to air-
craft attitude change requirements when the aircraft is being 
operated in the manual simulation mode. The pitch and roll rate 
commands are proportional to the displacement of the rotational 
hand controller. When the rotational hand controller is returned 
to its spring-loaded center detent position in either roll or 
pitch, zero attitude rate is commanded and the existing attitude 
is maintained. The rotational hand controller also provides 
orbiter pitch and roll trim commands and a takeover discrete to 
allow the Instructor Pilot to take over control of the aircraft 
and operate it in the manual mode. 
B. Microwave Scan Beam Landing System 
The Microwave Scan Beam Landing System (MSBLS) provides the DAS 
with azimuth, elevation, and range to touchdown during simulated 
final approach and landing when operating the aircraft in the 
simulation mode. All data is transferred to the DAS on a serial 
data line. 
,-
C. TACAN 
The TACAN provides the DAS with range and bearing data, referenced 
to a ground based TACAN station. This data is used by the DAS in 
the simulation mode during the energy management phase to compute 
position and bearing relative to the heading alignment circle, and 
during the approach and landing phase to compute range and bearing 
to the runway threshold. 
D. Inertial Navigation System 
E. 
F. 
The Inertial Navigation System (INS) provides the DAS with pitch 
and roll attitude data in synchro format and vertical acceleration 
in analog format. The INS also provides the following data in 
binary format to the DAS on'a serial digital data line: latitude, 
longitude, true heading, wind speed, wind angle, north-south 
velocity, east-west velocity, cross track deviation, track angle 
error, and drift angle. Two valid output signals are also pro-
vided; one for pitch and roll signals and one for the binary data. 
VHF Navigation System 
The VHF navigation system provides the DAS with VOR bearing infor-
mation for radio navigation and glidescope/localizer deviations 
for display and guidance during approach and landing with the 
aircraft operating in the manual ILS approach and the autopilot 
mode. The information is displayed on the Instructor Pilot's 
horizontal situation indicator and attitude indicator. Three 
valid output signals are provided: localizer; tune-to-localizer; 
and glide slope. 
Gyrocompass System 
The gyrocompass system provides gyro stabilized magnetic heading 
information for display on the system radio magnetic indicator 
(RMI) and for use by the digital avionics system (DAS), VOR/ILS 
systems, TACAN system, heading situation indicator (HSI), and the 
flight recorder. Two independent gyrocompasses are provided. 
Gyrocompass No. 1 is the primary gyrocompass for the Instructor 
Pilot and No. '2 is primary for the Simulation Pilot. However, 
either gyrocompass can be selected for operation by either p~lot 
by selecting COMP 1 or COMP 2 with INST SWITCHING controls on the 
center pedestal and the Instructor Pilot's flight panel. The 
gyrocompass is a standard gyro-stabilized compass. Aircraft 
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magnetic heading is sensed by the flux valve and transmitted to 
the RMI via the remote magnetic compensator. The RMI displays 
the magnetic heading and also provides heading information to the 
compass switching circuits for distribution to other navigation 
systems and flight recorder. Gyrocompass No.2 RMI also displays 
TACAN bearing on both pointers simultaneously. 
G. Radar Altimeter System 
The radar altimeter system provides the Instructor Pilot with an 
accurate indication of the aircraft's altitude above the terrain 
for altitudes up to 5,000 feet. The system also provides the 
digital avionics system (DAS) with altitude data for computing 
final flare altitude during final approach. The radar altimeter 
system equipment are all components of Electronic Altimeter Set 
AN/APN-194(V). 
H. Central Air Data Computer 
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The central air data computer provides the DAS with altitude, air-
speed, and Mach number data as shown in Figure 119. The central 
air data computer also provides the altitude, airspeed, and Mach 
number signals to the Mach airspeed and servo altimeter systems 
for display on the cockpit instruments. True airspeed data is 
also provided to the INS. Temperature reference is provided to 
the central air data computer by the total temperature sensor. 
Four valid output signals are provided; altitude; computed air-
speed (CAS); Mach number; and true airspeed (TAS). 
I. Autothrottle Servo System 
The autothrottle servo system provides automatic computer control 
of engine power during simulation mode operation. A servo inter-
lock control unit in the Digital Avionics System (DAS) contains 
the servo control loops and interlock electronics that drive the 
autothrottle servo in response to commands from the DAS computer. 
The autothrottle servo is mechanically linked to the throttle 
levers and controls engine power through the same linkage as the 
throttle levers. Engine power is varied to allow the aircraft to 
simulate the orbiter airspeed and attitude characteristics. The 
throttle settings are determined by the DAS computer using inputs 
from the aircraft instrument and navigation systems for comparison 
with orbiter requirements. The computer then generates either 
increase or decrease throttle drive signals. 
J. Data Acquisition 
The purpose of data acquisition system is to record a set of 
preselected parameters. All data recording is controlled by the 
Digital Avionics System. The start and stop modes are keyboard 
controlled. START mode implements recording, and is initiated any 
time the DAS system is powered up; recording can be eliminated by 
use of the STOP mode. Both modes are overridden by the AUTO mode 
which initiates recording whenever SIM is engaged. 
The automatic recording mode, which is activated during SIM 
engage, is implemented with an automatic timed-out stop after SIM 
disengage. The timed-out clock can be loaded with any value 
between zero and 120 seconds by the GNS routine. If an earlier 
stop than the value of the clock is anticipated, termination of 
recording can also be accomplished by entering the stop mode via 
the REC mode. This premature stop provision of the automatic 
mode is available only during the time-out phase. The data 
recording routine automatically checks status of the magnetic 
tape unit. Once this occurs, recording will start with 273 words 
being recorded every 50 millisecond cycle. 
During the record mode, an interrupt is received from the magnetic 
tape controller after the completion of each recorded record. 
Status is then checked to determine if a valid condition still 
exists. Five different forms or packages of the data are trans-
mitted to the data acquisition system: 
• A/D inputs (12 bits) +6 bit discretes 
• D/A outputs (12 bits) +6 bit discretes 
• Serial input words (36 bits) 
• Serial output words (36 bits) 
• Miscellaneous orbiter model and STA parameters 
Negative logic is employed; zero states are true, and ones are 
false. All input and output words are recorded from their 
respective raw data buffers. Miscellaneous parameters are first 
buffered before a record transfer is initiated. 
Decoding synchro inputs and cancelling reference voltage 
fluctuations and gains introduced in the A/D converter are 
performed. 
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K. Air Data Systems 
The Pitot and Static Pressure Systems supply impact (Pitot) and 
atmosoheric (Static) pressure to various instruments and 
equipment. 
The Pitot System obtains its pressure from the Pitot Probes 
located on the left and right side of the fuselage at station 63. 
The Left Pitot Probe supplies impact pressure to the ARINC 565 
Air Data Computer and Flight Recorder. The Right Pitot probe 
supplies impact pressure to the Instructor Pilot's Mach Airspeed 
indicator, Overspeed Warning Sensor and 844 air Data Computer. 
The Static System obtains its pressure from Flush Static Vent 
Systems No.1 and 2. These two vents are located on the sides 
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of the fuselage at station 196. From the Static Vent System 
No.1, static air is piped to the Alternate Static Selector Valve 
System No.1, where the static air is forwarded to the Altimeter, 
IVSI, and Mach Airspeed indicators. From the static Vent System 
No.2, static air is piped to the Alternate Static Selector Valve 
System No.2, where the static air is forwarded to the Cabin 
Altimeter, Differential Pressure gage, Overspeed Warning Sensor, 
844 Air Data Computer and Flight Recorder. 
If the Flush Static Vent Systems No.1 and 2 become inoperative 
an alternate means of obtaining static pressure is provided. 
Positioning the Alternate Static Selector Valve, located on the 
Instructor or Simulation Pilot's Flight Instrument Panel to 
ALTERNATE will permit ambient air to flow through the Alternate 
Static Vent Systems No. 1 and 2 to supply static pressure to the 
equipment normally supplied by the No.1 or 2 Flush Static Vent 
System. The Alternate Static Vent System also provides static 
pressure to the ARINC 565 Air Data Computer. There is a Pitot 
and a Static Shutoff Valve for the 844 Air Data Computer located 
on the aft end of the Instructor Pilot's Side Console. Both 
valves would normally be in the ON position. If a rupture in the 
lines should occur between the valves and the 844 Air Data 
Computer, the valves would be placed to the OFF position. This 
would retain valid Pitot and Static pressure to the Instructor 
Pilot's flight instruments and Overspeed Warning Sensor. 
The Mach Airspeed and Servo Altimeter System monitors indicated 
airspeed, Mach number, and indicated altitude. The Air Data 
Computer provides analog and digital outputs representing pitot 
pressure, static pressure aircraft altitude, limited altitude 
correction signals, and Mach number to the indicators. All of 
these signals are derived from inputs into the Air Data Computer 
from the Pitot and Static System. 
The Air Data System for FBW applications requires review as to the 
reliabilit.Y and redundancy levels required based on the dependency 
of the flight control laws on air data. 
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TABLE 19 
GN&C SUB-SYSTEMS 
SYSTEM 
------
INS (Inertial Navigation System) 
Vertical Gyro (2) 
Gyro Compass System (2) 
TACAN 
DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) 
Radar Altimeter 
CADC (Central Air Data Computer) 
VOR/ILS (2) 
Flight Director Computers 
DAS (Digital Avionics System) 
Stability Augmentation Computer 
Rotational Hand Controller 
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TYPE 
Litton LTN-51 
Sperry VG-311 
Sperry C-11B {C-6E Indicators} 
Hoffman AN/ARN-117 
Collins 860E-3 
Honeywell AN/APN-194 
Sperry ARINC 565 Modified for 
36,000 ft/min capability 
Collins 51RV-2B Nav Receiver 
Sperry Z-14 (SPI-77A) 
Sperry 1819B Digital Computer 
Sperry SP-50G AFCS (P/O) 
LM GFE 
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